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INTRODUCTION
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act,' commonly
known as ERISA, mandates that when a retirement plan 2 provides re-
I Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, §1 (CCH 1999) [hereinaf-
ter ERISA]. ERISA was enacted as Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26, 29 U.S.C.) [hereinafter ERISA of 1974]. Titles I,
III, and IV of ERISA of 1974 are codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
(1994 & Supp. 1997). Provisions of Titles I, III, and IV of ERISA of 1974 as amended
are often cited to ERISA sections. Tide II of ERISA of 1974 amended scattered sec-
tions of the Internal Revenue Code. See I.R.C. §§ 1-9833 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
Together, ERISA and the retirement plan provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
comprise the law governing retirement plans.
2 This Article uses the terminology "retirement plan" to refer to "tax-qualified"
retirement plans that are sponsored by an employer and that provide retirement ben-
efits to that sponsoring employer's employees. The term is used to refer only to plans
that are "qualified" for special income tax treatment under Internal Revenue Code
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tirement benefits to an employee, the employee's rights to those bene-
fits must vest, that is become nonforfeitable,3 when the employee has
completed a certain minimum period of service with the employer.4
Congress intended that mandated vesting would increase the amount
of retirement benefits to be received by some retirement plan partici-
pants.5 It may seem obvious that mandated vesting would have this
effect, since accelerated vesting implies that some plan participants
will not forfeit otherwise unvested benefits, and fewer and smaller for-
§ 401 and § 501(a). See I.R.C. §§ 401, 501(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997); see also infra
notes 34-47 and accompanying text. The retirement plans discussed in this Article
are included in the term "employee pension benefit plan" as defined by ERISA. See
ERISA § 3(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (1994). This analysis is limited to plans
sponsored by private, for-profit employers. Virtually all retirement plans sponsored
by private, for-profit employers are subject to ERISA. See ERISA § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 1003
(1994 & Supp. III 1997). See generally PeterJ. Wiedenbeck, ERISA's Curious Coverage
76 WASH. U. L.Q. 331 (1998).
This Article excludes plans that are sponsored by governmental employers,
churches, and retirement savings arrangements connected with employers that are
nonprofit organizations such as educational institutions. Also excluded are plans that
have been the subject of collective bargaining between an employer and employees;
these plans are often referred to as "union retirement plans." Many union retirement
plans are described by the ERISA definition of a "multiemployer plan," a plan that
covers the employees of more than one employer and is maintained pursuant to a
collective bargaining agreement. See ERISA § 3(37) (A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(37) (A)
(1994).
3 ERISA provides,
The term "nonforfeitable" when used with respect to a pension benefit or
right means a claim obtained by a participant or his beneficiary to that part
of an immediate or deferred benefit under a pension plan which arises from
the participant's service, which is unconditional, and which is legally en-
forceable against the plan.
ERISA § 3(19), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(19) (1994).
4 ERISA sets out three alternative minimum standards for vesting--"five-year
cliff vesting," "seven-year graded vesting," or "100% immediate vesting." ERISA
§§ 202(a) (1) (B) (i), 203(a) (2), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1052(a) (1) (B) (i), 1053(a) (2) (1994 &
Supp. III 1997). The identical rules are repeated as income tax qualification require-
ments in the Internal Revenue Code. See I.R.C. §§ 410(a) (1) (B) (i), 411(a) (2) (1994
& Supp. III 1997); see also infra note 98 and accompanying text.
5 See infra note 117 and accompanying text. The private retirement plan system
is an extremely significant institution. There are 702,000 private retirement plans in
the United States, and these plans provide benefits to 84,000,000 participants. See KEN
McDoNNELL ET AL., EBRI DATABOOK ON EMPLOYEE BENErrs 84, 98 (Employee Benefit
Research Institute, 4th ed. 1997). In 1995 these plans held $5.5 trillion, which ap-
proaches the value of all the residential real estate in the United States. See Sylvester
J. Schieber &John B. Shoven, The Economics of U.S. Retirement Policy: Current Status and
Future Directions, in PUBUC PoLIcy TowARD PENSIONS 1 (SylvesterJ. Schieber &John B.
Shoven eds., 1997).
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feitures must equate with larger benefits being paid to retired
participants.
In reality, mandated vesting will not increase the retirement benefits of its
intended beneficiaries, and it will reduce the retirement benefits of other retire-
ment plan participants. By definition, mandated vesting is intended to
increase the retirement benefits of plan participants who otherwise
would be unvested, a group of participants that this analysis refers to
as "short-tenure employees." 6 A fundamental reason that mandated
vesting cannot, in the long run, increase the retirement benefits of
short-tenure employees is the fact that the private retirement plan sys-
tem is voluntary. No law requires an employer to provide employees
with retirement benefits or requires employees to save any part of
their compensation for future retirement needs. In a world without
mandated vesting, the mix of wage compensation and retirement ben-
efits in an employee's total compensation package would reflect the
employer's and employee's preferences for wages and fringe bene-
fits. 7 Mandated vesting attempts to provide short-tenure employees
with larger retirement benefits than they would voluntarily choose.
Over time, retirement plans will reduce their benefit levels to elimi-
nate the benefits that mandated vesting attempts to extend to short-
tenure employees.
Mandated vesting will, in the long run, cause a reduction in the
retirement benefits of retirement plan participants other than the
short-tenure employees. Retirement plan law includes nondiscrimina-
tion rules, which, in general terms, compel a retirement plan to pro-
vide benefits to "non-highly compensated employees" that are
reasonably comparable to the benefits provided "highly compensated
employees."8 The nondiscrimination rules prevent a retirement plan
from responding to mandated vesting by reducing only the benefits of
short-tenure employees. The benefits of other participants in the
plan will also have to be reduced. Generally these other plan partici-
pants have stronger preferences for retirement benefits than the
6 See infra note 124 and accompanying text. The term "short-tenure employees"
has no normative content; the term is used to identify exactly those employees who
receive larger vesting percentages because of legal mandates. There is no presump-
tion that employees who have relatively shorter job tenures are somehow less deserv-
ing of retirement benefits. This analysis develops the effects that mandated vesting
has on the private retirement plan system. These effects might influence a reader's
opinion about the appropriate structure of retirement plan law, and how the law
might affect the retirement benefits to be received by particular categories of
employees.
7 These preferences would be influenced by other elements of the legal environ-
ment, including the federal income tax. See infra notes 35-48 and accompanying text.
8 See infra note 227 and accompanying text.
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short-tenure employees. The combination of mandated vesting and
the nondiscrimination regime drastically limit the plan's flexibility to
provide retirement benefits to those employees who most highly value
the benefits. As the plan's ability to provide retirement benefits to
those employees who prefer the benefits is diminished, the plan be-
comes a less valuable compensation mechanism for the sponsoring
employer and its workforce. As plans suffer this loss in value, fewer
will be sponsored.9
Today, proposals abound for further acceleration of the vesting
mandates.10 Proponents continue to assert that quicker vesting will
enhance the retirement benefits that employees will receive." This
article disproves that assertion. Part I develops the fundamental ex-
planation for the failure of mandated vesting: the fact that retirement
plan sponsorship is voluntary. A retirement plan can exist only so
long as it creates additional value for the sponsoring employer and
participating employees. If legal regulation of a plan makes it impos-
9 Cf Norman Stein, ERISA and the Limits of Equity, 56 LAw & CoNrEmp. PROBS.
71, 109 (1993) ('These notions of regulation and encouragement [of employee bene-
fits] are not entirely compatible. The greater the degree of regulation of plans, the
greater the direct and indirect costs to the plan sponsor. The greater these costs, the
lower the size of benefits and the rate of plan formation.").
10 SeeJoHN A. TURNER, PENSION PoLIcY FOR A MOBILE LABOR FORCE 124 (1993)
("Private pension portability would be improved by requiring shorter vesting....
Vesting could be reduced to three-year cliff vesting or could occur immediately. Im-
mediate vesting would reduce the benefits the average pension-covered worker loses
by four percent. . . ."). For current legislative proposals, see, for example, Taxpayer
Refund and Relief Act of 1999, H.R. 2488, 106th Cong. § 1223 (approved by both
House and Senate on Aug. 5, 1999, but vetoed by the President on Sept. 23, 1999)
(mandating that employer matching contributions under a § 401(k) plan must vest
according to either a three-year cliff vesting schedule or a six-year graded vesting
schedule); H.R. 352, 106th Cong. §§ 2-3 (1999) (creating a new variant of a defined
contribution plan, a "qualified small employer plan," which must provide vesting ac-
cording to either a three-year cliff vesting schedule or a six-year graded vesting sched-
ule). Proposals for immediate full vesting are not a recent phenomenon. See Russell
K. Osgood, Qualified Pension and Profit-Sharing Plan Vesting: Revolution Not Reform, 59
B.U. L. REV. 452, 453, 465-75 (1979) (proposing that ERISA and the I.R.C. be
amended to require immediate full vesting).
11 See, e.g., TURNER, supra note 10, at 124. A very significant precursor of ERISA
was the PRESmENT'S Comm. ON CORP. PENSION FUNDS AND OTHER PRIVATE RETIREMENT
AND WELFARE PROGRAMS, PUBLIC PoLrc AND PRIvATE PENSION PROGRAMS: A REPORT TO
THE PRESIDENT ON PRIVATE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT PLANs (1965) [hereinafter WIRTZ
REPORT]. A central concern of the Wirtz Report was the extent of vesting in private
retirement plans. See id. at 27-46. ERISA's vesting provisions have proven to be of
great importance: "ERISA's creation of federal vesting standards for pension plans
has had a pronounced effect on the benefit contract." Stein, supra note 9, at 72 n.8
(citations omitted).
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sible for the plan to provide retirement benefits to a group of employ-
ees Who value those benefits more highly than alternative forms of
compensation, the plan will be terminated.
Part II summarizes the vesting problem and the law of mandated
vesting and begins analysis of the justifications and effects of legal reg-
ulation of retirement plan vesting. It might appear that the effect of
mandated vesting is to redistribute retirement benefits from other re-
tirement plan participants to short-tenure employees. However, this
redistribution of retirement benefits is not a stable arrangement; in
the long run, further adjustments to the plan must occur. These long-
run effects of mandated vesting are developed in subsequent parts of
the article.
Before considering additional effects of mandated vesting, Part
III explores the full regulatory implications of mandated vesting. Sec-
tion A demonstrates that effective implementation of mandated vest-
ing requires regulation of all other important aspects of retirement
plan design, including employees' participation, benefit accrual, and
benefit payment. Section B explicates the nondiscrimination rules. It
is impossible to analyze the effects of mandated vesting without con-
sidering the nondiscrimination regime. The mandated vesting and
nondiscrimination regimes enjoy a symbiotic relationship. Section C
shows that the nondiscrimination regime will ensure that some short-
tenure employees will participate in a retirement plan and thereby
accrue benefits. Mandated vesting ensures that some benefits that ac-
crue to these short-tenure employees will actually be paid to them.
The combination of mandated vesting and the nondiscrimination re-
gime attempts to compel a retirement plan to provide retirement ben-
efits to short-tenure employees.
Part IV returns to the analysis of the effects of this effort to man-
date retirement benefits. Section A explains that in the long run,
mandated vesting will not increase the retirement benefits of short-
tenure employees. Over time, the costs of retirement benefits are
borne by the employees who receive those benefits, and short-tenure
employees will be unwilling to trade wages for additional retirement
benefits. A retirement plan must eliminate the additional benefits
mandated by the vesting rules, and return the retirement benefits pro-
vided to short-tenure employees to a pre-mandate level. Section B
shows that when retirement benefits are reduced for short-tenure em-
ployees, the nondiscrimination regime will compel similar reductions
in the benefits of other employees. In effect, mandated vesting
reduces the retirement benefits of other employees. Section C ex-
plains how the combined regulatory regime of mandated vesting and
nondiscrimination rules drastically limits the extent to which a retire-
[VOL. 75:1
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ment plan can be designed to provide retirement benefits to those
employees who will value the benefits most highly. This implies that
fewer retirement plans will be created and that some existing retire-
ment plans must be terminated. Thus, mandated vesting reduces the
number of retirement plans.
Part V explores some broad implications of the analysis. Part VI
offers a brief conclusion: great caution should be exercised before
lawmakers impose a further acceleration of the time for mandated
vesting of retirement benefits. Those who would prescribe additional
mandated vesting as a cure for insufficient retirement benefits ought
to bear a burden of persuasion that their prescription will provide a
net improvement for the participants in our voluntary retirement plan
system. To those who would prescribe a single prescription for a di-
verse economy, it must be said, "Above all do no harm."' 2
I. VOLUNTARY RETREMENT PLANS
A. Voluntarism
The creation of a private retirement plan is voluntary in the sense
that there is no legal requirement that an employer provide its em-
ployees with retirement benefits, nor that employees set aside a por-
tion of their earnings as retirement savings. The Supreme Court has
stated the rule plainly: "Nothing in ERISA requires employers to estab-
lish employee benefits plans. Nor does ERISA mandate what kind of
benefits employers must provide if they choose to have such a plan.' u3
Since sponsorship of a plan is voluntary, it follows that the type and
amount of benefits to be provided by a particular plan are also volun-
tary choices. As part of the initial establishment of a retirement plan,
the plan will specify the amount or level of contributions that will be
paid to the retirement plan, or the level of benefits that will be paid by
the plan to retired employees. 14 The revision, continuation, and ter-
mination of a retirement plan are also voluntary; if the sponsoring
12 This phrase is often attributed to Hippocrates, but it is not found in his works.
Its origin is obscure. See W.H.S. JoNES, HIPpocRAs (1923).
13 Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 887 (1996) (citing Shaw v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 91 (1983), and Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S.
504,511 (1981)); see also Bruce Wolk, Discrimination Rules for Qualified Retirement Plans:
Good Intentions Confront Economic Reality, 70 VA. L. REV. 419, 430 (1984) ("Of course,
the employer is the one who makes the decision to establish a retirement plan."). See
generally JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WoLi, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW
127 (1995); Catherine L. Fisk, Lochner Redux: The Renaissance of Laissez-Faire Contract in
the Federal Common Law of Employee Benefits, 56 OHIO ST. Lj. 153, 157-61, 170-72, 171
n.61 (1995).
14 See infra notes 22-33 and accompanying text.
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employer or the participating employees decide that the plan no
longer adds value, the plan can be revised or terminated by action of
the sponsoring employer.' 5 As a matter of form, it is the employer
that establishes a retirement plan, determines the content of the plan
document, and terminates the plan.
The formality of the employer's apparently unilateral control
over the retirement plan obscures a more important reality: a retire-
ment plan reflects the preferences and choices of the employees who
participate in the plan. The plan is one component of the entire rela-
tionship between an employer and its employees, and retirement ben-
efits are but one form among the many in which compensation may
be paid to employees. Wages typically comprise the largest portion of
employees' compensation packages, but those packages usually in-
clude several types of in-kind compensation. 16 When an employee
earns rights, whether vested or unvested, to (perhaps) receive retire-
ment benefits in the future, the employee has received in-kind com-
pensation. The total cost of employees' compensation packages,
including wages and fringe benefits, is limited by an employer's com-
pensation budget.' 7 When employees receive compensation in the
form of retirement benefits, they will necessarily receive lesser
amounts of other forms of compensation.
An employer will create a plan to provide retirement benefits,
and employees will receive compensation in that form when the em-
ployees participating in the plan prefer retirement benefits to other
forms of compensation. Different employees will have different pref-
erences about retirement benefits as a form of compensation.' 8 A
sponsoring employer aims to provide that level and structure of retire-
15 ERISA requires that "[e]very employee benefit plan shall ... provide a proce-
dure for amending such plan, and for identifying the persons who have authority to
amend the plan .... ERISA § 402(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b) (1994). Typically a retire-
ment plan provides that the sponsoring employer has the authority to amend the
plan. The authority to amend the plan includes the authority to terminate a plan.
16 The term "wages" refers to money compensation paid to employees at approxi-
mately the same time that the employees provide services to the employer. Wages are
contrasted with fringe benefits (for example, health insurance) which are various
forms of in-kind compensation. Wages do not include deferred compensation (such
as retirement benefits) which is paid in money but is paid perhaps many years after
services have been rendered.
17 See infra note 257 and accompanying text.
18 One powerful explanation of the differing preferences of employees stems
from the income tax treatment of retirement benefits. See infra notes 35-48 and ac-
companying text.
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ment benefits that its workforce values most highly.19 An employer
does not gratuitously provide retirement benefits to its employees, nor
can it unilaterally dictate the portion of employees' compensation
that will be received in the form of retirement benefits. Instead, a
retirement plan is a device by which both the employer and employ-
ees can realize additional value from the resources available to com-
pensate employees. From this perspective, it can be seen that a
particular retirement plan structure reflects the compensation prefer-
ences of the employer's workforce. While as a matter of form, the
sponsoring employer seems to control a retirement plan, in substance,
the employer must satisfy the preferences of its workforce by provid-
ing that level and structure of retirement benefits that its workforce
values most highly.
B. Retirement Plan Taxonomy
The principle of voluntarism in the retirement plan system ap-
plies only to the fundamental choices to establish a retirement plan,
to determine the type and level of benefits, and ultimately to termi-
19 The analysis in this Article assumes that, in general and on average, employers
that sponsor retirement plans will act to maximize the value of their expenditures on
employee compensation, whether it is paid in the form of wages, retirement benefits,
or other forms of fringe benefits. Similarly, the analysis assumes that employees will
prefer employment that offers them the highest total value, or "utility," in exchange
for the time and effort that they expend during their workings hours. In this sense,
the analysis is economic; it assumes "that man is a rational maximizer of his ends in
life, his satisf-actions-what we shall call his 'self-interest.'" RICHARD A. POSNER, Eco-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3-4 (5th ed. 1998).
It is appropriate to analyze private retirement plans and the benefits they provide
from an economic perspective. Since the private retirement plan system is voluntary,
all sponsoring employers and plan participants have exercised some degree of choice
in participating in the system in the first place. These choices are heavily, if not exclu-
sively, influenced by economic considerations. Sponsoring employers must respond
to the legal environment in economically rational ways; employers who face competi-
tion in their labor supply markets or product or service markets must spend their
employee compensation budgets efficiently or be driven out of business by other em-
ployers who operate more efficiently. See infra notes 254-61 and accompanying text.
Employees also face choices that can be understood in economic terms. So long as
retirement plan sponsorship is voluntary, some employers will offer employment that
includes retirement benefits, and others will not. Economic analysis suggests that em-
ployees will sort themselves among employers in part based upon the employees' vari-
ous preferences for wages or for other forms of compensation, such as retirement
benefits. If particular aspects of retirement plan law have generally predictable effects
upon employer and employee choices, then analysis from an economic perspective
may enlighten us about the effects of retirement plan law on the future retirement
income security of American workers.
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nate the plan. Beyond these basic decisions, there are drastic limita-
tions on the freedom of an employer and its employees to agree upon
the structure of retirement benefits that they might include as part of
employees' compensation. The Internal Revenue Code creates a spe-
cial income tax regime for "tax-qualified retirement plans;" the price
of qualification for this income tax treatment is conformity to a system
of minute regulation of a retirement plan.20 ERISA simply outlaws
certain forms of retirement benefits. For example, retirement bene-
fits must vest no later than upon an employee's completion of seven
years of service; if a retirement plan required that an employee attain
age sixty-five before she was entitled to receive benefits, the sponsor-
ing employer and the plan would be subject to a variety of legal sanc-
tions. Once an employer and its employees have chosen to join the
retirement plan system, every aspect of their retirement plan is subject
to pervasive regulation.
If an employer sponsors a retirement plan, ERISA demands that
all contributions paid to fund future benefits must be segregated in a
separate retirement trust.21 These contributions are held and in-
vested and the resulting accumulations are used to pay the retirement
benefits when participating employees ultimately retire. Depending
upon how a plan determines the amount of retirement benefit to be
paid to a retired participant, it is classified as either a "defined contri-
bution plan,"22 or it falls into the residual category, a "defined benefit
20 As a practical matter, if retirement benefits are to be provided to employees,
other than a very limited group of the highest paid executive employees, the benefits
must be provided by a tax-qualified retirement plan. See infra notes 35-48 and accom-
panying text.
21 See ERISA § 403(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1994). As a structural matter, an
employer that sponsors a retirement plan is obligated to create a separate trust fund,
referred to as a "retirement trust," that holds the funds accumulated to pay the retire-
ment benefits. See id. Insurance contracts can serve the trust function in certain cir-
cumstances. SeeERISA § 403(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(b) (1994). The retirement trust is
irrevocable, and once paid to the retirement trust, an employer's contributions are
not returnable to the employer except in very limited circumstances. The retirement
trust is not subject to claims of the employer's creditors. Retirement benefits are paid
entirely from the retirement trust fund. See id. The retirement trust provides both
the employer and the employees with the security of advanced, segregated, and exclu-
sively dedicated funding for the retirement benefits. The trust requirement is re-
peated in the Code. See I.R.C. § 401(a) (2) (1994).
22 I.R.C. § 414(i) (1994); ERISA § 3(34), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (1994). A defined
contribution plan is a plan that bases a participant's benefit on that participant's indi-
vidual account, which represents that participant's share of the plan's total assets. See
id. See generally Norman P. Stein, Qualiied Plans and Tax Expenditures: A Reply to Profes-
sor Zelinsky, 9 Am. J. TAX POL'y 225, 228-29 (1991).
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plan. '23 Under a defined contribution plan, the amounts that the
sponsoring employer will contribute to the plan are defined in the
document that creates the plan.2 4 For example, in a particular species
of defined contribution plan known as a "money purchase pension
plan," the plan specifies that the employer will contribute a fixed per-
centage, for example ten percent, of each participating employee's
compensation for each year of participation; this specified contribu-
tion is the defined contribution.2 5 This defined amount contributed
on behalf of each employee is allocated within the retirement trust to
that employee by means of a bookkeeping account, which is referred
23 I.R.C. § 4140); ERISA § 3(35), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35) (1994). Technically the
statutes define a "defined benefit plan" as the residual category of retirement plans,
including all retirement plans that are not defined contribution plans. See id. The
technical statutory definition reflects the operational reality of retirement plans: if a
plan does not base a participant's benefit on that participant's individual account, the
plan necessarily must express the participant's benefit as a fixed, or defined, benefit.
See I MXcHAELJ. GANAN, QuALIFIED RETRENT AND OTHER EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS
§ 3.51 (1997); PAMELA D. PERDuE, QUALFIED PENSION AND PROFIT-SHARING PLANS
11.03[3] [a] (1994).
24 If the employer sponsors a species of defined contribution plan known as a
profit-sharing plan, the amount contributed may be varied, or even reduced to zero,
from year to year;, this variability of contributions distinguishes a profit-sharing plan
from a pension plan. As a matter of form, the sponsoring employer determines the
amount contributed to a profit-sharing plan. As a matter of substance, the profit-
sharing contributions depend upon the expectations of the employer and of the par-
ticipating employees. These expectations can be embodied in a relatively definite
understanding about a relationship between the sponsoring employer's financial
profits in a given year and the amount of the plan contribution. Alternatively, an
employer might be given "discretion" to determine the amount of the contribution,
but the employer would exercise this discretion in light of employee perceptions and
expectations. The annual flexibility in the amount of contributions to a profit-shar-
ing plan is the essential factor that distinguishes a profit-sharing plan from a pension
plan. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b) (1) (ii) (as amended in 1976). Internal Revenue
Code § 401(a) (27) eliminates the requirement that contributions to a profit-sharing
plan be made from the employer's profits. See I.R.C. § 401(a) (27) (A) (1994).
In contrast, the benefits paid by a defined benefit pension plan must be defi-
nitely determinable, see Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b) (1) (i) (as amended in 1976), and the
employer is obligated to contribute amounts to the plan sufficient to adequately fund
the benefits. See infra note 33 and accompanying text. The requirement of definitely
determinable benefits does not apply to a money purchase pension plan; instead, a
sponsoring employer must undertake a fixed commitment to contribute specified
amounts to the money purchase pension plan. See Tres. Reg. § 1.401-1(b) (1) (i).
25 See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.401-1 (b) (1) (i). For example, the plan might specify that
the employer would contribute 10% of each participating employee's compensation
to the retirement trust during each year that an employee participated in the plan. If
the plan is a profit-sharing plan, it could provide that the employer would contribute
that amount which the employer determined each year to pay as a contribution.
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to as that employee's "individual account" or "participant's account."
Each participant's account states the total value of the assets that are
allocable to, and held for the benefit of, that participant; this amount
is referred to as the participant's accrued benefit.26 When the partici-
pant qualifies to receive retirement benefits, the amount held in the
participant's individual account is paid to her as her retirement bene-
fit. The defined contribution plan takes its name from this mode of
operation: the plan specifies-that is, defines-the contributions that
will be paid by the employer during a participant's working career.27
However, the amount of retirement benefits that a participant will ul-
timately receive is indeterminate-undefined-until the participant
actually receives the benefits.
If a retirement plan does not maintain individual participants'
accounts and does not determine each participant's benefit with refer-
ence to that account balance, then the plan is a defined benefit
plan.28 Typically, a defined benefit plan promises to pay to each par-
ticipant a retirement benefit in an amount defined by the plan docu-
ment, a "defined benefit."29 The defined retirement benefit is usually
a pension of a specified amount payable monthly, beginning at some
future date (for example, upon the participant's attaining age 65) and
continuing until the retired participant's death.30 The amount of the
pension is computed by application of a benefit formula; usually the
benefit formula is based upon a participant's years of service and com-
pensation history through the date of the benefit computation.3 1 As
26 The investment gains and losses of the trust fund are allocated at the end of
each plan year proportionately among the participants' accounts.
27 All retirement plans must be funded plans. See ERISA § 403(b), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1102(b) (1994). The mechanics of funding differ very significantly between de-
fined contribution plans and defined benefit plans. In a defined contribution plan,
each participant's account determines the amount that will be paid to the participant
as a retirement benefit. Since each participant's retirement benefit is equal to the
amount of assets which are allocated to her participant's account (plus all investment
gains or losses allocated to those assets), a defined contribution plan is always, by
definition, a fully funded plan.
28 See I.R.C. § 414(0) (1994); ERISA § 3(35), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35) (1994).
29 For example, a participant's retirement benefit would be defined as a pension
of $500 per month beginning when the participant attained age 65 and continuing
for the life of the participant. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.401-1 (a) (2) (i), (b) (1) (i) (as
amended in 1976).
30 This beginning date is often referred to as the plan's "normal retirement age."
31 The benefit formula is stated in the defined benefit plan document. For exam-
ple, a benefit formula might provide that a participant will accrue a pension benefit
of 1% of the participant's final average compensation for each year of service with the
sponsoring employer; as applied to a participant who was credited with 30 years of
service, upon retirement, that participant would be entitled to a pension of 30% of
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of any specified date, it is possible to compute the amount of defined
benefit that each participant has earned through that date, based
upon her years of service and compensation history through that date.
This earned benefit is referred to as the "accrued benefit."32 The de-
fined benefit plan takes its name from the fact that it defines the re-
tirement benefits that will be paid to participating employees. An
employer that sponsors a defined benefit plan is obligated by the min-
imum funding requirements of ERISA and the Code to pay contribu-
tions to the retirement trust that will be sufficient to pay the benefits
that the plan has promised to its participants. 33
C. Choosing Retirement Benefits
The establishment of a retirement plan, the selection of the type
and level of benefits, and (to some extent) the choice of the group of
employees to participate in the plan are voluntary choices.3 4 Many
factors may influence an employer and its employees to choose retire-
ment benefits as part of the employees' compensation. Among these
factors are favorable legal treatment of retirement benefits by federal
law. The Code confers special favorable income tax treatment on re-
tirement benefits, and ERISA provides special legal protections to re-
tirement plans and their participants. Business and personnel
management factors can also weigh heavily in the choice. Where the
her final average compensation. If the participant's annual compensation for each of
her last five years of employment averaged $40,000, then the participant would be
entitled to a pension of $12,000.
32 See I.R.C. § 411(a) (7) (1994 & Supp. III 1997); ERISA § 3(23) (A), 29 U.S.c.
§-1002(23) (A) (1994). Note that the accrued benefit is defined as a benefit begin-
ning at the normal retirement age. Assuming that the participant has not attained
the normal retirement age, the present value of the accrued benefit as of the date of
computation would be the discounted present value of the accrued benefit that is
projected to begin at normal retirement age. See id.
33 See I.R.C. § 412 (1994 & Supp. III 1997); ERISA §§ 301-08, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1081-86 (1994 & Supp. 1111997). In a defined benefit plan the sum of all accrued
benefits for all participants represents the amount of retirement benefits which the
plan has promised to pay; these accrued benefits are referred to as the "plan's liabili-
ties." Retirement plan law includes mandatory minimum funding rules which obli-
gate the sponsoring employer to pay annual minimum contributions to a pension
trust so that the plan should have sufficient assets to meet the plan's liabilities as they
become due. The minimum funding requirements apply to defined benefit plans
and money purchase pension plans. A pension plan is necessarily a funded plan. See
i&2 See generally 1 GANAN, supra note 23, §§ 12.1-.9; PERDUE, supra note 23,
13.08-.15.
34 The choice of the group of employees to participate in a retirement plan is
constrained by the nondiscrimination rules. See infra note 205 and accompanying
text.
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balance of these factors offers an economic advantage to an employer
and its employees, then the employer's compensation arrangements
are likely to include retirement benefits as a part of employees' com-
pensation packages. Conversely, if there is little or no economic ad-
vantage to be drawn from the establishment or continuation of a
retirement plan, it is unlikely that retirement benefits will be
provided.
1. Special Income Tax Treatment of Retirement Benefits
The Code creates a special income tax regime for "tax-qualified"
retirement plans.35 A sponsoring employer is allowed an income tax
deduction for contributions paid to a retirement trust.36 A participant
in the plan does not recognize income as she earns increasingly valua-
ble vested rights to receive retirement benefits. 3 7 The investment in-
come of the retirement trust is exempt from current income
35 See I.R.C. §§ 401-20 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). Special favorable income tax
treatment is extended to those retirement plans that satisfy the substantive standards
set out for "tax-qualified retirement plans." In order to achieve "tax qualification," a
plan must satisfy extensive statutory conditions; it must provide retirement benefits to
a classification of employees that does not discriminate in favor of highly compen-
sated employees, and the benefits must be provided on terms that Congress has de-
fined as being worthy of receipt of the income tax incentive. Much of the legal
regulation of retirement plans is expressed in the income tax requirements for quali-
fication. When this Article refers to the "Code" as governing retirement plans, the
reference is to I.R.C. §§ 401-20.
Tax qualification is a system of indirect regulation of a retirement plan; the Code
specifies standards for the substantive content of a retirement plan document. In
order to achieve tax qualification an employer must design its retirement plan docu-
ment to satisfy these standards and operate the plan in accordance with this docu-
ment. The Code's tax incentive evokes the appropriate content for a retirement plan,
and then the retirement plan provides retirement benefits to employees on terms that
Congress has deemed worthy of the tax subsidy. For example, the Code provides that
a retirement trust will not be a "qualified trust" unless the trust provides full vesting
for a participant no later than her seventh year of service. See I.R.C. § 411(a) (2) (B)
(1994). If an employer desires to provide retirement benefits to its employees on a
tax-qualified basis, the employer will cause the governing retirement plan document
to provide participants with vested rights according to a schedule that satisfies the
Code's standard. Since the retirement plan provides benefits in accordance with the
Code's standards, the plan and its participants qualify for the special tax treatment
allowed to tax-qualified retirement plans.
In addition, many of the Code's qualification standards are repeated as
mandatory rules by ERISA. See, e.g., ERISA § 203, 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (1994 & Supp. III
1997).
36 See I.R.C. § 404(a) (1994).
37 See id. § 402(a) (1994); Treas. Reg. § 1.402(a)-1 (a) (1) (i) (amended 1994).
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taxation.3 8 Only when the retirement trust ultimately distributes as-
sets to a participant as retirement benefits does the participant in-
clude the value of the distribution in her gross income.3 9 The effect
of these rules is to defer income taxation of savings held for retire-
ment purposes until the savings are distributed from the retirement
trust. This income tax deferral can continue over a substantial period;
for example, if a participant were twenty-five years old when her em-
ployer made a contribution which funded her benefit, and she re-
ceived a distribution upon retirement at age sixty-five, payment of
income tax on the retirement benefits portion of her compensation,
and the investment earnings on that contribution, would have been
deferred for forty years.4° This deferral of income taxation creates a
tax incentive for compensation to be paid in the form of tax-qualified
retirement benefits.4 1 This special income tax treatment is a tax
38 See I.R.C. § 501(a) (1994).
39 See id. § 402(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.402(a)-l(a) (1) (i).
40 Although it is counterintuitive, the tax incentive is not the mere mismatch of
the employer's deduction and the employee's recognition of income; this mismatch
would create no tax advantage if the employer and the employee faced equal margi-
nal tax rates at all times during the accumulation and distribution phases of the retire-
ment plan and if the earnings of the retirement trust were taxed when earned at that
same rate. See Daniel I. Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Taxing the "Time Value of Money,"
95 YALE LJ. 506, 522-24 (1986). In practice, however, the marginal tax rates of the
parties typically are not equal, and usually an employee's marginal rate after retire-
ment will be lower than her rate during many of her years of active employment. And
the Code explicitly exempts the investment earnings of the retirement trust from cur-
rent taxation. Given these facts, savings held by a retirement trust enjoy a substantial
tax advantage over savings that a taxpayer accumulates on an after-tax basis. Professor
Stein offers an example in which saving through a retirement trust permits an em-
ployee to accumulate a retirement fund 2.5 times larger than that which would have
been accumulated through regular savings. See Stein, supra note 22, at 230.
41 The deferral of income tax on amounts held to pay retirement benefits is gen-
erally described as preferential. See, e.g., Stein, supra note 22, at 229-31. The prefer-
ential description is accurate if the baseline for comparison is the Schanz-Haig-
Simons (SHS) income tax base. "Personal income may be defined as the algebraic
sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in
the value of the store of property rights between the beginning and end of the period
in question." HENRY C. SimoNs, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938). For a brief
introduction to the SHS income tax base, see J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., The Deceptively
Disparate Treatment of Business and Investment Interest Expense Under a Cash-Flow Consump-
tion Tax and a Schanz-Haig-Simons Income Tax, 3 FLA. TAX. REV. 544 (1997).
Under the SHS formulation, an increase in savings is currently included in the
income tax base. Retirement plans are funded, and that funding, and the investment
earnings accumulated on that funding, represent savings-savings held for the partic-
ular purpose of paying retirement benefits to the employee-participants in the retire-
ment plan. If one conceives of the retirement plan funding as savings of the
sponsoring employer, held to pay deferred compensation in the form of retirement
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subsidy that enhances retirement plan sponsorship and participa-
tion.42
benefits to its employees, then the savings would be included in the employer's in-
come tax base. If one conceives of the funding as compensation which the employees
have accumulated during their employment and which is held to support them after
retirement, then the savings would be included in the employees' gross incomes. Or
one might choose to divide the income tax liability between the employer and em-
ployees, perhaps concluding that the retirement plan savings are properly attributa-
ble to the employer until an employee acquires vested rights to receive retirement
benefits, at which time the savings are to be attributed to the employee for income tax
purposes. Under the SHS formulation, the employer's deduction and an employee's
income would be matched as a matter of timing, and the investment earnings accu-
mulated on retirement savings would be included in some taxpayer's income tax base
as those earnings were accumulated. The SHS tax base includes savings in the in-
come tax base. When the employer is allowed a deduction for contributions to a
retirement plan, those retirement savings are removed from the employer's tax base;
in order to include the savings in some taxpayer's tax base in that year, the em-
ployee's income recognition must be matched with the employer's deduction.
Professor Zelinsky has challenged the conventional wisdom that the current tax
treatment of retirement plans should be understood as preferential. He argues that a
normative income tax system can reasonably include the present treatment of retire-
ment plans. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Qualified Plans and Identifying Tax Expenditures: A
Rejoinder to Professor Stein, 9 AM. J. TAx POL'y 257 (1991) [hereinafter Zelinsky, Quali-
fied Plans]; Edward A. Zelinsky, Tax Policy v. Revenue Policy: Qualified Plans, Tax Expend-
itures, and the Flat, Plan Level Tax, 13 VA. TAx REV. 591, 598-602 (1994) [hereinafter
Zelinsky, Tax Policy]; Edward A. Zelinsky, The Tax Treatment of Qualified Plans: A Classic
Defense of the Status Quo, 66 N.C. L. REV. 315 (1988) [hereinafter Zelinsky, Tax
Treatment].
42 The tax subsidy increases the number of retirement plans over the number
that would exist in its absence. See generally LANGBEIN & WOLI, supra note 13, at 30.
The fact that retirement plans enjoy a tax subsidy is generally accepted as ajustifica-
tion for substantive regulation of the plans. See generally Daniel I. Halperin, Special
Tax Treatment for Employer-Based Retirement Programs: Is It "Still" Viable as a Means of In-
creasing Retirement Income? Should It Continue?, 49 TAx L. REV. 1 (1993). For ajustifica-
tion of regulation of the vesting provisions of retirement plans, see WrRTz REPORT,
supra note 11, at 42. This analysis is not primarily concerned with the justification of
mandated vesting on this ground. Instead, this analysis essentially assumes a constant
level of tax subsidy and that the number of retirement plans and the level of benefits
that they provide is consistent with that level of tax subsidy. The analysis then demon-
strates the effects of a newly imposed legal mandate requiring more accelerated vest-
ing. Among those effects will be a reduction in the number of retirement plans, and a
reduction in the benefit levels provided by the remaining plans.
In reality over time, the amount of tax subsidy available to the retirement plan
system in general changes constantly and mainly depends upon the marginal rates of
individual income tax applicable to participants in retirement plans. See Halperin,
supra, at 15-22. The amount of tax subsidy that any particular retirement plan will
attract depends upon the marginal tax rates of participants in the plan.
The special income tax treatment of retirement plans is justified by the public
policy to enhance retirement benefits. See STANLEY S. SuRREY, PATHWAYS TO TAx Ra-
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The delivery of the subsidy for retirement plan sponsorship
through the mechanism of income tax deferral has a collateral conse-
quence of great significance. The tax incentive to pay compensation
to an employee in the form of tax-deferred retirement benefits be-
comes greater as the employee's marginal tax rate increases. 43 An em-
ployee who faces a higher marginal tax rate will avoid a larger amount
of income tax when she receives compensation in the form of retire-
ment benefits than an employee in a lower tax bracket. In general
and on average, highly compensated employees will be subject to
higher tax rates than employees who are not so highly compensated. 44
FORM 127 (1973) ("[T]he preferential tax treatment of qualified pension plans was
intended to foster broad pension plan coverage ... ."). "The basic justification for
the indirect public subsidy involved in favored tax treatment lies in the social pur-
poses served by private pension plans." WirTZ REPORT, supra note 11, at viii.
Compare the conclusions of the Congressional Research Service:
The earnings of stock-bonus or profit-sharing plans were exempted in 1921
and the treatment was extended to pension trusts in 1926.
Like many early provisions, the rationale for these early decisions was
not clear.... It seems likely that the exemptions may have been adopted in
part to deal with technical problems of assigning income.
... [Today] [t]he major economic justification for the favorable tax
treatment of pension plans is that they are argued to increase savings and
increase retirement security. The effects of these plans on savings and over-
all retirement income are, however, subject to some uncertainty.
CONG. REs. SERv., TAx EXPENDrTURES 480-81 (S. Print No. 103-101 1994).
Professor Halperin has described the purpose of the tax subsidy much more nar-
rowly: "[T]ax incentives traditionally have been provided to encourage employers to
offer retirement protection for rank and file employees." Halperin, supra, at 7. The
employees who are described as "rank and file" are essentially the same category that
is referred to in this article as "non-highly compensated employees." See infra notes
227-29 and accompanying text. The extent to which the tax subsidy enhances retire-
ment benefits for non-highly compensated employees depends upon the efficacy of
the nondiscrimination rules. See infra note 210 and accompanying text.
43 See I.R.C. § 1 (1994). The deferral of income taxation will reduce an em-
ployee's tax liability as compared with the amounts that would have been payable if
retirement benefits were taxed currently. However, highly compensated employees
will enjoy greater tax savings than non-highly compensated employees. See Stein,
supra note 22, at 231. Therefore, in general, highly compensated employees will have
a stronger preference for retirement benefits, and non-highly compensated employ-
ees will have a stronger preference for wages. This implies that an employer with a
larger proportion of highly compensated employees will be more likely to create a
retirement plan for those employees than an employer that mainly employs non-
highly compensated employees.
44 "Highly compensated employees" and "non-highly compensated employees"
are both defined terms of art in retirement plan law. See infra notes 227-29 and
accompanying text.
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Therefore, the structure of the tax subsidy for retirement plans cre-
ates a pervasive pressure for a retirement plan to provide dispropor-
tionately larger retirement benefits to highly compensated
employees.45
Apart from the income tax incentive for a retirement plan to
favor highly compensated employees in its benefit structure, these em-
ployees are likely to have a stronger preference for retirement bene-
fits. Retirement benefits are a form of savings, and highly
compensated employees are more likely to have the economic re-
sources for saving and perhaps higher than average propensities to
save.
46
The bias in favor of highly compensated employees is limited by
an important component of retirement plan law, the Code's nondis-
crimination regime. 47 The nondiscrimination regime attempts to re-
quire a retirement plan to provide reasonably comparable benefits to
non-highly compensated employees, but these rules do not operate in
For a recent summary of effective marginal income and social security tax rates
on earned income, see Elliott Manning & Laurence M. Andress, The 1996 Marginal
Federal Income Tax Rates: The Image and the Reality, 73 TAx NoTEs 1585 (1996). The
combined marginal rates exceed 46% for a married couple both of whom are earners.
See id. at 1597. In addition, the employer is subject to social security taxes that could
push the combined tax burden above 50%. See id.
45 The amount of tax subsidy available to any particular retirement plan depends
upon the proportion of highly and non-highly compensated employees who partici-
pate in the plan. The efficacy of a retirement plan as a tax deferral or avoidance
device could be quantified by comparing the amount of taxes deferred in a given year
with the amount of contributions to the plan and investment earnings of the trust
fund in that year. A plan could be considered to be more "tax efficient" as it provided
a greater ratio of tax deferral. A plan that provided benefits exclusively to partici-
pants who were highly compensated employees who faced high marginal tax rates
would be more tax efficient than a plan that provided benefits to participants who
faced lower tax rates. In a perverse effect, generally, as a plan covers more highly
compensated employees, it becomes more tax efficient. See Joseph Bankman, The
Effect of Anti-Discrimination Provisions on Rank-and-File Compensation, 72 WASH. U. L.Q.
597 (1994); see also infra note 210 and accompanying text.
Apart from the income tax incentive, highly compensated employees generally
have a stronger preference for retirement benefits than non-highly compensated em-
ployees. From the perspective of a plan participant, retirement benefits are a form of
personal savings. Individuals with higher incomes are able to save more than those
with lower incomes. In fact, "[i] t is well established empirically that pension coverage
is positively correlated with earnings levels and union status." David E. Bloom & Rich-
ard B. Freeman, The Fall in Private Pension Coverage in the United States, 82 AM. ECON.
REv. 539, 540 (1992) (citations omitted).
46 See infra note 212 and accompanying text.
47 See Joseph Bankman, Tax Policy and Retirement Income: Are Pension Plan Anti-
Discrimination Provisions Desirable?, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 790 (1988).
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any systematic manner to ensure that non-highly compensated em-
ployees generally receive retirement benefits. 4 8 The tension between
a retirement plan's economic impulse to favor highly compensated
employees and the effort of retirement plan law to channel retirement
benefits to non-highly compensated employees is evident in much of
the regulation of retirement plans.
2. ERISA's Special Legal Protections
ERISA provides special legal protections to retirement plans and
participants. Plans are protected by the Act's broad federal preemp-
tion provision: ERISA "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as
they . . . relate to any employee benefit plan."49 Early on, the
Supreme Court gave full effect to this broad language, holding that
ERISA preempted not only state law which conflicted with a substan-
tive provision of the Act, but literally all state law that relates to an
employee benefit plan.50 This federal preemption implies that a re-
tirement plan, the sponsoring employer, and their agents are not sub-
ject to state law claims most significantly tort claims. 51 Instead, these
48 See infra note 210 and accompanying text.
49 ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994). The term "employee benefit
plan" clearly includes an employer-sponsored retirement plan. See ERISA § 3(2)-(3),
29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)-(3) (1994). For ERISA to apply, the sponsoring employer must
be engaged in interstate commerce. See ERISA §§ 3(11), 4, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(11),
1003 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
50 See Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 524-25 (1981). The pur-
pose of this broad preemption has been succinctly stated: "A central objective of
ERISA was to federalize pension and employee benefit law." LANGBEIN & WOLx, supra
note 13, at 416; see also Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 842 (1997) (referring to
"ERISA's concern for securing national uniformity in the administration of employee
benefit plans . . . ."). And this purpose has been realized: an employer-sponsored
retirement plan is governed solely and exclusively by federal law.
The federalization of retirement plan law promotes the provision of retirement
benefits in two ways. First, there is a single system of law governing retirement plans.
One system of national law governing retirement benefits offers important simplifica-
tion and administrative efficiencies to an employer that has employees in more than
one state; the employer is assured that a uniform administrative and benefits structure
will be legally permissible without regard to the place of residence of any of its em-
ployees. A single system of law also reduces the administrative costs associated with a
retirement plan since the required expertise and systems are applicable on a nation-
wide basis. A single system of employee benefits law reduces the administrative costs
and overhead associated with retirement plans.
51 In the absence of ERISA's preemption, the tort law of some states could subject
an employee benefit plan or its administrator to liability for punitive damages. See
generally LANGBEIN & WOIC, supra note 13, at 457-64. The possibility of potentially
large punitive damage liability would introduce an important risk factor into the deci-
sion to sponsor a retirement plan.
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actors are liable only to the extent provided by ERISA, and the Act
provides limited legal remedies.5 2 In general terms, a retirement plan
is liable to plan participants only for the payment of benefits as pro-
vided by the plan, with some exposure for additional penalties.53 ER-
ISA effectively limits the liabilities of a retirement plan sponsor,
thereby reducing the costs associated with a retirement plan and,
hence, promoting retirement plan sponsorship.
ERISA also provides special legal protections to participants in a
retirement plan. A plan or its associated trust must include a "spend-
thrift" provision, which protects a participant's retirement benefits
against assignment or alienation.54 Coupled with ERISA's preemption
of state-law claims against a participant's retirement benefits, the
spendthrift protection ensures that a participant's retirement benefits
will not be subject to creditors' claims. 55 This special status enhances
the value of compensation paid in the form of retirement benefits and
thus promotes retirement plan participation and sponsorship.
3. Business Considerations
Apart from the special income tax and legal treatment of retire-
ment benefits, both employers and employees may have preferences
for compensation paid in the form of retirement benefits. 56 An em-
ployer may seek to increase employees' job tenures. Retirement plans
and particularly defined benefit plans are associated with longer job
tenures. Increasedjob tenure may allow an employer to provide more
education and training for employees, since a longer job tenure will
enable the employer to recover more of its training costs. 57 Not only
may a plan increase job tenure so that employees remain employed
through their most productive years, but the same plan may facilitate
52 See ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). A partici-
pant may bring an action to compel compliance with ERISA, and for penalties in the
case that a plan administrator fails to comply with its disclosure and reporting obliga-
tions. See ERISA § 502(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
53 See ERISA § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
54 See ERISA § 206(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). Very similar
requirements are imposed by the Code as conditions for plan qualification. See I.R.C.
§ 401 (a) (13) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). The general rule forbidding assignment and
alienation of retirement benefits is subject to several statutory and regulatory excep-
tions. See, e.g., ERISA § 206(d) (2)-(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (2)-(3).
55 See Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992).
56 This second component of value is often referred to as the "nontax" reasons
for employer sponsorship of a retirement plan. See, e.g., LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra
note 13, at 30-33; Halperin, supra note 42, at 8-11.
57 See RicHARD A. IPPOLITO, PENSION PLANS AND EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE 27
(1997); see also infra note 70 and accompanying text.
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a timely retirement of an older employee whose productivity might be
declining.58 A retirement plan may act as a sorting device, enabling
an employer to select reliable and productive employees, while en-
couraging less valuable employees to leave the employer's
workforce.5 9 To generalize, a retirement plan can function as a com-
pensation device that may enable an employer to assemble a more
productive workforce.
From the perspectives of employees, compensation in the form of
retirement benefits may be preferred to wage compensation. Some
employees may distrust their ability to systematically save for retire-
ment and, therefore, prefer that accumulations for their retirement
years be structured for them through an employer-sponsored retire-
ment plan.60 Assets held by a retirement trust are often managed by a
trustee with access to professional investment management services;
generally, this arrangement may give employees the benefits of invest-
ment management which they could not acquire individually and
which may provide superior rates of return. Finally, an employer-
sponsored retirement plan may give employees access to annuity con-
tracts at premiums calculated for a group of lives; these premiums
may be more attractive than those charged for individual annuity con-
tracts. In short, apart from the special income tax treatment of retire-
ment benefits, some employees may prefer compensation in the form
of retirement benefits instead of receiving the employer's cost of
those retirement benefits as wage compensation.
D. Choosing a Retirement Plan
Income tax incentives, legal incentives, and business considera-
tions all affect the choice by an employer and its employees to allocate
a portion of compensation to the provision of retirement benefits. So
long as a retirement plan can be designed to provide retirement bene-
fits to employees who prefer those benefits to wages, the plan will be
continued. A legally imposed restriction on the design of a retire-
ment plan, such as mandated vesting, attempts to compel a plan to
provide larger retirement benefits to some participants than those
participants would have received in the absence of the mandate. If
the employees who initially receive these mandated retirement bene-
fits in fact prefer wages to the mandated benefits, the employees will
be unwilling to accept the substitution of benefits for wages. Over
58 See Ipoiro, supra note 57, at 41-60.
59 See id. at 79-156.
60 See generally Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Policy: Psychological Evidence
and Economic Theoy, 58 U. CI. L. REV. 1275 (1991).
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time the employees' preference for wages will control the composition
of their compensation packages. 61 The level of retirement benefits
provided to these employees must be reduced, or the retirement plan
must be terminated. 62 Since the continuation or termination of a re-
tirement plan is ultimately a voluntary choice, when a retirement plan
no longer creates additional value for the sponsoring employer and
the participating employees, the plan will be modified or termi-
nated. 63 If the plan is terminated, then none of the employer's em-
ployees will receive employer-sponsored retirement benefits.64 The
61 See infra notes 252-59 and accompanying text. This analysis is most applicable
to an employer that operates in a competitive market for its products or services and
faces a labor market in which there is competition for desired employees. See infra
notes 252-59 and accompanying text.
62 The authority to adjust the level of contributions or to terminate a retirement
plan is included in the authority to amend the plan, which, as a matter of form, is
exercised by the employer. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. The essence of
a profit-sharing plan is that the contributions may be varied from year to year; there-
fore, it is a simple matter for the employer to reduce the contribution level, even to
zero. Contributions to a pension plan, including both a defined benefit plan and a
money purchase pension plan, may be reduced or eliminated by an amendment to
the plan, although only prospectively and after notice to the affected employees. See
ERISA § 204(h) (1), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(h)(1) (1994). The reduction of future benefit
accruals under a defined benefit plan does not affect the sponsoring employer's obli-
gation to fully fund all accrued benefits. See ERISA §§ 301-08, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-86
(1994 & Supp. III 1997).
A retirement plan may be terminated at any time by an amendment to the plan
that states that the plan is terminated or will be terminated at a future date. An
amendment terminating a defined benefit plan is not effective until the Pension Ben-
efit Guarantee Corporation has determined that the plan has sufficient assets to pay
all accrued benefits. See ERISA § 4041, 29 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994).
63 Section 401(k) plans explicitly confer voluntary choice on participants as to
the amounts which they will choose to save through the retirement plan. A § 401 (k)
plan is a particular species of profit-sharing plan that permits employees to make
voluntary, pre-tax contributions of a part of their otherwise taxable compensation to
the plan. See I.R.C. § 401(k) (1994). However, the retirement plan system allocates
very few voluntary choices to employees, and those choices are typically of limited
significance. Section 401 (k) places numerous limitations on the amount of an em-
ployee's voluntary pre-tax contribution to her retirement plan, most notably a current
maximum annual dollar limitation of $10,000 on contributions, and percentage limi-
tations that depend upon the voluntary contributions made by non-highly compen-
sated employees generally. See id. §§ 401 (k) (2)-(3), 402(e) (3), (g) (1994). Professor
Weiss argues that the paternalistic foundation of retirement benefits policy explains
the very narrow range accorded individual employee choice in the retirement plan
system. See Weiss, supra note 60, at 1282-83.
64 The power to amend the plan and to reduce or to eliminate retirement bene-
fits may be exercised only prospectively. Benefits which have accrued through the
date of the amendment may not be reduced. See I.R.C. § 411(d)(6) (1994); ERISA
§ 204(g) (1), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g) (1) (1994). In furtherance of its nondiscrimination
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right of an employer and its employees to opt out of the private retire-
ment plan system acts as a pervasive constraint on the efficacy of
mandatory regulation of retirement plans.65
II. MANDATED VESTING
A. The Vesting Problem
A retirement plan creates a relationship among the sponsoring
employer, the retirement trust fund, and the participating employee
that may stretch across decades. If an employee began to participate
in her employer's retirement plan at a young age, stayed with that
employer for her entire working career, retired, and then received
benefits from the plan during her entire retirement period, the rela-
tionship might exceed sixty years. 66 Since the relationship is poten-
tially lengthy, it can involve many changes in circumstances; therefore,
a retirement plan must address a wide variety of topics and contingen-
cies. Obvious among these contingencies is the possibility, even
regime, the Code requires that all accrued benefits become fully vested upon a com-
plete or partial termination, except that in the case of defined benefit plans this full
vesting rule is limited to the extent that accrued benefits are funded. See I.R.C.
§ 411(d) (3) (1994). In furtherance of its employee protection purposes, ERISA re-
quires advance notification to plan participants of future benefit reductions by plans
which are subject to the minimum funding regime. See ERISA § 204(h), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1054(h) (1994).
65 "[Tthe legislative and administrative burdens imposed during the Reagan-
Bush years emerge as prime causes of diminished U.S. pension coverage-hence, the
paradox that is federal retirement policy: discouraging the system of qualified plans in
order to extend its benefits." Zelinsky, TaxPolicy, supra note 41, at 597; see also MARIA
O'BRIEN HYLTON & LORRAINE A. SCHMALL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYEE BENI-
Frrs LAW 36 (1998).
This dynamic-regulation followed by employer efforts to avoid or minimize
the financial impact of the regulation-is crucial to bear in mind. The les-
son might be that discretionary benefits can only be regulated up to a point.
Once the cost becomes excessively expensive or the regulatory regime com-
plicated, employers can (and do) opt out.
Id.
Recognition of the limits of mandatory regulation of a voluntary retirement plan
system naturally leads to consideration of a mandatory employer-sponsored retire-
ment plan system. A fully developed proposal for a Mandatory Universal Pension
System (MUPS) was offered by President Carter's Commission on Pension Policy. See
PRESmENT'S COMM'N ON PENSION POL'Y, COMING OF AGE: TOWARD A NATIONAL RETIRE-
MENT INcomE Pouicy (1981). In the intervening years, concern about the availability
of employer-provided health insurance has eclipsed efforts to expand retirement plan
coverage. See generally LANGBEIN & WoLy, supra note 13, at 38-41.
66 For example, if the participant began participation at age 25 and received re-
tirement benefits until age 85, the relationship would last 60 years.
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probability, that an employee will, prior to retirement, terminate her
employment with the employer that sponsors the plan.6 7 The vesting
provision of a retirement plan specifies the level of benefits, if any, to
be received by an employee who terminates employment prior to ac-
tual retirement. If a participant's rights in her retirement benefits are
entirely unvested when she terminates employment, then she will for-
feit all of her accrued retirement benefits, and she will receive noth-
ing from the retirement plan with respect to her period of
employment with that particular sponsoring employer. 68 If the par-
ticipant's retirement benefits are fully vested upon employment termi-
nation,69 she will receive some form of distribution from the plan.
The present value of her retirement benefits might be paid to her
shortly after termination, or she might receive retirement benefits at
some future date, such as when she attains age sixty-five. The vesting
provision of the retirement plan defines the moment or moments
during a participant's career of service when she earns nonforfeitable
rights to her retirement benefits.
1. Choices About Vesting
If vesting were unregulated, retirement plan design would con-
sider several effects of deferred vesting. Deferral of vesting provides
advantages to some employers and, perhaps surprisingly, to some em-
ployees. If an employer were strongly interested in binding certain of
its employees to it for lengthy careers of service, then that employer
might choose to defer vesting in whole or in part until an employee
completed the desired career. The potential loss of retirement bene-
fits that a plan participant would incur if she left employment would
act as a substantial deterrent to quitting.70 The risk of loss of retire-
67 The terminology "termination of employment" is used to include all cases of
severance of the employment relationship between the employee and employer. The
terminology includes a termination initiated by the employer ("firing") and a termi-
nation initiated by the employee ("quitting"). The terminology includes termination
of employment without reference to whether the termination was "with cause" or
"without cause." Generally, the vesting provisions of retirement plans do not differen-
tiate levels of benefits based upon the circumstances of termination of employment.
68 See I.R.C. § 411(a) (2) (1994 & Supp. III 1997); ERISA § 203(a) (2), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1053(a) (2) (1994).
69 Alternatively, many retirement plans provide that a participant's retirement
benefits become vested incrementally over a specified period of service; this is re-
ferred to as "graded vesting." See generally I.R.C. § 411(a) (2) (B); ERISA
§ 203(a) (2) (B), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a) (2) (B); infra note 100.
70 Pensions are important tools to enforce long-term contracts in the firm. On
average, they reduce quit rates by approximately 20% and increase tenure levels at
older ages by over 25%. The results offer little support for the hypothesis that wage
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ment benefits could also serve as a particular incentive for an older
employee to continue to work diligently even as retirement ap-
proached .7  These advantages appear to inure solely to the employer.
In fact, increased job tenures can benefit both employers and em-
ployees. When employers can bind new hires to longer careers of ser-
vice, employers are more likely to invest in job-specific training for
employees. 7 2 Greater investment in employee training will improve
productivity and, depending upon the division of those gains between
an employer and employees, raise both the employer's profits and the
employee's wages.7 3 Employers might generally support long-de-
ferred vesting, or more accurately the availability of deferred vesting
as a possible plan design element, because of the flexibility it allows in
designing a retirement plan to achieve maximum value for both the
sponsoring employer and the participating employees. Deferred vest-
ing offers important and valid advantages in some retirement plan
cases.
74
tilt is an efficient substitute for pensions to deter quitting. See IPOLiro, supra note 57,
at 27.
71 This effect would limit "short-timer's syndrome," in which an employee who
knows that she soon will be leaving ajob relaxes her efforts. Cf RICHARD A. POSNER,
AGING AND OLD AGE 303-04 (1995).
72 Pension plans provide firms with a type of insurance against employees quiting
prematurely by paying the firms
a lump sum-the non-vested portion of payments-whenever a worker quits.
Insurance is needed for specifically trained employees because their turno-
ver would impose capital losses on firms. Firms... would be more willing to
pay for training costs if insurance were provided. The effects on the incen-
tive to invest in one's employees may have been a major stimulus to the
development of pension plans with incomplete vesting.
GAR, S. BECHER, HUMAN CAI'rrAL 48 (1993). "This economic function of incomplete
vesting should caution one against conceding to the agitation for more liberal vesting
privileges." Id. at 48 n.20.
73 Becker summarizes the division of both costs and gains of firm-specific training
costs: "[Firms] share both with employees. The shares of each depend on the rela-
tions between quit rates and wages, layoff rates and profits, and on other factors not
discussed here, such as the cost of funds, attitudes toward risk, and desires for liquid-
ity." Id. at 44 (footnote omitted).
74 "Employer cost" of retirement benefits is not, in the long run, an important
reason why an employer might prefer long-deferred vesting. It is true that an acceler-
ation of vesting, whether by a voluntary change in a plan or in response to a legal
mandate, increases the "cost" of a retirement plan in the sense that larger contribu-
tions must be made to the plan. Accelerated vesting is, in effect, a promise of larger
benefits for employees. Larger benefits necessarily imply larger contributions to the
plan. The employer is the nominal payer of plan contributions; however, over time,
the cost of those contributions is shifted to the employees who benefit from the in-
creased vesting. See infra text accompanying note 253. This cost shifting implies that
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
The disadvantage of long-deferred vesting is obvious: it imposes
on the participant for a prolonged period the risk of forfeiture of her
retirement benefits. From the perspective of a plan participant, when
she accrues a benefit that is contingent upon completion of a fifteen
year career of service, she should discount the value of that retirement
benefit. Contingent retirement benefits are less valuable than vested
benefits. Plan participants do not appear to be the only ones disad-
vantaged by deferred vesting. In fact, the discounted value of contin-
gent retirement benefits is also a disadvantage for the sponsoring
employer. Plan participants may discount the value of the benefit to a
level below the cost of the benefit. In this case, a retirement plan is
unlikely to continue to provide the participant with retirement bene-
fits since the participant will be unwilling to accept the shifting of the
costs of benefits to her.75 Depending upon the preferences of a par-
ticular employer's workforce, deferred vesting could devalue retire-
ment benefits so significantly that a retirement plan would not be
acceptable to employees.
In a world without legal regulation of vesting, the choice of vest-
ing periods in retirement plan design would balance the gains from
increased job tenures with the devaluation of contingent retirement
benefits. Different employers with different workforces would settle
on different solutions for plan design.76 There would be variation,
the additional benefits are either paid for by the employees who receive the benefits,
or eliminated from the plan because those employees are unwilling to trade wages for
the benefits. See infra note 252-59 and accompanying text. Therefore, in the long
run, the "cost" of a retirement plan is not borne by an employer.
An employer, and more accurately, either the employer's owners or customers (if
the employer has some market power in its product market), might bear the cost of
the initial shock of a new vesting mandate. See infra note 253-54 and accompanying
text. However, once employees' compensation packages and the retirement plan
have been adjusted to the new vesting standards, the employer will not bear the cost
of mandated vesting.
An employer might prefer to have the alternative of long-deferred vesting avail-
able as a retirement plan design element because it would enable a plan to provide
retirement benefits only to those employees who prefer the benefits to wages. De-
ferred vesting is attractive to an employer because of the plan design flexibility it
offers. To assert that mandated vesting is unattractive to an employer because of
'cost" is misleading. The accurate explanation is that mandated vesting is unattrac-
tive because it causes a retirement plan to be unfeasible economically as a compensa-
tion device for some employers.
75 See infra notes 255-64 and accompanying text.
76 Cf PETER J. WIEDENBECK & RuSSELL K. OSGOOD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EM-
PLOYEE BENEFITS 544 (1996) ("Perhaps in some businesses, involving rapidly-changing
technology, turn-over should be encouraged. And in others, like teaching school,
stability may be especially valuable."). A related question is whether a business or
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perhaps wide variation, in the degree of vesting offered. Some spon-
soring employers would be more or less successful because of the plan
design that they chose. Retirement plan design would evolve to pro-
vide the most valuable combinations of retirement benefits and de-
ferred vesting.
2. Evolution of Vesting
During the early stages of development of the private retirement
plan system, plans generally did not provide any vesting prior to retire-
ment.77 In 1875 the American Express Company started the first em-
ployer-sponsored retirement plan. By 1929 employer-sponsored plans
covered fifteen percent of private employees, and by 1930 one-fifth of
unionized workers were covered by union-sponsored pension plans. 78
Into the 1930s, few plans provided participants with vested rights.79
Vesting, or more accurately its absence, was understood as a matter of
contract law, and if a plan did not provide vested rights for partici-
pants, termination of employment would result in the loss of all retire-
ment benefits. Courts evolved some common law doctrines that
responded to difficult cases, but there was no general limitation on
the principle of freedom of contract.80
By 1960 the private retirement plan system had expanded enor-
mously; forty-one percent of U.S. workers were covered by some form
institution should make its own choices about turn-over and stability, or whether Con-
gress should choose.
77 See generally Patricia E. Dilley, The Evolution of Entitlement: Retirement Income and
the Problem of Integrating Private Pensions and Social Security, 30 Lov. L.A. L. REV. 1063,
1114-16 (1997); W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Rights and Liabilities as Between Employer and
Employee with Respect to General Pension or Retirement Plan, 42 A.L.R.2d 461 (1955).
78 See CONG. BUDGET OFF., TAX POuCY FOR PENSIONS AND OTHER RETIREMENT SAV-
ING 129-30 (1987).
79 See id. By the time that Murray W. Latimer made his encyclopedic study of
private pension plans [1932], one out of every seven workers in industrial employ-
ment was covered by such a plan, but Latimer did not even mention the word "vest-
ing" much less cite statistics as to its frequency. In various sections of his book,
Latimer commented in a critical vein on the stringent requirements for benefit enti-
tlement; but when, in the final pages of his lengthy work, he set forth the features of
an ideal plan, he made no mention of vesting. It is known, however, that some plans
of that era did provide for vesting of pension accruals prior to normal retirement age.
See DAN M. McGILL, PRESERVATION OF PENSION BENEFrr RIGHTS 102-03 (1972) (citing
MURRAY W. LATIMER, INDusTRiAL PENSION SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA
(1932)).
80 See, e.g., Sigman v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 11 N.E.2d 878 (Ohio 1937); Wilson
v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 194 N.E. 441 (Ohio App. 1934).
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of retirement plan. 81 Retirement plans had also begun to voluntarily
provide vested rights to participants. 82 At that time, two-thirds of all
plans provided some degree of vesting for participants.8 3 In addition
to vesting that plans provided voluntarily, IRS policy increasingly de-
manded some degree of vesting. It had long been understood that, in
order for a retirement plan to be tax-qualified, it ultimately must pay
benefits to the participants.8 4 By definition, payment of benefits im-
plies vesting; after benefits are paid, the participant necessarily has
vested rights in those benefits.85 By the late 1960s, the IRS sometimes
required some vesting in order to prevent certain plans, mainly those
of small employers, from providing retirement benefits that were ex-
cessively discriminatory in favor of highly compensated employees.8 6
However, within these broad limits, each retirement plan was free to
determine its own conditions for vesting.
About twenty-five million employees were participating in private
retirement plans at this time,87 so it was inevitable that there would be
cases in which a plan participant did not receive anticipated retire-
ment benefits in questionable or controversial circumstances. Long-
deferred vesting provisions insured that some long-service participants
were denied retirement benefits. There were also cases of abuse of
81 See STUART DORSEY ET AL., PENSIONS AND PRODucrIVrrv 16 (1998); see also infra
note 274 and accompanying text.
82 A common pre-ERISA retirement plan vesting schedule granted vested rights
after the sum of the participant's age and years of service reached specified levels.
For example, a participant would be fully vested when the sum of her age and years of
service equaled or exceeded 65; therefore, a participant who was age 55 and had
completed 10 years of service would be fully vested. This type of vesting rule re-
warded long-tenure employees and provided retirement benefits to employees who
were approaching a normal retirement age. The prevalence of these vesting sched-
ules seems consistent with theories that employers sponsored retirement plans in or-
der to encourage longerjob tenures and to facilitate the retirement of older workers.
Prior to ERISA, other common vesting rules were based upon age alone, or service
alone, or some even deferred all vesting until actual retirement. Prior to vesting man-
dates, a wide variety of vesting rules had been adopted by different employers and
different industries. See McGILL, supra note 79, at 102-40. "[A] remarkable amount
of vesting has already been provided [by 1972] on a voluntary basis, and the trend is
expected to continue." Id. at 50.
83 See WiRTz REPORT, supra note 11, at 38-39.
84 See Isidore Goodman, Speeches on Qualified Pension and Profit-Sharing Plans
under the Internal Revenue Code between Oct. 20, 1955 and OcL 5, 1970, Pens. &
Profit Sharing (PH) 19,018, at 19,208-09 (Dec. 2, 1961).
85 See id. 19,018, at 19,205-06.
86 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 73-299, 1973-2 C.B. 137; Rev. Rul. 71-151, 1971-1 C.B. 123;
Rev. Rul. 68-302, 1968-1 C.B. 163.
87 See WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 11, at 2.
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retirement trusts and financial failure of plans.8 8 In response to these
concerns, in 1962 President Kennedy appointed a cabinet-level
committee to review the legislation and administrative practices relat-
ing to private employee retirement plans. 89 The report of that Com-
mittee, commonly known as the Wirtz Report, was issued in 1965; it
recommended extensive regulation of retirement plans, including
mandated vesting legislation. 90 The Wirtz Report recommended that
retirement plans be required to provide fifty percent vesting after fif-
teen years of service and an additional ten percent vesting for each of
the next five years, so that full vesting would be achieved after twenty
years.9 1 Many of the Wirtz Report's recommendations were finally im-
plemented with the enactment of ERISA in 1974.
ERISA brought a dramatic halt to the natural evolution of retire-
ment plan vesting. The Act mandated that all retirement plans main-
tained by an employer engaged in interstate commerce provide
participants with vested rights in their accrued retirement benefits.92
The Act specified three alternative minimum vesting schedules and
required a plan to satisfy at least one of the statutory schedules.93 A
plan had to provide vesting at least as rapidly as the statutory schedule,
although a plan could provide more rapid vesting if it chose to.94 In
the years since ERISA's enactment, the federal vesting standards have
been amended repeatedly, always in the direction of requiring addi-
tional vesting for participants after shorter periods of service.
95
B. The Law of Mandated Vesting
Current retirement plan law mandates that a participant's retire-
ment benefits vest upon the occurrence of any one of a variety of cir-
88 See generally LANGBErN & WoLy, supra note 13, at 62-96.
89 The Committee was comprised of the Secretaries of Labor, Treasury, Health,
Education and Welfare, and the Chairmen of the Council of Economic Advisers, the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Securities and Exchange
Commission. See WiRTz REPORT, supra note 11.
90 See i& at viii-xvi.
91 See id at 42-44.
92 In general terms, ERISA covers an "employee benefit plan if it is established or
maintained... by any employer engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity
affecting commerce . . . ." ERISA § 4(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (1994). "The term
'commerce' means trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication be-
tween and State and any place outside thereof." ERISA § 3(11), 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (11)
(1994).
93 See ERISA of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 203(a) (2) (B), 88 Stat. 829, 854-55
(1974).
94 See § 203(d), 88 Stat. at 862.
95 See CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 78, at 11.
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cumstances. One rule requires that "[e]ach pension plan shall
provide that an employee's right to his normal retirement benefit is
nonforfeitable upon the attainment of normal retirement age."96
Other rules demand that upon a participant's death, some part or all
of her retirement benefits must vest, so that they will be paid to her
successor.97 Most significant to this analysis are the rules mandating
that a retirement plan must grant a participant vested rights in her
accrued benefit after she completes a certain period of employment
with the sponsoring employer. The law offers several alternatives for
design of the plan's vesting provisions; they must comply with either
the "five-year cliff vesting" schedule, the "seven-year graded vesting"
schedule, or provide 100% immediate vesting.98 To satisfy five-year
cliff vesting, a participant must become fully vested no later than upon
the completion of her fifth year of service; prior to that time, no incre-
mental vesting is required. 99 To comply with the seven-year graded
96 ERISA § 203(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). This mandate is
repeated as a condition for tax qualification. See I.R.C. § 411(a) (1994 & Supp. III
1997). ERISA defines normal retirement age:
The term "normal retirement age" means the earlier of-
(A) the time a plan participant attains normal retirement age under the
plan, or
(B) the later of-
(i) the time a plan participant attains age 65, or
(ii) the 5th anniversary of the time a plan participant commenced par-
ticipation in the plan.
ERISA § 3(24), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(24) (1994). The Code repeats this definition. See
I.R.C. § 411(a) (8).
The use of the "normal retirement age" terminology in retirement plan law re-
flects the traditional retirement age of 65, which was a part of the context in which
ERISA was enacted. See generally LANGBEIN & WOL, supra note 13, at 375-78,
385-400.
The mandated vesting concept would be much more clearly reflected if the statu-
tory language dropped the references to normal retirement age and simply stated
that retirement benefits must vest upon the later of the participant's attaining age 65
or completing five years of participation.
97 In the case of a defined contribution plan, the successor acquires a fully vested
right to receive the participant's account balance. In the case of a defined benefit
plan, the joint and survivor rules determine the amount of benefit that must be paid
to a successor who is a surviving spouse.
98 See I.R.C. §§ 410(a) (1) (B) (i), 411(a)(2) (1994); ERISA §§ 202(a) (1) (B) (i),
203(a) (2), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1052(a) (1) (B) (i), 1053(a) (2) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
99 See ERISA § 203(a) (2), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2)(A). The Code repeats the re-
quirement as a condition for tax qualification: "A plan satisfies the requirements of
this subparagraph if an employee who has completed at least 5 years of service has a
nonforfeitable right to 100 percent of the employee's accrued benefit derived from
employer contributions." I.R.C. § 411 (a) (2) (A).
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vesting schedule, a plan must grant a participant vested rights incre-
mentally, with full vesting no later than upon completion of her sev-
enth year of service.100 The five-year cliff vesting or seven-year graded
vesting schedules may be utilized only if the retirement plan permits
an employee to begin participation in the plan upon completion of an
eligibility waiting period not longer than one year.1 1 If the plan re-
quires a new employee to complete an eligibility waiting period longer
than one year, then any accrued benefit must be fully vested when the
employee completes two years of service.10 2 (An eligibility waiting pe-
riod may not exceed two years in any case.' 0 3) All these rules set mini-
mum standards that an employer's retirement plan must meet; a
retirement plan may provide participants with more rapid vesting or
larger vesting percentages than the mandated statutory floors.' 04
In addition to the vesting rules that apply to all qualified plans,
there is an additional set of more rigorous vesting requirements that
apply only to retirement plans that meet the definition of a "top-heavy
plan," a plan that has accrued more than sixy percent of its benefits
for "key employees." 105 A top-heavy plan must provide either three-
year cliff vesting or six-year graded vesting. 0 6 Top-heavy plans must
100 See ERISA § 203(a) (2) (B), 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (a) (2) (B). The Code repeats the
requirement as a condition for tax qualification:
A plan satisfies the requirements of this subparagraph if an employee has a
nonforfeitable right to a percentage of the employee's accrued benefit de-
rived from employer contributions determined under the following table:
Years of service: The nonforfeitable percentage is:
3 20
4 40
5 60
6 80
7 or more 100
I.R.C. § 411(a) (2) (B).
101 See I.R.C. §410(a)(1)(A)(1994); ERISA §202(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.c.
§ 1052(a) (1) (A) (1994); see also infra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
102 See I.R.C. § 410(a) (1) (B) (i) (1994); ERISA §202(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1052(a) (1) (B) (1994).
103 See ERISA § 202(a) (1) (B), 29 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (1) (B).
104 See ERISA § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(d) (1994) ("A [retirement] plan may
allow for non-forfeitable benefits after a lesser period and in greater amounts than
are required by [statute].").
105 See I.RC. § 4 16(g), (i) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). In general terms, a key em-
ployee is an owner of the employer, or an officer of the employer who earns a speci-
fied minimum amount of compensation. See § 416(i) (1). The top-heavy rules are
solely a requirement for income tax qualification and are not repeated in ERISA.
106 See id. § 416(a) (1), (b) (1994).
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also provide certain minimum levels of benefits to "non-key" employ-
ees.107 The top-heavy vesting rules have the same effects on top-heavy
plans that the general vesting rules have on all retirement plans; the
analysis of mandated vesting applies with equal force to the general
vesting rules and the top-heavy vesting rules.108
C. Justifications for Mandated Vesting
Congress has offered several intertwined threads of justification
for the enactment of mandated vesting.10 9 ERISA's legislative history
explained that mandated vesting would extend retirement benefits to
additional employees, that it would increase the benefits received by
non-highly compensated employees, and that it would improve the
security of retirement income by preventing inequitable forfeiture of
benefits by long-serving employees. 10 The first two justifications of
mandated vesting, that it will extend retirement benefits to additional
employees and to non-highly compensated employees in particular,
are the principal focus of this analysis, which ultimately concludes that
mandated vesting will not have these effects."' Subsection 1 below
begins to consider mandated vesting with a "static analysis" of its ef-
fects, which seems to show that mandated vesting would enhance
short-tenure employees' retirement benefits. Subsection 2 begins a
107 See id. § 416(a)(2), (c) (1994).
108 Mandated vesting for top-heavy plans means compliance with the top-heavy
vesting rules. In general, the top-heavy rules can be understood as additional nondis-
crimination rules applicable only to plans that are primarily benefiting the owners
and officers of the sponsoring employer. The nondiscrimination regime applicable
to all retirement plans is discussed infra notes 204-45 and accompanying text.
109 Mandated graduated vesting "helps [employees] to accumulate adequate pen-
sions over their entire working careers and tends to spread the cost of providing such
pensions more equitably over the various employers for whom they have worked dur-
ing these careers. ." S. REP. No. 93-383, pt. 11 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4890, 4906.
110 On one level, the justification of mandated vesting as an improvement to the
security of retirement benefits is simply another version of the justification that man-
dated vesting will increase aggregate retirement benefits. Greater security of retire-
ment benefits means fewer and smaller forfeitures, which would seem to imply larger
aggregate retirement benefits. But cf. infra notes 264-84 and accompanying text. In
other words, improved security might be a desirable public policy goal because it
increases aggregate retirement benefits.
On another level, improved security of retirement benefits may be an independ-
ent justification of mandated vesting. Mandated vesting may be a form of employee-
protective legislation justified by a conclusion that employees generally are unable to
protect themselves against the risks posed by employer sponsored retirement benefits
that are subject to lengthy periods of forfeitability.
111 See infra note 253 and accompanying text.
[VCOL. 75:1
MANDATED VESTING
"dynamic analysis" of the secondary and unintended effects of the
vesting mandate in our voluntary retirement plan system. This itera-
tion of dynamic analysis seems to show that mandated vesting reallo-
cates retirement benefits from long-tenure employees to short-tenure
employees. Subsection 3 further develops the hypothesis that man-
dated vesting might reallocate retirement benefits; a final conclusion
on this point must await full development of the subsequent analysis.
Subsection 4 offers a brief summary of the argument that improve-
ment of the security of retirement benefits justifies mandated vesting.
1. Increased Retirement Benefits: The Static View
ERISA includes a fairly detailed recitation of Congressional find-
ings and declaration of policy. 112 One of the findings was that "many
employees with long years of employment are losing anticipated re-
tirement benefits owing to the lack of vesting provisions ... "113 This
explanation for the enactment of mandated vesting is expanded in
the House and Senate Committee Reports:
This legislation is concerned with improving the fairness and effec-
tiveness of qualified retirement plans in their vital role of providing
retirement income. In broad outline, the objective is to increase
the number of individuals participating in employer-financed plans;
to make sure to the greatest extent possible that those who do par-
ticipate in such plans actually receive benefits and do not lose the
benefits as a result of unduly restrictive forfeiture provisions or fail-
ure of the pension plan to accumulate and retain sufficient funds to
meet its obligations; and to make the tax laws relating to qualified
retirement plans fairer by providing greater equality of treatment
under such plans for the different taxpayer groups concerned. 114
In order for retirement plans to effectively provide retirement income
to employees generally, more employees need to participate in retire-
ment plans,115 and those who do participate need to have vested
rights to benefits.
Coverage under a pension plan does not aid an individual if he later
forfeits his right to his pension benefits upon voluntary or involun-
112 See ERISA § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994).
113 ERISA § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001.
114 H.R. REP. No. 93-807, pt. II (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CA.N. 4670,
4676-77. The same language appears in SEN. REP. No. 93-383, pt. If (1974), reprinted
in 1974 U.S.C.G.A.N. 4890, 4898.
115 ERISA sought to bring additional employees into retirement plan participation
by means of statutory participation requirements. Coupled with the nondiscrimina-
tion regime, retirement plan law attempts to mandate that non-highly compensated
employees receive retirement benefits. See infra notes 245-50 and accompanying text.
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tary termination of employment. This is an important considera-
tion in view of the fact that ours is a fairly mobile economy where
employees tend to change jobs rather frequently, especially in their
younger years. Moreover, the cyclical and technological nature of
certain industries results in frequent layoffs over a work career for
employees in those industries, as in aerospace and defense. The
committee bill deals with this problem by requiring qualified pen-
sion plans to grant covered employees minimum vested rights to
their pension after serving a specified number of years. 116
This rationale assumes that mandated vesting will cause employees to
receive larger retirement benefits."17 The Wirtz Report is explicit about
the connection between vesting and the extension of retirement bene-
fits to additional workers:
With vesting, the employer's contributions are made available to a
higher proportion of his work force. By bringing pension benefits
to additional workers with a rightful claim to benefits, vesting
strengthens the private pension system and the security function it
is expected to perform. 118
In 1986, when Congress accelerated the times at which retirement
benefits must vest, it focused particularly on classes of disadvantaged
workers:
Congress believed that prior law did not meet the needs of many
workers who changedjobs frequently. In particular, women and mi-
norities were disadvantaged by the prior-law rules because they
tended to be more mobile, shorter service employees. In addition,
lower-paid employees, in general, were more likely to be mobile and
thus more likely to terminate employment before vesting in any ac-
crued benefits. Accordingly, Congress believed that more rapid
vesting would enhance the retirement income security of low[] and
middle-income employees."19
116 See S. REp. No. 93-383, pt. II (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4890,
4904-05.
117 And in fact, mandated vesting has resulted in a greater percentage of all work-
ers having at least some vested interest in retirement benefits. "[Mandated vesting]
regulations have contributed to a higher vesting rate. Sixty perscent of active partici-
pants were fully vested by 1993, compared with 36 percent in 1975." DoRSE ET AL.,
supra note 81, at 17 (citaition omitted). This increase in the proportion of partici-
pants who are vested has coincided with the stagnation in coverage-that is, a decline
in the proportion of employees who participate in a retirement plan. See infra notes
271-84 and accompanying text.
118 WRTZ REPORT, supra note 11, at 40.
119 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
TAX REFORM Acr OF 1986, at 688 (Comm. Print 1987). The second reason given for
acceleration of vesting was that employees may receive lower current money compen-
sation when they also receive accruals of retirement benefits and that their accrued
[VOL- 75:1
MANDATED VESTING
Two important purposes of mandated vesting are to increase retire-
ment benefits for existing plan participants and to extend retirement
benefits to additional employees, particularly non-highly compen-
sated employees. 120
Initially it may appear that mandated vesting will necessarily have
the effect of increasing retirement benefits. Mandated accelerated
vesting implies that retirement plan participants who were less than
fully vested, and who enjoy additional vesting under the mandate, will
necessarily receive larger retirement benefits. Earlier vesting means
fewer forfeitures, and fewer forfeitures mean more retirement bene-
fits. A newly enacted vesting mandate unquestionably increases the
retirement benefits to be received by (previously unvested) retirement
plan participants to the extent that those benefits have accrued at the
time the mandate becomes effective. This can be described as a static view
of retirement plan benefits; a given amount of retirement benefits will
accrue for plan participants, and if those participants have larger vest-
ing percentages, then they will receive greater benefits.
There are two ways to measure a plan participant's retirement
benefits: first, by the amount of the participant's accrued benefit,
some or all of which might be vested; and second, by the value that
retirement benefits ought not be subject to long-deferred vesting. Id.; cf. infra note
159 and accompanying text.
Compare Congress's assertions about minority job tenures with the data: "The
duration of employment among blacks is as long as that among whites. Even though
jobs held by blacks are worse along almost every other dimension, they are no less
stable than those held by whites." TURNER, supra note 10, at 17 (summarizing data
from Robert E. Hall, The Importance of Lifetime Jobs in the U.S. Economy, 72 Am. EcoN.
REv. 716 (1982)).
Prior to 1986, the cliff vesting schedule required that a plan grant full vesting
upon the completion of ten years of service. See I.R.C. § 411(a) (2) (A) (1985). The
Tax Reform Act of 1986 amended the cliff vesting schedule to impose full vesting
after five years of service. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1113(a),
100 Stat. 2085, 2446-47 (1986). This amendment wvas effective for plan years begin-
ning after December 31, 1988. See § 1113(c) (1), 100 Stat. at 2448.
120 Some commentators have explained mandated vesting as necessary to protect
employees' interests in retirement benefits. See, e.g., PeterJ. Wiedenbeck, Implement-
ing ERISA: Of Policies and "Plans," 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 559, 571-76 (1994). From this
perspective, mandated vesting is akin to consumer protection legislation; it protects
employees from a risk (unanticipated forfeiture of retirement benefits) that employ-
ees are unable to protect themselves against. See generally infra notes 153-71 and ac-
companying text.
However, the question remains why it is appropriate policy to protect employees
against forfeiture of retirement benefits. Presumably increasing retirement benefits
(for those who are protected against unanticipated forfeiture) is a desireable goal in
itself. Beyond this, it is not clear that there is an independentjustification for restric-
tion of forfeiture.
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the participant assigns to her accrued benefit. Consider the measure-
ment of the amount of a participant's vested accrued benefit. For ex-
ample, under a defined contribution plan a participant with nine
years of service might have an accrued benefit of, say, $50,000, but
under a ten-year cliff vesting schedule, the participant would have no
vested rights. In this case, the amount of her vested accrued benefit is
$0, and if she terminates employment prior to completion of her
tenth year of service, she will receive no retirement benefits. Suppose
that after a new vesting mandate was enacted, this plan decided to
comply by adopting a five-year cliff vesting schedule.121 As of the ef-
fective date of the plan amendment, the amount of this participant's
vested accrued benefit would instantly increase to $50,000.122 If the
participant terminates employment at any time after completion of
five years of service, she will receive retirement benefits. The vesting
mandate has conferred a one-time gain on the participant who had an
unvested accrued benefit as of the effective date of the mandate, and
that one-time gain implies that this participant will receive retirement
benefits as a result of the mandate. 123 In these cases, mandated vest-
ing has extended retirement benefits to a participant who would not
have received any in the absence of the mandate.
Retirement plan participants who receive a larger vesting percent-
age solely because of mandated vesting will be referred to as "short-
tenure employees." Other participants who had partial or full vesting
under the plan's pre-mandate design, to the extent of their pre-ex-
121 In the above example, during the years five through nine, the mandate causes
each participant to be 100% vested, as compared with 0% vested prior to the man-
date. The benefits that are vested because of this mandate are referred to as "man-
dated benefits." Those participants in a retirement plan who have periods of service
that fall within the mandated period as of the effective date of the vesting mandate
will have an increase in the value of their retirement benefits at that effective date.
122 Mandated vesting increases the vesting percentages of participants only to the
extent that the mandated vesting percentages exceed the vesting that the plan pro-
vided prior to the mandate. Before the enactment of mandated vesting standards,
most retirement plans provided some level of vesting for participants in retirement
plans. To the extent that mandated vesting exceeded these voluntary vesting levels,
the vesting mandate caused some previously unvested participants to have vested ben-
efits, and it caused an increase in the vesting levels of other participants. The compar-
ison is not between mandated vesting and no vesting; the comparison is between
mandated vesting and the vesting that would be provided by voluntary retirement
plan design.
123 In the case of acceleration of a graded vesting schedule in response to a man-
date, some participants will receive larger retirement benefits than they would have
received in the absence of the mandate. When a new vesting mandate requires the
acceleration of vesting under a graded vesting schedule, similar effects occur to the
extent of the newly mandated increments of vesting.
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isting vesting, will be referred to as "long-tenure employees."1 24 Fo-
cusing upon retirement plan participants who had accrued some
retirement benefit as of the effective date of a vesting mandate, the
effect of mandated vesting is to provide additional retirement benefits
to short-tenure employees, while having no effect upon the vesting per-
centages of long-tenure employees. 125 The retirement benefit that a
short-tenure employee receives because of the mandated increase in
her vesting percentage is referred to as a "mandated benefit"; in the
example above, the $50,000 is a mandated benefit during years six
through ten, because she is vested during that period solely because of
the vesting mandate.
A second measure of retirement benefits is the value that a par-
ticipant might place upon her accrued retirement benefits, even if
those benefits are partly or fully forfeitable. For example, under a cliff
vesting schedule, so long as a participant is unvested, the value of her
accrued retirement benefits is discounted by a factor that reflects the
risk that she might forfeit the benefits upon termination of employ-
ment. If a participant were subject to a ten-year cliff vesting schedule,
and after nine years of service her accrued benefit were $50,000, she
might conclude that there was a ten percent risk that she would forfeit
the accrued benefit, so that she would value her accrued benefit at
$45,000. When vesting is achieved, that risk of forfeiture is elimi-
nated, and the value of her retirement benefits increases as of that
moment.126 Under a ten-year cliff vesting schedule, each participant
enjoyed the increment in value arising from the elimination of the
124 Under these definitions, a single participant can be both a long-tenure em-
ployee and a short-tenure employee. For example, when graded vesting was acceler-
ated from 15 years to seven years, a participant with seven years of service jumped
from 35% vesting to 100% vesting. Under the definitions, this participant is a long-
tenure employee with respect to her 35% vested percentage and a short-tenure em-
ployee with respect to the 65% vesting increment attributable to the vesting mandate.
125 The definitions isolate all effects of mandated vesting with the group of short-
tenure employees. Long-tenure employees enjoy no increase in their vesting percent-
ages. For example, when 10 year cliff vesting was accelerated to five-year cliff vesting,
participants with 11 years of service did not have an increased vested percentage.
126 Yet another understanding of vesting would suggest that the risk of forfeiture
discount under a five-year cliff vesting schedule diminishes incrementally as the par-
ticipant completes each year (or hour) of service toward satisfaction of the five-year
requirement. However, regardless of one's understanding of the shape of accrual of
the vesting percentages over the fully or partially unvested portion of a participant's
career, there is some discontinuous increment of value of retirement benefits when
that last hour of service necessary for full (or graded partial) vesting is completed.
The absolute amount of the increment of value is larger the longer that vesting is
deferred, since the risk of forfeiture applies to the entire retirement benefit and the
accrued benefit is larger with increasing periods of service.
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risk of forfeiture upon completion of her tenth year of service. After
five-year cliff vesting was mandated, that incremental increase in value
occurs upon completion of a participant's fifth year of service.' 27 Fo-
cusing upon the value that a participant might assign to her unvested
retirement benefits, the effect of mandated vesting is to accelerate the
moment(s) in an employee's career when she receives the incre-
ment(s) of value of retirement benefits attributable to the elimination
or reduction of the risk of forfeiture.
From the perspective of the value of retirement benefits, man-
dated vesting appears to confer value upon all of an employer's em-
ployees who are eligible to become participants in the employer's
retirement plan. The acceleration of the moment when the risk of
forfeiture is eliminated confers a one-time gain on a participant who
has an accrued (but not fully vested) benefit at the time a vesting man-
date becomes effective. This one-time gain in value is simply the par-
ticipant's perception of the one-time increase in the amount of the
participant's vested accrued benefit that was described above. For an
employee who had not yet become a participant in the plan at the
time the vesting mandate is effective, acceleration of vesting implies
that, when the employee does become a participant and first accrues a
benefit, the value of that benefit will be greater because the risk of
forfeiture will be eliminated sooner. The earlier elimination of the
risk of forfeiture appears to confer additional value on all short-tenure
employees, both those participating at the time the mandate becomes
effective, and those who enter the plan later.
From both of these perspectives, mandated vesting appears to in-
crease retirement benefits for short-tenure employees. To the extent
that a participant has an unvested accrued benefit, she enjoys a one-
time gain equal to the amount that becomes vested. And even short-
tenure employees who have not accrued benefits appear to enjoy a
one-time gain in the expected value of the retirement benefits that
they will accrue in the future, since mandated vesting reduces the risk
of forfeiture of benefits. However, the focus on these one-time gains,
the static view of mandated vesting, is seriously incomplete. The
amount of retirement benefits that a retirement participant will re-
ceive depends not only on the participant's vesting percentage, but
also on the total amount that the participant will accrue for retire-
127 In the above example, during the years five through nine, the mandate causes
each participant to be 100% percent vested, as compared with 0% vesting prior to the
mandate. Those participants in a retirement plan who have periods of service that fall
within the mandated period as of the effective date of the vesting mandate will have
an increase in the value of their retirement benefits at that effective date.
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ment benefits. The next Section begins a dynamic analysis of how
vesting mandates will affect the amounts of participants' accrued
benefits.
2. Reallocation of Retirement Benefits Among Participants:
Dynamic Analysis
Under static analysis, mandated vesting confers one-time gains on
short-tenure employees by increasing their vesting percentages in
their accrued benefits. The first step in a dynamic analysis of man-
dated vesting is to consider the effects of a vesting mandate on the
retirement benefits of the employees who are not affected by the text
of mandated vesting, that group of plan participants designated as
long-tenure employees. An initial effect of mandated vesting is to re-
duce the total amount of forfeitures in a retirement plan;128 this re-
sults from a reduction in the number of participants who forfeit their
accrued retirement benefits in any given plan year, and from a reduc-
tion in the value of those forfeitures that do occur. For example,
under ten-year cliff vesting some participants would forfeit accrued
benefits upon termination of employment during their sixth through
tenth years of service. And the value of forfeitures in these years
would exceed the value of the accrued benefits at the end of the fifth
year of service since a participant's accrued benefit increases in value
as the period of service increases. When mandated vesting reduced
the cliff vesting period from ten years to five years, fewer terminating
participants forfeited their accrued benefits, and those who did forfeit
their benefits forfeited a smaller amount. This reduction in forfeit-
ures is equivalent to the increased retirement benefits that short-ten-
ure employees receive; those benefits that are not forfeited are paid
out as additional retirement benefits.
In a profit-sharing plan, the reduction in forfeitures by short-ten-
ure employees has a direct effect upon the accrued benefits of long-
tenure employees. A profit-sharing plan allocates forfeitures among
those participants who continue active employment with the sponsor-
ing employer; thus, forfeitures increase the accrued benefits of long-
tenure employees. 12 9 When forfeitures are reduced, the initial, direct
128 The total amount of retirement benefits that are forfeited during a plan year
are referred to as the "forfeitures."
129 Allocation of forfeitures in a profit-sharing plan is governed by a provision of
the plan document. Traditionally many profit-sharing plans allocated forfeitures pro
rata to participants' account balances as of the end of the plan year in which the
forfeiture occurred. This allocation usually favored long-tenure employees since ac-
count balances are the cumulative sum of prior contributions and investment returns.
See Sol Walker & Co. v. United States, 636 F.2d. 298 (Cl. Ct. 1980) (holding that an
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effect is to reduce the benefit accruals of long-tenure employees to
lesser amounts than they would have enjoyed in the absence of the
mandate. A reduction in benefit accrual for a long-tenure employee
implies that she will receive smaller retirement benefits. If the contri-
butions to a profit-sharing plan are not increased to an amount suffi-
cient to restore the accrual of benefits of long-tenure employees to
their pre-mandate level, the vesting mandate appears to have simply
reallocated retirement benefits from long-tenure employees to short-
tenure employees. 130
If a pension plan is providing retirement benefits, the effect of a
reduction in forfeitures is less obvious. Forfeitures under a pension
plan may not be used to increase these benefits, but instead are ap-
plied as credits against the employer's required contributions. 131
Thus, the initial, direct effect of a vesting mandate in a pension plan is
to increase the amount of contributions that must be paid to the
plan. 3 2 All of the mandated benefits are paid to short-tenure employ-
ees, so that all of these increased contributions fund benefits for short-
allocation pro rata with account balances is not inherently discriminatory). Rev. Rul.
81-10, 1981-1 C.B. 172 requires that an allocation of forfeitures must not result in the
prohibited discrimination against non-highly compensated employees. An alternative
allocation provision would allocate forfeitures pro rata with participants' compensa-
tion for the plan year in which the forfeiture occurred. Allocation pro rata with par-
ticipants' compensation is nondiscriminatory.
130 Reallocation of retirement benefits in this manner might be a desirable out-
come, if it were a stable arrangement. However, reallocation of retirement benefits
will cause additional adjustments in the structure of retirement plan benefits. See
infra notes 250-84 and accompanying text.
131 See Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1 (b) (1) (i), -7 (1963). The employer that sponsors the
plan is required to pay contributions sufficient to fund the benefits that the plan has
promised to pay. See supra note 33.
132 The vesting mandate requires the payment of additional benefits, and the em-
ployer is obligated to make contributions to the plan sufficient to pay all benefits.
Thus the cost of the plan increases. Professor McGill worked on studies that pre-
ceded the enactment of ERISA's first vesting mandates. He concluded,
It should be apparent at this stage that only the most generalized statements
can be made concerning the cost of vesting. Too many variables are in-
volved to permit categorical or unqualified pronouncements in respect of
the general cost impact.... [An] estimate may prove to be faulty not only
because of the inherent volatility of turnover rates but also because the very
act of adopting a vesting provision may alter the firm's pattern of employ-
ment terminations.
McGiL, supra note 79, at 175-76.
Shortly after the enactment of ERISA's first vesting mandate, Professors Green-
ough and King reviewed some of the estimates of the increases in the cost of funding
a defined benefit plan which might be caused by mandated vesting. These estimates
ranged from immaterial cost increases to increases of up to 25% in plan funding cost.
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tenure employees. Because a pension plan fixes the amount of bene-
fit (or in the case of a money purchase pension plan, the amount of
the contribution), mandated vesting appears to increase the benefits
of short-tenure employees, with these benefits being paid for by in-
creased employer contributions. And there appears to be no effect
upon the retirement benefits of long-tenure employees.
After the initial shock of newly mandated accelerated vesting, an
employer must consider whether to continue to pay an increased level
of contributions, or to adjust the compensation packages of the short-
tenure employees, or to adjust the level of retirement benefits to elim-
inate the incremental mandated benefits. Subsequent analysis devel-
ops the factors that control this decision; generally the level of
benefits will be adjusted in order to return the level of contributions
to that which existed prior to enactment of the mandate.13 3 The level
of benefits provided by a pension plan can be reduced prospectively;
the plan can be amended to reduce the rate at which benefits accrue
in the future. 34 Future benefit accruals can be reduced to a level that
can be financed with the pre-mandate plan contributions. If this were
done, short-tenure employees would receive increased retirement
benefits, while long-tenure employees would receive reduced retire-
ment benefits. 35 Assuming there is no increase in contributions, the
See WnILIAM C. GREENOUGH & FRANCIS P. KING, PENSION PLANS AND PUBLIC PoLIcY
169-72 (1976).
133 See infra notes 253-64 and accompanying text. The decrease in plan contribu-
tions precipitated by a vesting mandate will generally return the level of retirement
benefits of short-tenure employees to that level which existed prior to the mandate,
while causing an absolute decrease in the retirement benefits of long-tenure employ-
ees. The combined effect of mandated vesting and the nondiscrimination rules will
be to cause pension plan contributions to be reduced to a level below that which ex-
isted prior to the vesting mandate. See infra notes 265-72 and accompanying text.
134 See supra note 62 and accompanying text. In the typical case, the plan will
adopt a new benefit formula providing a new, reduced rate of accrual of benefits for
all plan participants, both short-tenure employees and long-tenure employees. See
infra notes 264-65 and accompanying text.
135 The reduced benefit level applies to all plan participants during all their future
years of participation. This implies that, except for those short-tenure employees who
receive retirement benefits solely because of the vesting mandate, all participants in a
pension plan will ultimately receive smaller retirement benefits than they would have
received prior to the vesting mandate. In the case of a defined benefit plan, the
reduced future benefit level translates directly to lower benefits. The effect is the
same in a money purchase pension plan. For example, assume that the money
purchase pension plan specified that contributions were to be made to the plan equal
to six percent of compensation and that, prior to an additional vesting mandate, for-
feitures paid for three percentage points of this contribution. The employer would
have had a net cost for its money purchase pension plan of three percent of compen-
sation. Assume that after the vesting mandate, forfeitures paid only one percentage
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second stage effect of mandated vesting on a pension plan is identical
to the effect on a profit-sharing plan: retirement benefits are reallo-
cated away from long-tenure employees and toward short-tenure
employees. 13 6
In both profit-sharing and pension plans, mandated vesting can
lead to increased aggregate retirement benefits only if contributions
to the plan are increased to cover the cost of the additional retirement
benefits that short-tenure employees receive as a result of the man-
date. Since contributions to a plan generally will not be increased
over the long run in response to mandated vesting,13 7 at this stage in
the analysis, the effect of vesting mandates appears to be a realloca-
tion of retirement benefits from long-tenure employees to short-ten-
ure employees. A reallocation of retirement benefits implies that
there is no increase in the aggregate retirement benefits of all plan
participants.
The justification of mandated vesting predicated on increasing
the amount of retirement benefits can now be more accurately stated
as increasing the amount of retirement benefits of short-tenure em-
ployees, at the expense of the retirement benefits of long-tenure em-
ployees. Analysis below illustrates that our category of "short-tenure
employees" will also include a disproportionately large fraction of an
employer's "non-highly compensated employees."1 38 The group of
non-highly compensated employees will include low and middle-in-
come employees. Thus the policy question becomes the desirability of
reallocating retirement benefits from long-tenure employees to short-
tenure employees, where the category of short-tenure employees in-
point of the contribution. To hold its net cost of the plan constant, the employer
would have to reduce the future contribution rate to four percent of compensation.
This results in a lower level of retirement benefits.
A reduction in the retirement benefits of long-tenure employees is not, in itself, a
stable situation. If the retirement benefits of long-tenure employees are reduced,
then the wage portion of their compensation packages must be increased to bring the
value of their compensation to the level that existed prior to the vesting mandate. See
infra notes 265-70 and accompanying text.
136 See Wolk, supra note 13, at 454 n.154 ("Shorter vesting would merely redistrib-
ute the benefits.").
137 See infra notes 252-64 and accompanying text.
138 "Non-highly compensated employees" is a defined term of art in retirement
plan law. See infra notes 227-29 and accompanying text. "Non-highly compensated
employees" are employees who are not "highly compensated employees," another de-
fined term of art. As a working example, in many cases, non-highly compensated
employees are those who earn less than $80,000 per year, and highly compensated
employees earn more than that. See infra notes 229-31 and accompanying text.
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cludes a disproportionate number of low and middle-income
employees.
3. Is Reallocation Desirable?
Reallocation of retirement benefits might be desirable on two
grounds. First, providing some retirement benefits to both short-ten-
ure employees and long-tenure employees might be preferable to pro-
viding a higher level of benefits predominantly for long-tenure
employees. Second, since short-tenure employees on average earn
less compensation than long-tenure employees, reallocation of retire-
ment benefits might be a means to redistribute income to lower in-
come individuals, which could be judged to be a desirable outcome in
itself.'3 9
Justification of mandated vesting on grounds that it distributed
retirement benefits more evenly across employees with different job
tenures was relied upon by the Wirtz Report140 and by Congress years
later in 1986 when it accelerated cliff vesting from ten years to five
years. 141 The Wirtz Report concluded,
Nonetheless, if a choice must be made between a system that pro-
vides a higher level of benefits but only for those who remain with
their employer until retirement age against one that assures a
slightly lower level of benefits to all workers after a reasonable pe-
riod of service, public policy clearly must choose the latter.142
The Wirtz Committee offered this conclusion as self-evident. Profes-
sor McGill prepared a definitive work on pension vesting in the years
immediately following the release of the Wirtz Report,143 and it more
fully captures the nuances of the debates during that period. 44 Mc-
Gill summarizes the competing arguments:
139 An important principle of retirement plan law is the nondiscrimination norm,
the concept that a plan may not accrue retirement benefits in a way that discriminates
excessively against non-highly compensated employees. See infra note 205 and accom-
panying text. In order for benefits that accrue on a nondiscriminatory basis to be
actually paid to retired non-highly compensated employees, mandated vesting is a
necessary element of the system. See infra note 248 and accompanying text. However,
there is serious concern that the nondiscrimination regime operates in such an unsys-
tematic fashion that it is ineffective to deliver retirement benefits to non-highly com-
pensated employees generally. See infra note 210 and accompanying text. If the
nondiscrimination regime is itself dubious, it cannot offer a sound justification for
mandated vesting.
140 See WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 11, at 41.
141 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
142 WIRTz REPORT, supra note 11, at 41.
143 See McGIuL, supra note 79, at x.
144 See id. at 29-32.
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[O]ne of the [arguments] in favor of vesting is that it produces a
more equitable distribution of benefits among the plan partici-
pants. Interestingly, one can argue against vesting on the same
grounds. In its simplest form, the equity issue can be reduced to
the question of whether, out of a given pension budget, it is more
equitable to provide smaller (but more secure) benefits to a larger
number of persons or larger (but more uncertain) benefits to a
smaller number of persons .... Persons who take this [latter] posi-
tion view pensions as a 'differential wage' for long and faithful ser-
vice. They contend that long-service employees make a special
contribution to the firm, not reflected in ordinary wage scales,
which entitles them to preferential treatment at retirement.
145
McGill offers no clear recommendation about mandated vesting,
other than to summarize the conclusions and reasons offered by the
Wirtz Committee. These arguments offer no compelling logical rea-
son to conclude that retirement benefits ought to be distributed more
or less evenly across employees, nor any explanation of why that distri-
bution is a proper object for federal legislation. If vesting had been
left unregulated, some retirement plans would choose to concentrate
retirement benefits on long-tenure employees; other retirement plans
would provide retirement benefits to a broader group of employees.
The question remains why a uniform legal solution is to be preferced
to the many differing solutions that individual employers and their
particular workforces would settle upon.
Perhaps the appeal of a more even distribution of retirement
benefits across the workforce lies in the second justification, that re-
distribution of retirement benefits might be perceived as largely
equivalent to redistribution of income from more privileged to 'less
privileged workers. The distribution of income that results from the
U.S. economic system has long been the source of widespread dissatis-
faction, and various public policies to adjust that distribution erjoy
deep and long-term support.146 If mandated vesting were likely to re-
145 Id. at 38-39. Note that McGill accepts as a fact the proposition that an em-
ployer faces a fixed budget for retirement benefits. This fact is an essential element
of the dynamic analysis of mandated vesting, see supra note 17 and accompanying text,
and an essential element of the analysis of this article, see infra note 253-57 and ac-
companying text.
146 In their classic analysis, The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, Professors Blum
and Kalven conclude,
[I]n the end it is the implications about economic inequality which impart
significance and permanence to the issue and institution of progression. Ul-
timately a serious interest in progression stems from the fact that a progres-
sive tax is perhaps the cardinal instance of the democratic community
struggling with its hardest problem.
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allocate income in the form of retirement benefits to poorer workers,
then it might be justified as desirable social policy on those grounds.
As an empirical matter, mandated vesting is misguided as income
redistribution policy. Mandated vesting as an income redistribution
device can only affect employees who participate in a retirement plan.
About forty-three percent of the labor force participate in a retire-
ment plan. 147 The participation is heavily skewed toward higher in-
come workers.' 48 About seventy-seven percent of workers earning
more than $30,000 participate in a plan, while fewer than thirteen
percent of workers earning less than $10,000 participate. 149 The re-
tirement plan system mainly benefits the higher-earning half of the
labor force. The technical definition that retirement plan law pro-
vides for the highly compensated employee group limits that group to
approximately the most highly paid five percent of the of the total
labor force. 50 If mandated vesting were effective as an income redis-
tribution device (which it is not),' 5 ' it would be redistributing income
largely from the most highly paid five percent of the workforce to
those in the fiftieth to ninety-fifth percentiles. Such redistribution
WALTER J. BLUM & HARRY KALvEN, JR., THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION
104 (1953).
For a recent summary of data suggesting an increasingly unequal distribution of
income, and an argument that this unequal distribution of income justifies greater
progressivity in the income tax rate structure, see Martin J. McMahon, Jr. & Alice G.
Abreu, Winner-Take-All Markets: Easing the Case for Progressive Taxation, 4 FLA. TAX REV.
1 (1998). See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Making the Case for a Constitutional Right to
Minimum Entitlements, 44 MERcER L. REv. 525 (1993) (arguing that the U.S. Constitu-
tion should be interpreted to provide citizens with a right to basic subsistence).
147 See infra note 274 and accompanying text.
148 The data demonstrate that few of the lowest income workers participate in a
plan, while 80% of those earning $50,000 or more do participate.
Retirement Plan Participation, 1993
Annual Earnings Participation Rate
(1993 dollars) (percentage)
Under $5000 3
$5000-9999 13
$10,000-14,999 29
$15,000-19,999 45
$20,000-24,999 61
$25,000-29,999 64
$30,000-49,999 75
$50,000 or more 80
McDoNNELL ET AL., supra note 5, at 91.
149 See id.
150 See infra note 232 and accompanying text.
151 See infra notes 254-66 and accompanying text.
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would do little for the least privileged workers, and it cannot justify
mandated vesting or the present structure of retirement plan law.
As a theoretical matter, mandated vesting cannot be an effective
income redistribution mechanism. The ultimate explanation is the
fact that the private retirement plan system is voluntary. This analysis
will demonstrate that in our voluntary system, employers will adjust
employees compensation packages, and retirement plans will adjust
benefit levels, in order to eliminate any additional retirement benefits
that are mandated by vesting mandates or by other aspects of retire-
ment plan law. Mandated vesting will not increase the retirement
benefits of short-tenure employees and non-highly compensated em-
ployees. 152 As a program for income redistribution, mandated vesting
will prove futile. And mandated vesting is destructive of our voluntary
system. 153 To justify mandated vesting, then, a purpose other than
income redistribution must be found.
4. Protection of Employee Interests
Mandated vesting might be justified as necessary to provide an
adequate level of protection of employee interests in retirement bene-
fits. In other words, even granting that mandated vesting reduces the
aggregate total of retirement benefits provided to employees, one
might conclude that it is preferable to have a smaller quantity of the
more secure retirement benefits that mandated vesting promises.
This Subsection briefly reviews justifications for mandated vesting that
are independent of its effects upon the aggregate amount of retire-
ment benefits or the distribution of those benefits among employees.
The sponsorship of a retirement plan by an employer appears to
create legal and financial relationships that are fraught with potential
for disappointment of employees' expectations. A promise by a spon-
soring employer and a retirement plan to pay retirement benefits is an
executory promise with an unusually long performance period. As
noted above, an employee might provide services as long as sixty-five
years prior to complete performance of the promise of retirement
benefits. 54 The lengthy performance period virtually ensures that
there will be numerous changes in circumstances for the sponsoring
employer, the retirement plan, and the employee. Much of ERISA
can be understood as an effort to protect an employee from loss of
152 See infra note 253 and accompanying text.
153 See infra notes 264-83 and accompanying text.
154 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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her retirement benefits during her potentially lengthy working career
and retirement period. 155
Mandated vesting limits one specific risk to an employee's retire-
ment benefits, the risk that the benefits will be forfeited because the
employee fails to complete a requisite period of service. Limitation of
the risk of forfeiture by a long-serving employee appears to present a
compelling case for governmental restriction on the freedom of con-
tract. In a narrow sense, the forfeitability of a retirement plan partici-
pant's accrued benefits creates a conflict of interest for the sponsoring
employer. By definition, long-deferred vesting extends the period
during which retirement benefits are forfeitable and increases the
amount of a potential forfeiture. In the case of a pension plan, forfeit-
ures directly and immediately reduce the amount of contributions
that the employer must pay to the trust. Since employment is gener-
ally an "at will" relationship between employer and employee, 156 an
employer is in a position to reap an immediate economic benefit by
terminating unvested pension plan participants. In the case of a
profit-sharing plan, forfeitures directly increase the accrued benefits
of long-tenure employees, who generally have stronger preferences
for retirement benefits. By causing forfeitures of accrued profit-shar-
ing benefits, an employer could indirectly capture economic benefit
by allocating retirement benefits to those employees who value the
benefits most highly. Long-deferred vesting appears to create a finan-
cial incentive for an employer to renege upon the promise of retire-
ment benefits.
This risk-the risk of loss of retirement benefits-was cited by
Congress in 1973 as a reason to mandate minimum levels of vesting in
ERISA
Over two-thirds of the private retirement plans provide vested rights
to retirement benefits before retirement. However, as a general
rule, employees do not acquire vested rights until they have accu-
mulated a fairly long period of service with the firm and/or are rela-
tively mature.
At present, only one of every three employees participating in
employer-financed plans has a 50 percent or greater vested right to
his accrued retirement benefits. Moreover, 58 percent of covered
155 See H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 1 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.AN. 4639,4639
("The primary purpose of the bill [a precursor of ERISA] is the protection of individ-
ual pension rights, but the committee has been constrained to recognize the volun-
tary nature of private retirement plans."); LANGBErN & WoLy, supra note 13, at 97
("The central problem to which ERISA is addressed is the loss of pension benefits
previously promised.").
156 See E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CoNTRAcTs 513 (3d ed. 1999).
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employees between the ages of fifty and sixty and 54 percent of cov-
ered employees sixty years of age and over do not have a qualified
vested right to even 50 percent of their accrued retirement benefits.
As a result, even employees with substantial periods of service may
lose retirement benefits on separation from employment. Extreme
cases have been noted in which employees have lost retirement
rights at advanced ages as a result of being discharged shortly
before they would be eligible to retire.157
Congress relied extensively on the conclusions of the Wirtz Report in its
explanations for mandated vesting. The Report of the Senate Com-
mittee on Labor and Public Welfare simply quoted the Wirtz Commit-
tee's conclusion: "[T]he degree of retirement protection in private
pension plans varies widely and in many cases remains quite
inadequate." 158
The Wirtz Report itself offers further explanation for mandated
vesting:
As a matter of equity and fair treatment, an employee covered by a
pension plan is entitled, after a reasonable period of service, to pro-
tection of his future retirement benefit against any termination of
his employment. Vesting validates the accepted concept that em-
ployer contributions to pension plans represent 'deferred compen-
sation,' which the individual worker earns through service with his
employer.
Without vesting, a worker displaced after long years of service is
denied all of his accrued pension protection. A worker in a similar
position who voluntarily changes his employment has to forfeit his
right to a future pension. Both circumstances are charged with
inequity.1 59
One argument is premised on the "accepted concept" that an em-
ployer's contributions to a retirement plan represent deferred com-
pensation that has been earned by the participants in the plan. This
argument merely begs the question about mandated vesting of retire-
ment benefits. Obviously retirement benefits are a form of deferred
compensation. 60 But the question remains about the extent to which
a retirement plan ought to be permitted to offer retirement benefits
that are contingent upon an employee's completion of a specified pe-
riod of service. Observing that retirement benefits are a form of de-
ferred compensation does not advance understanding of reasons for
mandated vesting.
157 H.R. REP. No. 93-807, at 12 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4679.
158 S. REP. No. 93-127, at 8 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4845.
159 WntTz REPORT, supra note 11, at 39.
160 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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The other explanation developed in the Wirtz Report focuses upon
the inequity of a long-term employee's forfeiture of accrued benefits.
Cases involving such forfeitures evidence two types of characteristics,
which can be labeled "abusive," and "innocent." The prototypical for-
feiture evidencing abusive characteristics would result from an em-
ployer's purposeful termination of a faultless employee for the
purpose of capturing the value of the employee's accrued benefits.' 6 '
An example of a case evidencing innocent characteristics might be a
termination of employment that results from the loss of an employer's
place of business due to a natural disaster. Mandated vesting reduces
the risks of loss by a plan participant from both sorts of forfeitures.
Forfeitures that clearly evidence abusive characteristics were spe-
cifically targeted by section 510 of ERISA:
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, ex-
pel, discipline, or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary
for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions
of an employee benefit plan .... or for the purpose of interfering
with the attainment of any right to which such participant may be-
come entitled under the plan .... 162
Under this provision, if a participant were able to prove that her em-
ployer terminated her employment for the purpose of causing a for-
feiture of her retirement benefits, then she would be entitled to
restoration of the benefits. As we consider whether the advantages of
mandated vesting and further acceleration of vesting periods exceed
the detriments associated with the mandates, the protections that sec-
tion 510 offers should be included in the balance.
Variations of abusive characteristics arise from the concern that
an employer might utilize a retirement plan as a mechanism to de-
fraud employees. In stark terms, a plan might promise to pay retire-
ment benefits, which the plan understands is a promise that it will not
have to perform for many years and until after the employee has com-
pleted providing services for her entire working career, but then,
when the time for the plan's performance arrives, the plan relies upon
inadequately disclosed vesting provisions to deny the participant re-
tirement benefits.163 Employees do face great challenges in monitor-
ing their own entitlement to retirement benefits. A retirement plan
161 Cf supra note 155 and accompanying text.
162 ERISA § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1994).
163 See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979) (deny-
ing a remedy for fraud under the federal securities laws to a pre-ERISA retirement
plan participant who failed to qualify for a pension from a union retirement plan
because a seven month break in service prevented his satisfying the requirement for
20 years of continuous service).
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW[
creates a substantively complex legal structure; detailed and precise
factual information must be gathered in order to predict the benefits
that a particular participant may receive at any given time. Most em-
ployees have a very limited understanding of their retirement benefits
in general and about conditions which might cause forfeiture in par-
ticular.'6 In fact, it may be entirely reasonable for an employee to fail
to devote resources to learning the terms of her employer's retire-
ment plan. During the early years of an employee's career, accrued
retirement benefits have a small economic present value; this small
value must be further discounted to the extent it is not fully vested. 165
And even this small economic value might be further undervalued
since employees may systematically under-estimate the importance of
retirement benefits.1 66 Even if employees expend effort in an attempt
to understand important aspects of their employer's retirement plan,
there is little reason for optimism that their understandings will be
accurate. 167 In most cases, monitoring of a retirement plan by partici-
pants is unlikely to directly and immediately constrain abusive action
to a significant degree.
A more effective constraint on plan abuse exists. An employer
has a strong incentive to honor its commitments under retirement
plans in order to protect its reputation among its current employees.
164 See, e.g., DAN M. McGILL ET AL., FuNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 354
(1996).
[O]verall measures of participants' knowledge of how their retirement pro-
grams are working is [sic] disappointing.
... In assessing covered workers' knowledge about their defined contri-
bution plans, [the findings indicate] that only about half of those workers
whose employers contribute to the plans believed that [the employers
contributed].
. . . [D]ata ... suggest that retirement plan participants know little
about their plans.
Id.
165 Cf. Wiedenbeck, supra note 120, at 574 ("For most workers, the cost of evaluat-
ing the specialized terms and particular finances of numerous alternative plans (asso-
ciated with different employment opportunities) may exceed the benefit of a
marginally more valuable pension.").
166 See POSNER, supra note 71, at 70-72; Weiss, supra note 60, at 1300-06.
167 Professor Kim recently reported data on workers' knowledge of the "at will"
condition that applies to almost all non-unionized employment. The at will condition
of an employment relationship is a far more simple and immediate component of the
conditions of employment than the retirement plan and its extensive terms and con-
ditions. Kim concluded that the "data reveal a striking level of misunderstanding
among respondents of the most basic legal rules governing the employment relation-
ship." Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information, 83 GoRNELL L. REV. 105,
133 (1997).
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This is known as the "reputational constraint." If the employer were
to abuse its retirement plan and the retirement benefits of long-ten-
ure employees or retirees, present employees would tend to (further)
discount the value of their pension promises. The employer's retire-
ment plan could no longer act as an effective compensation device for
the sponsoring employer and any advantage that it could draw from
the plan would be destroyed. Generally, the present value of the fu-
ture gains to a sponsoring employer from continuation of its retire-
ment plan would exceed any gains that an employer might reap from
abusive forfeitures. So long as an employer expects to continue its
business, the balance of the incentives that it faces dearly favors oper-
ating the plan so as to maximize the value that current employees
assign to their expectancy of future retirement benefits.1 68 When an
employer and its employees opt to include retirement benefits in the
employees' compensation packages, an implicit element of that
choice is that the employer will administer the plan in a manner that
realizes the parties' expectations.
The efficacy of the reputational constraint is validated by empiri-
cal studies. Prior to ERISA's vesting mandate, employers did not en-
gage in a pattern of firing workers shortly before they became
vested. 169 More broadly, the data directly refute the hypotheses that
fraud was, or is, an important problem in the retirement plan system
or that the risk of fraud discourages employees from participation in
retirement plans. 170 Justification of mandated vesting as a response to
retirement plan abuse should be an empirical exercise. The data that
exist suggest that plan abuse does not offer strong grounds for imposi-
168 This analysis does not hold true in the case of an employer that is facing finan-
cial difficulty.
169 See Christopher Cornwell et al., Opportunistic Behavior by Firms in Implicit Pen-
sions Contracts, J. HUM. REsouRcs 704, 721 (1991) ("Our results suggest that anec-
dotes of unvested workers fired just before retirement apparently were exceptions,
not the rule, prior to ERISA.").
170 See generally PosNE_, supra note 71, at 303 ("[T]here is no persuasive evidence
that pension abuses were so widespread as to justify the imposition of a complex
scheme of federal regulation. On the contrary, careful empirical research has shown
that before ERISA opportunistic discharges of workers covered by a pension plan
were rare and that ERISA has had no detectable impact on discharges of covered
workers."); Richard A. Ippolito, A Study of the Regulatory Effect of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act, 31 J.L. & ECON. 85, 100-01 (1988) ("[N]o evidence was found to
support the notion that fraud was an important problem in the pension market.").
Notwithstanding the lack of evidence, the theoretical potential for abuse of re-
tirement plans figures prominently in discussion of the regulation of retirement
plans, including vesting mandates. See, e.g., ERISA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994);
GREENOUGTH & KNG, supra note 132, at 155.
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tion of uniform mandated vesting on every retirement plan in the
United States.
Plan participants also forfeit retirement benefits in entirely inno-
cent circumstances-for example, upon termination of employment
resulting from a natural disaster. In addition to the vesting provisions
that have been discussed under the rubric of mandated vesting, other
provisions of retirement plan law compel vesting in certain circum-
stances. If a retirement plan is terminated, in full or in part, the re-
tirement benefits of participants affected by the termination must
become fully vested when the plan termination is effective. 171 In cases
in which an employer's business is terminated or substantially con-
tracted, causing full or partial termination of its retirement plan, the
retirement benefits of the affected plan participants will vest under
this rule. This rule protects retirement plan participants from forfei-
ture in many cases of "innocent" termination of employment. The
need for mandated vesting is mitigated by the existence of the plan
termination vesting provisions.
Another variation of innocent termination of employment raises
more difficult issues. Some employees are forced to quit a particular
job for reasons completely unrelated to the job or the employee's ca-
reer choices-for example, when an employee must leave employ-
ment for family reasons. In these cases, mandated accelerated vesting
is the only public policy that will protect the employee from forfeiture.
Of course the impact on business operations from the loss of an em-
ployee who quits for family reasons is the same as the impact from an
employee who quits in order to take a betterjob. Loss of an employee
imposes costs on the employer in addition to any costs imposed on the
employee. In order to reduce these losses, some employers would
choose deferred vesting. If that choice is the correct one for that em-
ployer and its workforce, both the employer and the employees may
gain from increased job tenures. 72 The policy decision becomes a
balance between the imposition of real economic losses on an "inno-
cent" employee and the elimination of the possibility for economic
gains from greater flexibility in retirement plan design. There is little
reason to believe that the present schedule of mandated vesting repre-
sents any systematic or reasoned resolution of that balance.
171 SeeI.R.C. § 411(d) (3) (1994&Supp. III1997). The rules requiring full vesting
upon full or partial termination of a plan are part of the nondiscrimination regime.
See infra note 205 and accompanying text. See generally 1 CANAN, supra note 23,
§§ 20.1-.3; LANGBEIN & WOLI, supra note 13, at 122.
172 See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
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In summary, protection of employee interests in retirement bene-
fits does not offer any clear-cut justification for mandated vesting.
The connection between retirement plan abuse and mandated vesting
is ultimately an empirical question, and existing data does not estab-
lish that plan abuse was a substantial problem prior to the enactment
of mandated vesting. Judgments about balancing equities among a
sponsoring employer, its workforce generally, and the interests of in-
dividual short-tenure employees are just that-judgments. In reality,
more vesting will come at the cost of reducing retirement benefits for
U.S. workers. Prudence demands attention to the costs of mandated
vesting before reformers simply assume that they are "improving" the
lot of the worker.
III. MANDATED VESTING AND THE MONOLITH OF
RETIREmENT PLAN LAw
Legally imposed mandated vesting might appear to affect retire-
ment plan design only by limiting the periods during which a partici-
pant's accrued retirement benefits might remain forfeitable.
Appearances once again deceive. In order for mandated vesting to be
effectively implemented, it is necessary to impose legal regulation on all
other important elements in the design of a retirement plan. Regula-
tion must constrain the of design the plan's rules that govern employ-
ees' participation, benefit accrual, crediting of employees' service,
and the payment of benefits. These rules, together with the specific
rules that limit the periods of forfeitability, form the mandated vesting
regime, the subject of Section III.A. In addition, effective implemen-
tation of mandated vesting depends upon the existence of the nondis-
crimination regime, a body of income tax law requiring that a
retirement plan provide retirement benefits to at least some of the
sponsoring employer's non-highly compensated employees, and that
those benefits be reasonably comparable to the benefits provided to
highly compensated employees. The nondiscrimination regime and
its connections with mandated vesting are the subject of Section
llI.B.173 If these additional supporting rules did not exist, mandated
vesting could not protect employees with lengthy service from loss of
retirement benefits.
Explication of these supporting rules is necessary to appreciate
the full impact of mandated vesting on the private retirement plan
system. The policy decision to regulate vesting implies the complete
regulation of which employees may participate in a retirement plan,
173 See infra note 205 and accompanying text.
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when those employees participate, the benefits that may be accrued by
different employees, when those benefits accrue, and how and when
the benefits may be paid to retired employees. This extensive and
detailed regulation implies that fewer employers will be able to design
a retirement plan that provides added value for an employer's
workforce. Fewer retirement plans implies a loss of potential retire-
ment benefits for those employees who are employed in workforces
for which a value-adding retirement plan can no longer be designed.
Mandated vesting has such a substantial impact on the voluntary re-
tirement plan system because vesting rules are not simply about limita-
tions on periods of forfeitability, but about limitations on all aspects of
retirement plan design.
Twenty years ago, Dean Osgood characterized retirement plan
law as having a "monolithic nature"; he suggested that "[i]n order for
a person to approach one aspect of the subject, familiarity with the
entire field is probably a necessity."'174 Osgood was right; retirement
plan law really is a monolith. The analysis in this part demonstrates
that mandated vesting is inseparable from the balance of retirement
plan law. In his article, Osgood suggested a departure from the con-
sideration of the entire monolith of retirement plan regulation. He
proposed the consideration of a mandate requiring 100% immediate
vesting as a separate and discrete change in retirement plan law.175 In
this respect, Osgood was wrong. A proper consideration of mandated
vesting requires that vesting regulation be analyzed in the context of
the entire employer-employee relationship. In American law, much
of that relationship, including the choice of whether it will include
retirement benefits, is left to the voluntary agreements of the parties.
Against this background of voluntary choices, an effort to regulate
one, seemingly discrete, aspect of the employer-employee relationship
will inevitably lead the parties to adjust other elements of their ar-
rangement. These longer-run effects on the totality of the employ-
ment relationship will tend toward returning the relationship to the
closest possible approximation of the arrangement that existed prior
to the legal mandate.
This process by which an employer and its employees adjust the
voluntary aspects of their relationship elucidates the effects of man-
dated vesting. Prior to the enactment of mandated vesting standards,
most retirement plans provided some level of vesting for participants
in retirement plans.176 That is, under a legal regime that permitted
174 Osgood, supra note 10, at 452-53.
175 See id.
176 See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
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voluntary design of retirement plan vesting schedules, different retire-
ment plans evolved toward providing different levels of vested benefits
to various participants, while at the same time providing for the forfei-
ture of the benefits of other participants. Vesting provisions varied
across plans, employers, and industries. But plans were free to evolve
toward maximizing their value to both employers and employees. In
industries in which retirement plan design was an important competi-
tive element, employers that provided the most efficient retirement
plan designs would be most competitive and therefore most likely to
succeed. In a voluntary system, retirement plans evolved toward those
designs that allocated the greatest shares of the plan contributions to
those participants who placed the highest value on retirement bene-
fits. In other words, retirement plan design evolved toward the most
efficient use of plan contributions.
When a new vesting mandate is introduced, some retirement
plans are compelled to provide more rapid vesting than was provided
under the pre-mandate schedule. The initial effect of accelerated
vesting is to provide vested retirement benefits to some employees,
the short-tenure employees, who did not receive benefits under a vol-
untary retirement plan design. Assuming that the pre-mandate vest-
ing schedule represented the most efficient use of retirement plan
contributions, after the vesting mandate the retirement plan (initially)
will allocate retirement benefits to participants who place a lower
value on those benefits. This situation is unstable because it creates
an incentive for the plan to eliminate the allocation of benefits to
short-tenure employees, and it creates a demand by long-tenure em-
ployees for a return to their prior level of benefits.177 These incen-
tives create a continuing pressure for retirement plan design to
minimize or to avoid the impact of the vesting mandates. In order to
forestall avoidance of the vesting mandates, Congress found it neces-
sary to create a comprehensive structure of supporting rules.
A. The Mandated Vesting Regime
1. Participation of Employees
A retirement plan provides retirement benefits only to employees
who "participate" in the plan; employees, who have met all conditions
for participation in the plan and who are accruing benefits under the
plan are referred to as "participants." 178 Just as no law requires that
177 See infra notes 255-64 and accompanying text.
178 An employee is a "participant" in a retirement plan after she has met any re-
quirements for participation-typically attainment of a minimum age and completion
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employees receive any retirement benefits, no law requires that retire-
ment benefits must be provided to all, or to any specific group, of an
employer's employees. A retirement plan may be designed to cover a
"reasonable classification" of employees who may become eligible to
participate in a retirement plan.179 This group of employees eligible
to participate in a plan is referred to as the group of employees "cov-
ered" by the plan.180 For example, a retirement plan may be designed
to cover only salaried employees and to exclude hourly employees, or
to cover only employees working in a particular division, subsidiary, or
geographic location operated by the employer, or to cover employees
who work in a particular job category.181 Those employees who are
not included in the classifications that are covered by the retirement
plan are permanently excluded from the plan.
The design of a retirement plan to classify employees and to des-
ignate the groups to be covered and excluded has both voluntary and
mandatory aspects. The general background norm is the voluntary
choice to provide or not to provide retirement benefits to employees.
However, the choices to provide benefits to particular groups of em-
ployees are constrained by the Code's nondiscrimination rules; 182 in
the most general terms, the nondiscrimination rules mandate that if a
retirement plan provides benefits to one or more "highly compen-
sated employees," then the plan must provide some reasonably com-
parable benefits to "non-highly compensated employees."183 The
nondiscrimination rules include "minimum coverage requirements"
of a specified period of service-and has begun to accrue retirement benefits. "The
term 'participant' means any employee or former employee of an employer.., who is
or may become eligible to receive a benefit of any type from an employee benefit
plan .. .or whose beneficiaries may be eligible to receive any such benefit." ERISA
§ 3(7), 29 U.S.C. 1002(7) (1994).
179 See I.R.C. § 410(b) (2) (A) (i) (1994); Treas. Reg. § 1.410(a)-3(d) (amended
1991); id. § 1.410(b)-4(b) (recognizing that a retirement plan may establish reason-
able classifications based upon objective, bona fide business criteria, but not classifica-
tions that have the effect of enumerating employees by name); see also infra note 219
and accompanying text.
180 A retirement plan may "cover" all employees of the sponsoring employer, or it
may cover only a portion of the sponsoring employer's employees. A retirement plan
"covers" a group of employees if employees included in that group are eligible to
become participants in the plan upon completion of any conditions required prior to
participation, such as an employee's completion of one year of service or the attain-
ment of age 21. See infra notes 186-87 and accompanying text. The group of employ-
ees eligible for participation must be defined by a reasonable classification of
employees. See infra note 219 and accompanying text.
181 See Treas. Reg. § 1.410(b)-4(b).
182 See infra notes 206-47 and accompanying text.
183 See infra notes 205-09 and accompanying text.
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that impose specific requirements about the numbers of non-highly
compensated employees who must receive benefits. 8 4 The important
connections among the nondiscrimination rules, the minimum cover-
age requirements, and mandated vesting are explored below.' 8 5 In
the present context of regulation of employee participation, the es-
sential idea is that a plan's designation of the group of employees to
be covered is subject to mandatory regulation by the nondiscrimina-
tion rules. The classification of employees covered must be a nondis-
criminatory group of employees.
After a retirement plan has identified a nondiscriminatory group
of employees to be covered, the plan must establish rules governing
which employees in that group actually will become participants in the
plan. Of course the plan could simply extend participation to any
employee who became a member of the covered group. This would
imply that newly hired employees would begin participation with their
first hour of service with the sponsoring employer. However, the typi-
cal retirement plan imposes some conditions prior to a covered em-
ployee becoming a participant in the plan; these conditions are
usually the completion of a minimum period of service, attainment of
a minimum age, or a combination of these conditions. The participa-
tion rules of retirement plan law forbid a plan from requiring an em-
ployee to complete, as a condition for participation in the plan, a
period of service in excess of one year (two years if the plan provides
100% vesting upon completion of two years of service).186 Any mini-
mum age condition for participation may not exceed age twenty-
one.18 7 A typical retirement plan participation provision would state
that an employee (in a covered group) shall become a participant in
the plan after completing one year of service and attaining age twenty-
one.
1 88
If retirement plan law did not constrain a retirement plan's par-
ticipation rules, participation requirements could impair or defeat a
vesting mandate. For example, if a retirement plan could require that
an employee complete twenty years of service prior to beginning par-
184 See I.RLC. § 410(b) (1994); see also infra note 233 and accompanying text.
185 See infra notes 245-53 and accompanying text.
186 See I.R.C. § 410(a) (1) (A) (ii) (1994); ERISA § 202(a)(1)(A)(ii), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1052(a) (1) (A) (ii) (1994).
187 See I.R.C. § 410(a)(1)(A)(i) (1994); ERISA §202(a)(1)(A)(i), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1052(a) (1) (A) (i) (1994).
188 See, e.g., 1 CANAN, supra note 23, at 1180. Actual entry in a plan may be de-
ferred until the next plan "entry date," which may not be more than six months after
completion of the conditions for participation. See I.RLC. § 410(a) (4) (1994); ERISA
§ 202(a) (4) (B), 29 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (4) (B) (1994).
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ticipation in the plan, then an employee would not begin to actually
accrue retirement benefits until late in her career of service.'8 9 Such
a plan could provide a high rate of benefit accrual, so that the total
retirement benefit might approximate that which could have been
earned over a longer period of participation. This high rate of benefit
accrual would be earned only by those who satisfied the lengthy condi-
tions for participation, so that the effect would be functionally similar
to long-deferred vesting. By constraining the design of a plan's partic-
ipation rules, retirement plan law closes off this escape from man-
dated vesting.
The limitations on the period of service that may be required as a
condition for participation compels a further set of rules defining a
"year of service." In the absence of a mandated definition of a year of
service, a retirement plan might define the term in such a way that
only long-tenure employees would be likely to earn a year of service
for participation. ERISA and the Code mandate that a retirement
plan must grant every employee a year of service for participation pur-
poses in any year during which the employee completes at least 1000
"hours of service" during a twelve-consecutive-month period.190 Ref-
erence to "hours of service" brings this element of the employment
relationship within the regulatory monolith: ERISA directs the Secre-
tary of Labor to prescribe regulations defining an "hour of service."' 91
The participation regulations ensure that an employee comes within
the statutory protections as soon as she begins employment. Every
employee (in a covered group) who satisfies the statutory minimum
conditions is assured of participation in her employer's retirement
plan. And participation sets the employee on a course that can lead
to vesting, and ultimately, to receipt of retirement benefits.
2. Accrual of Retirement Benefits
The next layers of support for mandated vesting are the statutory
minimum standards for a retirement plan's definition of the partici-
pant's accrued retirement benefit. After an employee has become a
189 One can envision various combinations of long-deferred participation require-
ments: a plan might require that an employee attain age 55 or perhaps satisfy some
combination of age and years of service.
190 See I.R.C. § 410(a) (3) (1994); ERISA § 202(a) (3), 29 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (3)
(1994). Participation in the plan must commence no later than six months after com-
pletion of the participation conditions. See I.R.C. §410(a)(4) (1994); ERISA
§ 202(a) (4), 29 U.S.C. § 1052 (a) (4) (1994).
191 See I.R.C. §§ 410(a) (3) (C), 411(a) (5) (B) (1994 & Supp. III 1997); ERISA
§§ 202(a) (3) (C), 203(b) (2) (B), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1052, 1053 (1994 & Supp. III 1997); see
also infra note 200 and accompanying text.
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participant in her retirement plan, she begins to earn-that is, to ac-
crue-a retirement benefit. In general terms, the participant's "ac-
crued benefit" is the amount of retirement benefits that a participant
has earned at any given time during her period of participation in a
retirement plan. The definition of the accrued benefit is vital to the
structure of mandated vesting, since it is this accrued benefit in which
a participant must be granted vested rights.192 In the case of a de-
fined contribution plan, the participant's accrued benefit must be de-
fined as the participant's individual account balance.' 93 The
individual account balance represents all of the retirement benefits
that a participant has earned.194 By requiring that a participant ac-
quire vested rights in her account balance, the vesting mandate ap-
plies to all retirement benefits that the participant has earned. 95
In the case of a defined benefit plan, the participant's accrued
benefit is the amount of retirement benefit (calculated to begin at the
normal retirement age) that a participant has earned based upon her
years of service and compensation history through the date for which
the accrued benefit is being determined. In concept, the Code and
ERISA require that a defined benefit plan must provide that a partici-
pant's benefit accrues approximately evenly over her entire period of
participation. 96 The concept that defined benefits accrue evenly over
192 See I.R.G. § 411(a)(1)-(2) (1994 & Supp. III 1997); ERISA § 203(a) (2), 29
U.S.C. § 1053 (a) (2) (1994).
193 See I.R.C. § 411. In the case of a profit-sharing plan, there is no entitlement to
accrual of a benefit; benefit accrual is dependent upon a contribution being made to
the plan. The essence of a profit-sharing plan is that the sponsoring employer has no
continuing legal obligation to contribute to the plan. However, if a contribution is
made, it must be allocated among participants in the plan-that is, it must be added
to the balance held in each participant's "individual account." In a defined contribu-
tion plan, all contributions must be allocated annually. The balance of each partici-
pant's account is the participant's "accrued benefit" Thus, if a contribution is made
to a profit-sharing plan, then there necessarily must be an accrual of benefits for
participants.
194 See I.RC. § 411(a)(7)(A)(ii) (1994 & Supp. III 1997); ERISA § 3(23)(B), 29
U.S.C. § 1002(23) (B) (1994).
195 In the absence of this definitional constraint, a retirement plan might erode
the vesting mandate by granting a participant vested rights in something less than all
retirement benefits that she had earned as of a given date.
196 In extremely general terms, the accrual rules require a defined benefit plan to
accrue the benefit of a participant on a roughly pro rata basis, over a period begin-
ning no later than the participant's third year of service with the sponsoring em-
ployer, and ending at the participant's projected retirement at the plan's specified
normal retirement age. For example, consider a case of a participant who completes
seven years of service and then terminates employment. Assume that the participant
is age 41 at the time of termination, and that the plan's normal retirement age is 65,
so that period of 24 years must elapse between the participant's termination of em-
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a participant's period of participation is imposed in order to prevent a
defined benefit plan from "backloading" the participant's benefit ac-
crual. Backloading would occur if the plan provided that dispropor-
tionately large portions of a participant's benefit were earned late in
her career. 97 If backloading were permitted, a plan could evade
mandated vesting by granting vested rights, but the actual benefit in
which the participant was vested would be relatively small during some
lengthy portion of the participant's career. Then, if a participant
completed a substantial period of service, she would accrue the bulk
of her pension late in her career.19 8 Backloading would substantially
ployment and her receipt of a retirement benefit. The essence of a defined benefit
plan is to provide a definitely determinable benefit at normal retirement age, so logic
dictates that a participant who terminates employment prior to retirement age ought
to receive something less than the retirement benefit received by a participant who
works until retirement. In the case of our participant who terminated employment at
age 41, assume that the plan imposed a one-year of service requirement prior to par-
ticipation. Thus the participant began employment at age 34, began participation in
the plan at age 35, had six years of service at termination, and would have had 30
years of participation if she had remained employed until normal retirement age.
The fractional accrual rule treats the participant's retirement benefit as accruing
evenly over these years, allocating 6/30's of the participant's projected retirement
benefit at normal retirement age to her six years of plan participation. Six-thirtieths
of the participant's projected retirement benefit is the participant's accrued benefit at
the date of termination of employment. The various vesting rules are then applied to
this accrued benefit.
197 The accrual rules limit the "backloading" of a participant's accrual of her bene-
fit in a defined benefit plan. Benefit accrual would be backloaded when dispropor-
tionately large fractions of the benefit accrue in the last few years of the participant's
plan participation. An explicitly backloaded defined benefit would approximate the
effects of long-deferred vesting since long-tenure employees would earn much larger
benefits than short-tenure employees.
198 Mandated vesting compels intensely detailed regulation of a participant's ac-
crual of benefits under a defined benefit plan. If retirement plan law failed to regu-
late benefit accrual, the vesting mandate could be largely defeated. A retirement plan
could provide, for example, that a participant would accrue no retirement benefits
during the first two-thirds of her projected career of service, and that benefits would
then accrue on a pro rata basis over the last one-third of the career. If a participant
began to accrue benefits under a retirement plan at age 35, and assuming a normal
retirement age of 65, the participant would have a projected accrual period of 30
years. If accrual were not required to be approximately pro rata, this participant
would accrue no benefits until she had been employed for 20 years (when she would
be 55 years old). Then during her last 10 years of participation, she would accrue her
entire retirement benefit (in which she would always be 100% vested since she had
long since completed seven years of service). In effect, if a plan were permitted to
control the accrual of benefits, the plan would be able to substantially replicate the
effects of long-deferred vesting. Regulation of the manner in which retirement plan
participants earn their retirement benefits is necessary for the efficacy of mandated
vesting.
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replicate the effects of long-deferred vesting. The defined benefit ac-
crual rules prevent this escape from mandated vesting. For the vest-
ing mandate to be effective, retirement plan law must impose detailed
regulation of benefit accrual.
3. Crediting Years of Service
The vesting rules require that a retirement plan grant a partici-
pant the mandated minimum vested rights in the participant's ac-
crued benefits. The five-year cliff vesting schedule and the seven-year
graded vesting schedule both define the required percentages of vest-
ing with reference to the number of years of service which the partici-
pant has completed. 199 Obviously both of these schedules depend
upon the definition of a "year of service"; that dependency necessi-
tates regulation of the definition of a year of service. ERISA and the
Code require that a participant be credited with one year of service
for vesting purposes for each plan year in which she works at least
1000 hours for the sponsoring employer.200 This requirement is but-
tressed by the mandate that all years of service must be taken into
account for vesting (subject to numerous technical exceptions)*201
Labor regulations define "hour of service" and periods of service in
hypertechnical detail. The original policy decision to mandate vesting
inexorably leads to a regulatory regime that rests upon the details,
hour by hour, of an employee's entire career of service with an
employer.
For example, in the absence of restrictions on the definition of a year of service, a
plan could limit the crediting of years of service for vesting purposes to service per-
formed by employees after they had been assigned to, or promoted to, certain job
classifications, such as "senior operator" or "team supervisor." These job classifica-
tions could be structured so that in general practice, the classifications were restricted
to long-tenure employees. This would enable the plan to limit vesting to employees
who completed periods of service that might be generally longer than those permit-
ted under the years of service vesting rules. In order to prevent such indirect exten-
sions of the permissible vesting periods, ERISA and the Code require that all years of
service be taken into account for vesting, subject to exceptions.
199 See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
200 See I.R.C. § 411(a)(5) (1994 & Supp. III 1997); ERISA § 203(b)(2)(C), 29
U.S.C. § 1053(b) (2) (1994). ERISA directs the Secretary of Labor to define "hour of
service." I.R.C. §§ 410(a)(3)(C), 411(a) (5) (B) (1994 & Supp. III 1997); ERISA
§§ 202(a) (3) (C), 203(b) (2) (B), 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). The regu-
lations define an "hour of service." 29 C.F.R. § 2530.200a-1 to .201-2 (1976).
201 ERISA § 203(b) (1) includes several pages of detailed statutory rules control-
ling which years of service may be disregarded for vesting purposes. See ERISA
§ 203(b) (1), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a) (2) (B) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). The rules are re-
peated in the Code, see I.R.C. § 411 (a) (4) (1994 & Supp. III 1997), and have spawned
pages of detailed regulations, see Treas. Regs. § 1.411(a)-5 to -6 (amended 1980).
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4. Time of Payment of Retirement Benefits
An effective mandated vesting regime also compels regulation of
the time at which retirement benefits are to be paid to a participant.
Even though a participant has vested rights to receive retirement ben-
efits, those benefits are not paid to the participant until the occur-
rence of the time for payment as specified in the retirement plan. If
the time for payment of benefits under a retirement plan were left
unregulated, a plan could replicate at least one element of long-de-
ferred vesting. As a hypothetical example, the plan could comply with
participation, service crediting, accrual, and vesting rules, but the plan
might provide that benefits would not be paid to a participant until
the participant had completed twenty years of service. If a participant
failed to meet such a service requirement, then the participant herself
would never receive retirement benefits. (Of course, since the partici-
pant's benefit was "vested," the benefit could not be forfeited and it
would have to be paid to some recipient at some point; hypothetically,
the benefits might be paid after the participant's death to her desig-
nated beneficiary or other successor.20 2) This hypothetical plan could
pay retirement benefits only to long-tenure employees, which is one of
the important effects of a plan with long-deferred vesting.
ERISA and the Code preclude a retirement plan from approxi-
mating long-deferred vesting with the plan's benefit payment provi-
sions. Retirement plan law requires that a plan begin actual payment
of benefits reasonably promptly after the later of a participant's attain-
ing the normal retirement age or actually retiring, unless the partici-
pant elects otherwise.20 3 These provisions are necessary to insure that
vested accrued benefits are actually paid to the participant as retire-
ment benefits after the participant retires from active employment. In
order for the vesting mandate to be effectively implemented, the time
202 Assuming that the successor is a natural object of the participant's bounty, the
plan does provide an indirect benefit to a short-tenure employee. In this respect, the
hypothetical plan does not represent a perfect replication of long-deferred vesting,
which would limit all benefits to long-tenure employees.
203 See I.R.C. § 401(a) (14) (A) (1994 & Supp. III 1997); ERISA § 206(a) (1), 29
U.S.C. § 1056(a) (1) (1994). Even when a participant elects to defer receipt of her
retirement benefits, payment must begin by the "required beginning date"; this date
is the April 1 following the later of the calendar year in which the employee attains age
70 1/2, or the calendar year in which the employee actually retires. (The actual re-
tirement rule does not apply to a five percent owner.) See I.R.C. § 401(a) (9) (C) (i)
(1994 & Supp. III 1997). The required distributions rules are aimed to prevent exces-
sive tax deferral. See generally LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 13, at 353.
Without limits on how long distribution of benefits could be delayed, an em-
ployer could design a retirement plan to provide that, in certain cases, vested benefits
would be paid only after the participant's death.
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at which a retirement plan may actually pay benefits to a participant
must also be regulated.
5. Mandated Vesting and Retirement Plans
The initial policy decision to legally mandate the vesting of retire-
ment plan participants' retirement benefits compels the adoption of
this extensive regime of supporting mandates. Employee participa-
tion rules compel the plan to extend participation to every employee
in a covered group who has completed one or two years of service.
Every participant must accrue benefits and become vested in those
benefits in accordance with the minimum standards set by ERISA and
the Code. And retirement plan law sets the time at which retirement
benefits must be paid. These elements are among the most important
in the design of a retirement plan, since they determine which em-
ployees will participate in the plan, when participants will accrue and
become vested in benefits, and when the retired participants will be
paid retirement benefits. The impact of the mandated vesting regime
on retirement plans extends far beyond a simple limitation on the
period during which retirement benefits may be forfeitable.
In subjecting each of these fundamental elements of retirement
plan design to mandatory regulation, retirement plan law has impor-
tant effects upon every plan. Regulation of retirement plan design
implies restricting the choices that are available to a plan about each
of these design elements. These restrictions on retirement plan flexi-
bility limit the extent to which a retirement plan may be designed to
provide more retirement benefits to those employees who value the
benefits most highly, while permitting the employer to compensate
other employees with the other forms of compensation, usually wages,
most highly valued by those employees. The elimination of substan-
tial areas of design flexibility changes the incentives that motivate an
employer and its employees to apportion compensation between re-
tirement benefits and other forms of compensation, and in changing
those incentives, ultimately reduces the coverage and benefits pro-
vided by the retirement plan system. 20 4
B. The Nondiscrimination Regime
Thus far, analysis of the mandated vesting regime has demon-
strated that mandated vesting limits retirement plan design flexibility
with respect to employees who are within the group of employees cov-
ered by the plan, that is, those employees designated by the plan as
204 See infra notes 266-86 and accompanying text.
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eligible to participate. However, the impact of the mandated vesting
regime is extended far beyond this group of eligible employees by the
nondiscrimination rules. In order to comply with the nondiscrimina-
tion rules, a retirement plan must take into account not only employ-
ees who might be covered by a plan if coverage were a voluntary
matter, but it must also take into account virtually all employees in the
employer's workforce. Nondiscrimination rules thus magnify the im-
pact of mandated vesting on the retirement plan system.
1. The Nondiscrimination Norm
In the most general terms, the nondiscrimination norm 20 5 re-
quires every tax-qualified retirement plan to provide "non-highly com-
pensated employees" with retirement benefits that are reasonably
comparable 20 6 to the benefits provided to "highly compensated em-
ployees."20 7 As rough working definitions, the highly compensated
employee group includes employees who earn more than $80,000 per
year, and employees who own more than five percent of the employer;
the non-highly compensated employee group will include all other
employees. 20 8 The nondiscrimination norm forbids a retirement plan
from engaging in "prohibited discrimination" against non-highly com-
205 The statutory text implementing this concept is deceptively simple: "A
trust... forming part of a stock bonus, pension, or profit-sharing plan ... shall
constitute a qualified trust... if the contributions or benefits provided under the
plan do not discriminate in favor of highly compensated employees.. . ." I.RC.
§ 401 (a) (4) (1994 & Supp. I1 1997). The statute appears to be simple; however, the
regulations explaining its application occupy 80 pages. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401 (a) (4)-
1 to -13 (amended 1993). The nondiscrimination regime relates only to the income
tax qualification of a retirement plan; there is no counterpart in ERISA to the nondis-
crimination rules. For descriptions of the nondiscrimination regime, see generally, 1
CANAN, supra note 23, §§ 10.1-.4; LANGBEIN & WOLI, supra note 13, at 199-261; Bank-
man, supra note 47, at 795-800; Bankman, supra note 45, at 599-601; Dilley, supra
note 77, at 1139-63; Wolk, supra note 13, at 434-63.
206 See generally I.R.C. §§ 401 (a) (4), 410(b) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). The relation-
ship between the benefits of highly and non-highly compensated employees is de-
scribed as "reasonably comparable" because the nondiscrimination regime does not
require precise equivalence of benefits. For example, a retirement plan may benefit a
smaller fraction of an employer's non-highly compensated employees than the frac-
tion of highly compensated employees benefiting. In general terms, the fraction of
non-highly compensated employees participating in a plan must be at least 70% of
the fraction of highly compensated employees, or the benefits provided to non-highly
compensated employees must be at least 70% of the benefits provided to highly com-
pensated employees. See I.R.C. § 410(b) (1)-(2) (1994).
207 See I.R.C. § 414(q) (1) (1994); Treas. Reg. § 1.410(b)-9 (amended 1993); see
also infra notes 227-29 and accompanying text.
208 See infra note 231 and accompanying text.
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pensated employees in the provision of retirement benefits. 20 9 Deter-
mining whether prohibited discrimination occurs is done by
arithmetical comparisons between the amounts of benefits provided
to non-highly and to highly compensated employees.
The nondiscrimination norm is a response to the fact that in a
purely voluntary retirement plan system, retirement plans would tend
to provide disproportionately larger retirement benefits to highly
compensated employees than to non-highly compensated employ-
ees.210 There are both tax and non-tax reasons for this. Highly com-
pensated employees are more likely to be higher-income taxpayers;
the progressive structure of income tax rates implies that the income
tax deferral on compensation paid in the form of retirement benefits
will be more valuable for highly compensated employees.21l Among
209 The statutory text of the nondiscrimination norm forbids discrimination in
favor of highly compensated employees: "A trust... forming part of a stock bonus, pension,
or profit-sharing plan... shall constitute a qualified trust... if the contributions or
benefits provided under the plan do not discriminate in favor of highly compensated
employees .... " I.R.G. § 401(a) (4) (1994).
Notwithstanding the statutory language, the only discrimination that is prohib-
ited is discrimination against non-highly compensated employees as compared with highly
compensated employees. This is because all other forms of discrimination are permit-
ted. A plan may provide benefits exclusively for highly compensated employees if the
sponsoring employer employs no countable non-highly compensated employees. See
id. § 410(b) (6) (F) (1994); Treas. Reg. § 1.410(b)-2(b), -2(b) (5) (amended 1994). A
plan may discriminate in favor of some highly compensated employees as compared
with other highly compensated employees. A plan may also discriminate in favor of
non-highly compensated employees; that is, the plan may provide these employees
with retirement benefits more generous than those provided to highly compensated
employees. A plan may also discriminate among non-highly compensated employees.
See id. § 1.401 (a) (4)-2(b) (2)-(3), -2(c), -3(b)-(c) (amended 1993).
210 The extent to which the nondiscrimination rules actually deliver retirement
benefits to non-highly compensated employees depends upon the proportion of
highly and non-highly compensated employees participating in a particular plan. If a
plan covered 99 highly compensated employees and one non-highly compensated
employee, that non-highly compensated employee probably would receive larger re-
tirement benefits than the great majority of non-highly compensated employees. The
efficacy of the nondiscrimination rules depends upon the proportions of highly and
non-highly compensated employees participating in a particular plan. Thus, the non-
discrimination rules do not ensure in any systematic manner that the tax subsidy to
retirement plans mainly subsidizes benefits for non-highly compensated employees.
See Bankman, supra note 47, at 821-25.
211 See supra note 43 and accompanying text. If the special income tax treatment
of retirement benefits were not limited, as an employee's compensation exceeded her
current consumption needs, then both employer and employee would seek to pay any
additional compensation in the form of tax-qualified retirement benefits. Income tax
law absolutely limits the annual benefit accruals under a defined contribution plan
for each participant to the lesser of $30,000 or 25% of the participant's compensa-
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the non-tax explanations is the fact that a retirement plan is a savings
vehicle for an employee, and highly compensated employees are more
likely to prefer savings to wage compensation because higher-income
individuals have a greater ability to save and may have a greater pro-
pensity for saving.212 A retirement plan may also provide workforce
productivity effects, and these effects are likely to be more pro-
nounced among highly compensated employees. 213 In order to align
retirement plan design with the preferences of employees and spon-
soring employers, in an unregulated system retirement plans would
tilt benefits to favor highly compensated employees.
The nondiscrimination norm predates mandated vesting. It was
first expressed by the Revenue Act of 1942, which created the new
condition for tax qualification: a retirement trust was tax-exempt only
"if the contributions or benefits provided under the plan do not dis-
criminate in favor of employees who are officers, shareholders, [su-
pervisors], or highly compensated employees."214 The norm was
developed specifically to control abuse of the special income tax treat-
ment of tax-qualified retirement plans.215
tion, and a defined benefit plan is limited to the accrual of a pension benefit of the
lesser of $90,000 or 100% of the participant's average compensation for her highest
three years of earnings, payable annually. See I.R.C. § 415(c) (1) (1994).
212 See Daniel I. Halperin, Cash or Deferred Profit-Sharing Plans and Cafeteria Plans, 41
N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX'N 39 (1983) (arguing that lower and middle-income employ-
ees are least likely to save). The correlation between income and propensity to save is
partially explained by the fact that higher-income individuals can afford to save;
lower-income individuals must apply all or a larger fraction of their income for neces-
sities. Given the greater propensity to save, higher-income individuals are likely to
more highly value the non-tax (as well as tax) advantages of saving through an em-
ployer sponsored retirement plan; these advantages include economies of scale in
investing and professional investment management and the desire for a precommit-
ted savings arrangement. See generally LANGBEIN & WoLK, supra note 13, at 30-33.
If the receipt of compensation in the form of retirement benefits were left to the
voluntary choices of employers and employees, it is likely that most retirement bene-
fits would be provided to highly compensated employees. Over the long run, retire-
ment benefits are a form of personal savings, and savings correlate positively with
income. This relationship reflects the fact that higher-income individuals have
greater resources and therefore have a greater ability to save. "Left to their own de-
vices, employers will provide more generous pensions to high income workers."
Weiss, supra note 60, at 1294.
213 See IPpoLrro, supra note 57, at 176-77.
214 Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, § 162(a), 56 Stat. 798, 862 (1942)
(amending I.R.C. § 165(a) (4) (1939)).
215 The nondiscrimination regime is generally believed to extend larger retire-
ment benefits to a larger number of non-highly compensated employees than would
receive benefits in a purely voluntary system. To the extent the regime is effective, it
causes a retirement plan to use part of the income tax subsidy to the plan for funding
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In the context of mandated vesting, if the nondiscrimination
norm did not exist, it would be necessary to invent something like it.
In the absence of the nondiscrimination rules, a retirement plan
could largely replicate the effects of long-deferred vesting for particu-
lar categories of employees. Hypothetically, a retirement plan could
define a classification of employees for coverage by the plan that
would exclude short-tenure employees; after a short-tenure employee
had accumulated some sufficient period of service, then she could
move into an employee classification that was eligible for plan partici-
pation. With such provisions, a retirement plan could limit the pay-
ment of retirement benefits only to longer service employees. The
nondiscrimination rules do not explicitly require plan coverage of the
category of employees we refer to as short-tenure employees; instead
they require coverage of non-highly compensated employees. How-
ever, in effect, coverage of non-highly compensated employees will
provide retirement benefits to some, perhaps a significant proportion,
of an employer's short-tenure employees.
There are four elements in the implementation of the nondis-
crimination norm: the identification of the sponsoring employer's
"countable" employees, the division of these employees into the
highly and non-highly compensated categories, 216 comparison of the
participation rates of highly and non-highly compensated employ-
ees, 217 and the comparison of the retirement benefits that are pro-
vided to each group.2 18
2. "Countable" Employees
As noted above, a retirement plan is not required to provide ben-
efits to all of the sponsoring employer's employees. A retirement plan
may limit coverage to a "reasonable classification" of employees, so
that only members of that group become participants upon comple-
tion of any age or years of service requirements.2 19 Limiting coverage
of retirement benefits for participants who would not otherwise accrue benefits. The
efficacy of the regime in a given case depends upon the proportions of highly and
non-highly compensated employees participating in the plan. See supra note 210.
216 See I.R.C. § 414(q)(1) (1994 & Supp. III 1997); Treas. Reg. § 1.410(b)-9
(amended 1993); see also infra notes 227-29 and accompanying text.
217 See I.R.C. § 410(b) (1994); see also infra notes 233-36 and accompanying text.
218 See I.R.C. § 401(a) (4) (1994 & Supp. III 1997); see also infra notes 237-42 and
accompanying text.
219 See Treas. Reg. § 1.410(b)-4(b) (amended 1991) (recognizing that a retire-
ment plan may establish reasonable classifications based upon objective, bona fide
business criteria, but not classifications that have the effect of enumerating employees
by name).
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of a retirement plan to a particular classification of employees could
be utilized by a plan as a means to restrict coverage mainly to highly
compensated employees. A plan could provide benefits only to em-
ployees included in a salaried pay classification, and therefore exclude
from participation all hourly-paid employees. Typically the salaried
classification would include all highly compensated employees, and
therefore they would receive benefits. 2 20 Typically all hourly-paid em-
ployees would be non-highly compensated employees. Thus the ex-
clusion of hourly-paid employees from a "salaried-only" plan might
result in the prohibited discrimination against non-highly compen-
sated employees. In order to test for the prohibited discrimination, it
is necessary to determine the total number of the sponsoring em-
ployer's non-highly compensated employees. If an excessively large
proportion of the entire group of non-highly compensated employees
are denied benefits by the salaried-only classification, the retirement
plan will be disqualified.
Discrimination testing starts from the general rule that all of an
employer's employees 221 will be counted in the tests, 222 excluding
only those employees who have not met any generally applicable age
and years of service requirements. 223 Thus, in the above example, all
of the sponsoring employer's non-highly compensated employees,
both salaried and hourly, will be counted in the discrimination test-
ing. But this simple general rule, by itself, is insufficient to support an
effective nondiscrimination regime. Hypothetically, a corporate em-
ployer could create a subsidiary corporation, segregate highly com-
pensated employees in the parent and non-highly compensated
employees in the subsidiary, and provide retirement plan coverage
only for employees of the parent. To prevent such abuse, the nondis-
crimination regime includes rules that treat all employees of certain
controlled groups and affiliated groups as employed by a single em-
220 The salaried-only classification would provide coverage to non-highly compen-
sated employees who are salaried. If the plan benefits a sufficient number of salaried,
non-highly compensated employees, the plan will qualify.
221 Generally retirement plan law relies upon the common law definition to estab-
lish the employer-employee relationship, so it would appear that an employer's em-
ployees would simply be those workers who have entered into a common law
employment relationship with a particular employer. With admirable circularity,
ERISA defines an "employee" as an "individual employed by an employer." ERISA
§ 3(6), 29 U.S.C. 1002(6) (1994).
222 See I.R.C. §410(b)(1).
223 The nondiscrimination rules are applied by excluding employees who have not
yet satisfied any age or years of service conditions for participation in the plan. See id.
§ 410(b)(1)(A).
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ployer.224 This means that when any employer entity within a defined
controlled group or affiliated group sponsors a retirement plan, the
occurrence of prohibited discrimination will be tested with reference
to all of the employees of all employers within the controlled or affili-
ated group.225 These employees who must be included in the testing
for prohibited discrimination are referred to as the "countable" em-
ployees.2 26 These rules expand the universe of countable employees
to include all the employees of a specific sponsoring employer as well
as employees of other related employers.
3. Highly and Non-Highly Compensated Employees
After a retirement plan has identified a universe of countable em-
ployees, those employees must be divided into the highly and non-
highly compensated employee groups. A highly compensated em-
ployee is an employee who is a five percent owner of the employer, or
who received compensation in excess of $80,000 during the prior year
224 See idt § 414(a)-(b), (in) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
225 See i. The nondiscrimination rules also address another means by which a
retirement plan could abuse the employer-employee definition to manipulate dis-
crimination testing. An employer could avoid the formal employer-employee rela-
tionship by having another person act as the employer of workers who provided
services to a retirement plan sponsor. Such an arrangement is commonly known as
employee leasing. The nondiscrimination regime includes rules that treat certain
"leased employees" not as employees of their actual employer, but as employees of the
person to whom the leased employees provide services. See id. § 414(n) (1994 &
Supp. III 1997). Thus, if an employer sponsors a retirement plan and receives serv-
ices performed by leased employees, under certain circumstances the leased employ-
ees will be counted as employees of the sponsoring employer.
The controlled group rules cast an extremely broad net. In the case of a group
that includes operations in different industries, each of which may have its own pat-
terns for provision of retirement benefits, the controlled group rules could make it
economically impossible to provide retirement benefits in one industry while leaving
employees in another industry without benefits. In this circumstance, a controlled
group would face a competitive disadvantage as compared with independently owned
operations in each industry. Recognizing this problem, the Code provides relief from
the controlled group rules for an employer that can establish that it operates "sepa-
rate lines of business." See iaL § 410(b) (5) (1994), id. § 414(r) (1994 & Supp. III
1997). The separate lines of business regulations, commonly referred to as the SLOB
regulations, obligate a retirement plan to demonstrate that its coverage reflects busi-
ness realities and is not a subterfuge for evasion of the nondiscrimination regime. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.414(r)-O to -11 (amended 1994).
226 Employees who have met these age and years of service requirements are
countable employees. They must be counted in computing the percentages of em-
ployees participating in the plan under I.R.C. § 410(b) (1)-(2) (1994).
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and, if the employer elects, is also in the "top-paid group."227 The top-
paid group consists of the top twenty percent of an employer's em-
ployees when ranked on the basis of compensation. 228 Perhaps unsur-
prisingly, a non-highly compensated employee is an employee who is
not a highly compensated employee. 229 Because the compensation
threshold for the highly compensated group is set at the relatively
high level of $80,000, only a small fraction of most employer's
workforces will fall into that group. Data from the March 1997 Cur-
rent Population Survey indicate that only 4.2% of all workers earned
$80,000 or more. 230 Based on compensation alone, the highly com-
227 The term "highly compensated employee" is partially defined by I.R.G.
§ 4 14 (q)(1) (1994 & Supp. III 1997):
The term "highly compensated employee" means any employee who-
(A) was a five percent owner at any time during the year or the preceding
year, or
(B) for the preceding year-
(i) had compensation from the employer in excess of $80,000, and
(ii) if the employer elects the application of this clause for such preced-
ing year, was in the top-paid group of employees for such preced-
ing year.
Id. The seeming simplicity of this paragraph is belied by the fact that the highly
compensated employee definition continues for eight more paragraphs of the statute,
see id, §§ 414(q) (2)-(9), and requires 12 pages of regulations, see Temp. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.414(q)-IT (amended 1994).
The $80,000 threshold is referred to as the I.R.C. § 414(q) (1) (B) amount; it is
subject to inflationary adjustments. SeeI.R.C. § 414(q) (1). The I.R.C. § 414(q) (1) (B)
amount remains at $80,000 for 1999. See IR-News Rel. 98-63, 16 Comp-Vol Stand. Fed.
Tax Rep. (CCH) 46,584 (1998).
228 See I.R.C. § 414(q) (3) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). If an employer has a highly-
paid workforce, more than 20% of the employees might receive compensation in ex-
cess of $80,000. By exercising the top-paid group election, the employer can limit the
highly compensated employee group to the 20% of its employees who receive the
highest compensation.
229 "'Non-highly compensated employee' means an employee who is not a highly
compensated employee." Treas. Reg. § 1.410(b)-9 (amended 1993). Note the dis-
tinction in terminology between a "short-tenure employee" and a "non-highly com-
pensated employee." A "short-tenure employee" is, by the definition adopted in this
analysis, an employee who receives a retirement benefit solely because of a vesting
mandate. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. A "non-highly compensated"
employee is described by the definitions of retirement plan law for the purpose of
identifying those employees who must receive sufficient benefits so that a retirement
plan is deemed to be nondiscriminatory.
230 See BuREAu OF LABOR STATISTICS & BUREAu OF THE CENSUS, ANNUAL DEMO-
CRAPHIC SURVEY, at tbl. NC8 (Mar. 1997) <http://ferret.bls.census.gov/macro/
031998/noncash/8-001.html> (copy on file with Journal). The total number of
workers was reported to be 144,582,000; 6,093,000 were reported in compensation
categories of $80,000 and above.
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pensated employee group would be a very small group. The five per-
cent ownership group expands the highly compensated employee
category; this criterion affects a business in which an individual both
owns five percent or more and is employed in the business.231 As a
rough working concept, the highly compensated employee group can
be thought of as including the most highly paid employees and the
owners of closely held businesses who also work in the business; in
general terms, this group will be a very small fraction of all workers.
Almost all short-tenure employees will be included in the non-highly
compensated employee group.23 2
4. Minimum Coverage Requirements
The nondiscrimination regime includes a set of rules known as
the minimum coverage requirements.233 These rules specify mini-
mums for the proportion of non-highly compensated employees who
must benefit under a retirement plan when that plan benefits one or
more highly compensated employees. 234 There are several alternative
tests, and if a plan satisfies any one of the tests, then it has complied
with the minimum coverage requirements. The tests are expressed as
arithmetic relationships between the numbers of highly and non-
highly compensated employees benefiting from the plan. For exam-
ple, if a plan covers 100% of the sponsoring employer's highly com-
pensated employees, it would be tax-qualified if it also covers at least
seventy percent of the sponsoring employer's countable non-highly
compensated employees. 235 There is immense complexity in the rules
231 A retirement plan may provide benefits only to employees. See I.R.C. § 401(a)
(1994 & Supp. III 1997). The 5% ownership criterion is most often met in closely
held business; if an employer is not closely held, it is unlikely that any single individ-
ual would own 5% of the employer.
232 See infra note 246 and accompanying text.
233 See I.R.C. § 410(b) (1994).
234 If an employer had no countable non-highly compensated employees, its re-
tirement plan could benefit exclusively highly compensated employees. There would
be no non-highly compensated employees against whom the prohibited discrimina-
tion would have occurred. See §410(b)(6)(F); Treas. Reg. § 1.410(b)-2(b)(5)
(amended 1994).
235 See I.R.C. § 410(b) (1) (B). There are many permutations and variations of the
coverage requirements. Generally these rules test the percentage of non-highly com-
pensated employees who actually participate in a plan, after application of any employee
classification rues. Thus if an exclusion of hourly-paid employees from eligibility for
the plan caused only 50% of the employer's countable non-highly compensated em-
ployees to participate in its plan, the plan would fail the 70% test, and the plan would
not be qualified. In order to bring additional hourly-paid employees into the plan,
the plan would have to expand its eligible classes of employees so that another group
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explicating the minimum coverage requirements; alternative numeri-
cal, bright-line tests are available, but if a plan fails to provide benefits
to a sufficient number of non-highly compensated employees, it will
lose its tax qualification. 236
constituting 20% of the countable non-highly compensated employees became par-
ticipants. The minimum coverage requirements limit the extent to which employee
classifications can be used to exclude non-highly compensated employees from plan
participation.
A different and more complex application of the coverage requirements permits
a plan to provide benefits to as few as 20% of the countable non-highly compensated
employees. See Treas. Reg. § 1.410(b)-4 (amended 1991). The example of 20% of
the countable non-highly compensated employees participating is an application of
the nondiscriminatory classification test. See id It is based upon the safe and unsafe
harbor percentages in Treas. Reg. § 1.410(b)-4(c) (4) (iv) and would be applicable if
99% of the employer's employees were non-highly compensated employees. See id&
Note that it is also necessary for a plan relying upon the nondiscriminatory classifica-
tion test to comply with the average benefit percentage test of Treas. Reg. § 1.410(b)-
5. See id. § 1.410(b)-2(b)(3) (amended 1994); id § 1.410(b)-5 (amended 1993).
The minimum coverage requirements rely upon a percentages based upon the
sponsoring employer's highly and non-highly compensated workforces. This concept
necessitates a definition of the "sponsoring employer." The Code relies upon a con-
trolled group concept to define the relevant workforce. However, the controlled
group concept would create serious problems for an employer that was diversified
into several different industries or geographic regions that require varying compensa-
tion structures for the workforces. These problems are addressed by the separate line
of business regulations.
236 See id. § 1.410(b)-4. A retirement plan might utilize the rules that permit fairly
free choice of employee classifications to largely replicate the effects of a retirement
plan with long-deferred vesting. For example, the plan could exclude from coverage
certain job classifications to which all newly-hired employees were assigned. Other
job classifications would be available to employees with longer tenures, and the retire-
ment plan would cover only employees in these latter classifications. When an em-
ployee did move into a covered classification, participation in the plan could be
immediate, and accrual of benefits could be rapid, thereby replicating the effects of a
retirement plan that offered broader coverage, but with long-deferred vesting. This
use ofjob classifications would frustrate the implementation of vesting mandates.
There is nothing in the legal structure of the mandated vesting regime that ex-
plicitly forbids such a pattern of operation. However, the covered job classifications
would have to comply with the regulation that requires that employee classifications
be based upon a bona fide business criteria. See id. § 1.410(b)-4(b); see also supra note
221 and accompanying text. If the job classifications were obviously surrogates for
long-deferred participation and vesting rules, it is likely that the IRS would determine
that the plan was not a qualified plan. Even if the employee classifications were valid,
the covered job classifications would have to yield a sufficient number of non-highly
compensated participants so that the plan could pass the nondiscriminatory classifica-
tion tests. See infta note 237. As a practical matter, this might be difficult. To some
extent, compensation correlates positively with job tenure, so that an employee classi-
fication populated mainly by long-tenure employees is likely to have a disproportion-
ately high number of highly compensated employees.
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5. Nondiscrimination in Benefits
The next element of the nondiscrimination regime is the mass of
rules requiring nondiscrimination in benefits.23 7 As noted above, the
minimum coverage requirements ensure that some non-highly com-
pensated employees will participate in a plan; the rules requiring non-
discrimination in benefits ensure that these participating non-highly
compensated employees will accrue benefits that are reasonably com-
parable with the benefits that highly compensated employees accrue.
The nondiscriminatory benefits regulations create numerous altera-
tive arithmetic tests for determining whether the benefit structure of a
particular retirement plan results in the prohibited discrimination.
The most simple of the nondiscrimination requirements finds a plan
to be nondiscriminatory if the plan accrues benefits at the same rate
for both highly and non-highly compensated employees. For exam-
ple, a defined benefit plan that provided every participant with a pen-
sion equal to thirty percent of the participant's average compensation
would be nondiscriminatory, since the non-highly compensated par-
ticipants would receive the same benefit accruals as highly compen-
sated participants. 238 The numerous exceptions and alternatives
permit retirement plans to accrue benefits at different rates for differ-
237 See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(4)-0 to -13 (amended 1993).
238 See id § 1.401(a) (4)-3(b)(2). The plan is nondiscriminatory because it pro-
vides benefits at a uniform rate to all participants, both highly and non-highly com-
pensated employees. In a defined benefit plan, average compensation is typically
defined as an average over some portion of the participant's career, such as the five
years in which the participant had her highest compensation.
In the interests of brevity, the nondiscrimination rule will be described as requir-
ing nondiscrimination in benefits only. Typically a defined contribution plan would
comply with the nondiscrimination rules by allocating the contributions to the plan
among highly and non-highly compensated participants in a manner that does not
discriminate against the non-highly compensated employees. An allocation among
participants that provides that each participant receive an allocation of the contribu-
tion which is a uniform percentage of that participant's compensation for the plan
year is nondiscriminatory. For example, an employee who earns $15,000 could re-
ceive an allocation of $1500, which is 10% of compensation, while an employee who
earns $150,000 could receive an allocation of $15,000. See id. § 1.401(a) (4)-2(b) (2).
Since the allocation of contributions under a defined contribution plan is equivalent
to the accrual of benefits for the plan participants, the nondiscrimination rules can be
capsulized as prohibiting discrimination in the accrual of benefits. A defined benefit
plan typically complies with the nondiscrimination rule by accruing benefits for non-
highly compensated employees that are sufficiently equivalent to the benefits accru-
ing for highly compensated employees. See id. § 1.401 (a) (4)-3.
The IRS does permit a defined contribution plan to establish that it is nondis-
criminatory by comparing the benefits to be received by participants, and a defined
benefit plan may satisfy the nondiscrimination rule by comparing the annual cost of
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ent employees, but ultimately, these alternatives may not have the ef-
fect of discriminating against non-highly compensated employees as a
group in the accrual of benefits.239
Nondiscrimination in benefits is applied, not only to the accrual
of benefits, but to each aspect of retirement benefits. "[A]ll optional
forms of benefit, ancillary benefits, and other rights and features avail-
able to any employee under the plan" must be made available in a
nondiscriminatory manner.240 All provisions governing the vesting of
participants' retirement benefits must be applied in a nondiscrimina-
tory manner,24' and participants' service must be credited in a nondis-
criminatory manner.242 These rules require that the retirement
benefits provided to non-highly compensated participants be reason-
ably equivalent to the benefits provided highly compensated partici-
pants, not only in amount, but also in quality.
6. (Non) Discrimination in Operation
The extent to which a retirement plan participant is vested, or
unvested, will ultimately affect the amount of retirement benefits that
are paid to her. Obviously if a participant is 0% vested, she will re-
ceive no retirement benefits, notwithstanding her accrual of benefits
under a plan that complied with the nondiscrimination regime. So
long as a plan applies the same vesting schedule to both highly and
non-highly compensated employees, the plan will remain qualified. 243
the benefits funded for participants. These rules are known as the "cross-testing"
rules. See id. § 1.401(a) (4)-1 (b) (2), -8.
239 There is an important limitation on the principle of nondiscrimination in ben-
efits that permits a retirement plan to "integrate" its benefits with those provided by
the Social Security system. See I.R.C. § 401(1) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
240 SeeTreas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(4)-4(a).
241 See id. § 1.401(a) (4)-1 (c) (10), -11(c). For example, if a plan provided that the
benefits of non-highly compensated employees vested under a seven year graded vest-
ing schedule, and that the benefits of highly compensated employees were 100% im-
mediately vested, the vesting provisions would be discriminatory and would not satisfy
Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a) (4)-1 (c) (10). See id. Therefore, the plan could not qualify
under I.R.C. § 401 (a) (4).
242 See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a) (4)-1 (c) (11), -11(d).
243 If the employer has complied with the mandated minimum vesting floors, the
employer has thereby complied with the nondiscrimination requirement, absent a
"pattern of abuse." The Code reads in relevant part:
A plan which satisfies the requirements of this section [411] shall be treated
as satisfying any vesting requirements resulting from the application of sec-
tion 401(a) (4) unless-
(A) there has been a pattern of abuse under the plan (such as a dismissal of
employees before their accrued benefits become nonforfeitable) tend-
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This conclusion stands even if non-highly compensated participants
on average have shorter job tenures than highly compensated partici-
pants, achieve smaller vesting percentages, and therefore ultimately
receive a lower rate of retirement benefits.244 If a plan has complied
with a mandated minimum vesting floor and applied the same vesting
schedule to all participants, deferred vesting can result in non-highly
compensated employees receiving retirement benefits at lower rates
than highly compensated employees.
And so it is with the other aspects of nondiscrimination in bene-
fits. So long as a plan complies with statutory or regulatory require-
ments, the actual payment of benefits to plan participants is not the
focus of the principle of nondiscrimination in benefits. Even if highly
compensated employees receive larger benefits as a percentage of
their compensation because a higher percentage of them satisfy the
conditions for participation, the plan is nondiscriminatory. The re-
quirements of nondiscrimination are applied at each stage of an em-
ployee's participation in a retirement plan, and so long as each aspect
of the employees' relationship to the plan is nondiscriminatory, then
the benefits that employees ultimately do (or do not) receive are
deemed to be nondiscriminatory. 245
ing to discriminate in favor of employees who are highly compensated
employees (within the meaning of section 414(q)), or
(B) there have been, or there is reason to believe there will be, an accrual of
benefits or forfeitures tending to discriminate in favor of employees
who are highly compensated employees (within the meaning of section
414(q)).
I.R.C. § 411(d) (1) (1994). The requirement for applying the same or a comparable
vesting schedule to both highly and non-highly compensated employees follows from
the regulations. See § 1.401(a) (4)-i(c) (11), -11(d).
If the IRS established that the smaller vesting percentages for non-highly com-
pensated employees were the result of a "pattern of abuse," the plan could be disqual-
ified. A pattern of abuse could be established by showing that the sponsoring
employer terminated participants shortly before they achieved vesting and for the
purpose of preventing participants from achieving vesting.
244 In the example, if benefits received were computed as percentages of the re-
spective employees' compensation, the highly compensated employee group would
have a higher percentage rate of benefits because the non-highly compensated em-
ployees would have forfeited much of their benefits. See supra note 243 and accompa-
nying text.
245 Cf Donald S. Collat, Note, Discrimination in the Coverage of Retirement Plans, 90
YALE L.J. 817 (1981) (proposing the use of Gini coefficients for § 410(b) (1) coverage
testing).
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C. Mandated Vesting and Nondiscrimination
Mandated vesting and the nondiscrimination norm enjoy a
symbiotic relationship. The nondiscrimination rules are necessary in
order for mandated vesting to provide retirement benefits to short-
tenure employees, and reciprocally, regulation of vesting periods is
necessary for the nondiscrimination rules to actually deliver benefits
to non-highly compensated employees. Mandated vesting and the
nondiscrimination rules support each other because the short-tenure
employees are largely included in the non-highly compensated em-
ployee category.
1. Short-Tenure Employees and Non-Highly Compensated
Employees
In a great majority of retirement plans, virtually all of the short-
tenure employees will be included in the non-highly compensated em-
ployee group. About ninety-five percent of the total workforce would
be classified as non-highly compensated employees, with only about
five percent being in the highly compensated employee group.24 6 If
short-tenure employees were distributed evenly among all compensa-
tion levels, about ninety-five percent of them would be non-highly
compensated employees. But the distribution of short-tenure employ-
ees is not even. Short tenure is associated with lower compensa-
tion.247 Conversely, a common route for an employee to enter the
246 See supra notes 227-30 and accompanying text. The highly compensated
group includes only about five percent of the total workforce, and all other employees
will be non-highly compensated employees. Of course the non-highly compensated
employee group would also include many long-tenure employees.
247 Mean tenure increases uniformly with compensation in the data below.
Percentage Distribution of Workers by Tenure at Current Job, 1988
Years of tenure at current job
Mean
Worker characteristic: Total Less 15 or Not tenure
1988 earnings (000s) than 1 1-4 5-9 10-14 more reported (yrs.)
$1-4999 2168 53 24 8 3 5 8 3
$5000-9999 8085 32 41 10 4 6 7 4
$10,000-14,999 13,542 22 43 15 7 8 5 5
$15,000-19,999 11,388 16 39 19 12 12 2 6
$20,000-24,999 9648 13 33 20 14 17 3 8
$25,000-29,999 6742 10 27 21 16 23 3 9
$30,000-49,999 11,369 9 28 21 14 26 2 10
$50,000 or more 3465 7 25 20 17 29 2 11
Not reported 6085 18 28 16 11 15 11 8
TURNER, supra note 10, at 30; accord Robert Topel, Specific Capital, Mobility, and Wages:
Wages Rise with Job Seniority, 99 J. POL. ECON. 145, 147-48 (1991) (finding that in-
creases in earnings over time are in fact attributable in significant part to tenure at a
particular firm).
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highly compensated employee group is to remain with the same em-
ployer for many years and to accumulate a large number of periodic
compensation increases. Thus, the non-highly compensated em-
ployee group will typically be composed of a disproportionately large
fraction of short-tenure employees, and the highly compensated em-
ployee group will typically be composed of a disproportionately large
fraction of long-tenure employees.
The nondiscrimination regime compels a plan to provide reason-
ably comparable retirement benefits to non-highly compensated em-
ployees. Because the non-highly compensated employee group is
composed disproportionately of short-tenure employees, the benefits
that the nondiscrimination regime compels a retirement plan to pro-
vide will accrue disproportionately to short-tenure employees. De-
pending upon the exact make-up of a group of retirement plan
participants, the nondiscrimination regime is more or less equivalent
to a requirement to provide benefits to short-tenure employees. The
nondiscrimination regime attempts to compel retirement plans to
provide short-tenure employees and non-highly compensated employ-
ees retirement benefits that are reasonably comparable to the benefits
provided to long-tenure employees and to highly compensated em-
ployees. The nondiscrimination regime demands an increased de-
gree of equivalence between the benefits accruing to these groups of
employees.
2. Mandated Benefits
The mandated vesting regime and the nondiscrimination regime
are mutually interdependent. In the absence of the nondiscrimina-
tion rules, it would be simple for a retirement plan to sidestep man-
dated vesting through the use of employee classifications.
Hypothetically, a plan could cover an employee group that included
exclusively long-tenure employees. Employees would not participate
in the plan until they achieved some minimum periods of service.
This design would restrict retirement benefits to longer-serving em-
ployees, which would defeat mandated vesting. The nondiscrimina-
tion regime eliminates this design possibility because the long-tenure
employees will be disproportionately highly compensated employees.
The nondiscrimination rules will compel the plan to expand coverage
to include a sufficient proportion of non-highly compensated employ-
ees, and in doing so, short-tenure employees will be included. Man-
dated vesting depends upon the nondiscrimination regime to bring
short-tenure employees within the covered group of employees.
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The nondiscrimination regime depends upon mandated vesting
to ensure that benefits are actually paid to non-highly compensated
employees. The nondiscrimination regime works in two stages. First
a plan must extend participation to some non-highly compensated
employees who would not have participated had coverage of the plan
been left to voluntary design choices.2 48 Second, the plan must ac-
crue reasonably comparable benefits to all participating non-highly
compensated employees. Once a benefit is accrued, mandated vest-
ing increases the likelihood that some retired non-highly compen-
sated employees will actually receive retirement benefits.
Earlier the term "mandated benefit" was used to describe a retire-
ment benefit that a short-tenure employee receives because of the
mandated increase in her vesting percentage. 249 The benefit that an
otherwise nonparticipating non-highly compensated employees re-
ceives because of the combined operation of the nondiscrimination
regime and mandated vesting can also be described as a mandated
benefit. A mandated benefit is a benefit that an employee receives
solely because of the requirements of retirement plan law. Legal re-
quirements that attempt to compel a retirement plan to provide man-
dated benefits set up a series of effects on our voluntary retirement
plan system.
IV. EFFECTs OF MANDATED VESTING: DYNAMIC ANALYSIS CONCLUDED
This part completes the dynamic analysis of the effects of man-
dated vesting. Section A explains that, over time, the costs of man-
dated benefits must be shifted to the employees who receive those
benefits. Short-tenure employees and non-highly compensated em-
ployees generally will be unwilling to accept the mandated benefits in
exchange for wages. Since the private retirement plan system is volun-
tary, in the long run retirement plans will reduce the levels of retire-
ment benefits provided to these groups of employees back to the
levels that existed prior to the imposition of the benefit mandates.
Section B demonstrates that the nondiscrimination regime will ensure
that any reduction in the level of retirement benefits will be applied
equally across all participants in a retirement plan. Benefits will be
reduced for long-tenure employees and for highly compensated em-
248 Of course in a voluntary retirement plan system some plans would provide
benefits to some non-highly compensated employees. For purposes of this analysis,
the relevant non-highly compensated employees are those who participate solely be-
cause of the requirements of the nondiscrimination regime, employees who partici-
pate solely in order to satisfy the requirements for income tax qualification.
249 See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
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ployees to levels reasonably comparable to the levels acceptable to
short-tenure employees and non-highly compensated employees.
Mandated vesting and mandated benefits cause a reduction in bene-
fits for plan participants generally.250 Section C argues that the man-
dated vesting and nondiscrimination regimes constrict the extent to
which retirement plan design can provide benefits to the categories of
employees who value those benefits more highly than the cost of the
benefits. Thus, fewer retirement plans are economically feasible. Re-
tirement plan regulation is an important element in the stagnation of
retirement plan coverage since 1974.251
A. No Enhancement of Benefits of Short-Tenure Employees
Legal requirements that a retirement plan pay mandated benefits
to short-tenure employees and non-highly compensated employees
are ineffective in the long run. In developing this proposition, it is
essential to focus on the precise meaning of mandated benefits; they
are benefits that an employee receives solely because of legal require-
ments.25 2 In the absence of mandated vesting, many employees would
satisfy job tenure requirements and receive retirement benefits. In
the absence of the nondiscrimination regime, many non-highly com-
pensated employees would receive retirement benefits. In these cases,
an employer and certain of its employees would have voluntarily
agreed to include forfeitable retirement benefits as a portion of these
employees' compensation packages. In general, in a purely voluntary
retirement plan system, retirement plans would provide that level of
retirement benefits that maximized the value of the employer's com-
pensation budget for both the employer and the employees. Employ-
ees would receive retirement benefits so long as they were willing to
accept those benefits instead of other forms of compensation. Analy-
sis of the effects of legal mandates begins from the assumption that a
voluntary system would deliver that level of benefits that employees
would voluntarily choose.
In the long run, the costs of retirement benefits are borne by the
employees who receive those benefits. This fact can be obscure. First,
as a matter of form, the sponsoring employer appears to pay the costs
of a retirement plan; it is the party that actually remits the contribu-
tions to the trust fund. However, simply because the employer is the
nominal payer of the contributions, it does not follow that the em-
ployer bears these costs over time. Second, when a vesting mandate is
250 See infra note 264 and accompanying text.
251 See infra note 270 and accompanying text.
252 See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
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newly enacted, some or all of the costs associated with the initial shock
will be borne by the sponsoring employer. In the case of a defined
benefit plan, the sponsoring employer is legally obligated to fund the
plan adequately, and therefore, it must initially bear the costs associ-
ated with the payment of newly mandated retirement benefits.25 3 In
the case of a defined contribution plan, if the sponsoring employer
increases contributions to protect the benefits of the long-tenure em-
ployees, then it will initially bear the costs. 25 4 In both cases, the imme-
diate effect of the vesting mandate appears to be to grant short-tenure
employees an increase in total compensation equal to the value of the
newly mandated retirement benefits that they receive, with the cost of
that increase being borne by the employer.
A legally mandated compensation increase for short-tenure em-
ployees does not represent a stable arrangement, assuming that the
employer that sponsors a retirement plan operates in a competitive
product or service market. If the market is competitive, the employer
that sponsors a retirement plan will face competition from another
employer that may never have sponsored a retirement plan or that
may have terminated its retirement plan in response to the vesting
mandate. The competitor will be paying its short-tenure employees
compensation that does not include mandated retirement benefits,255
and it will have a cost advantage over the retirement plan sponsor. In
order to remain competitive, the retirement plan sponsor will be com-
pelled to reduce its compensation costs for its short-tenure employees
to the level that existed prior to the imposition of the vesting man-
date.2 56 The sponsoring employer's alternatives are to reduce the
253 See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
254 If contributions to plan remain constant, the costs of newly mandated benefits
are initially borne by long-tenure employees. See supra note 132 and accompanying
text.
255 By definition the short-tenure employees are willing to accept compensation
packages that do not include retirement benefits, since, prior to the mandate, they
received no retirement benefits.
256 In economic substance, an employer that operates in a competitive market is a
representative of the parties involved in the process of production and consumption.
The employer attempts to organize capital and labor together in a productive and
profitable combination. The employer must provide compensation and working con-
ditions sufficient to attract an adequate number of workers with the requisite skills; in
this sense, the employer represents its workforce. The owners of the employer, those
who have supplied capital to it, demand sufficient returns from their investment; in
the absence of adequate financial returns, over time the owners will withdraw their
capital from the employer. And the employer must produce goods or services which
customers will purchase at a price sufficient to cover the costs of production; the
employer must serve the interests of its customers. From this perspective, the em-
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wage portion of the compensation packages of short-tenure employ-
ees in an amount sufficient to cover the costs of mandated retirement
benefits, or to eliminate the mandated retirement benefits.2 57
Competitive forces and the preference of short-tenure employees
for wage compensation typically will drive a retirement plan to elimi-
nate the mandated benefits that it is compelled to provide to short-
tenure employees. Prior to a vesting mandate, short-tenure employ-
ees accepted wage compensation and did not choose retirement bene-
fits as part of their compensation packages. Prior to the mandate, had
the short-tenure employees preferred retirement benefits, the volun-
tary retirement plan design would have provided benefits to them.25 8
This demonstrates that the short-tenure employees prefer wage com-
pensation to retirement benefits. Suppose that in response to a vest-
ing mandate, an employer that sponsors a retirement plan attempted
to reduce the short-tenure employees' wage compensation in order to
cover the costs of mandated benefits. Assuming that a competing em-
ployer cannot bear costs itself; it is the representative who must allocate costs among
labor, capital and customers.
257 This choice is confirmed by economic theory.
Our theory suggests that employers probably will not-and in a competitive
market cannot-absorb the added pension costs. Those firms for which
pension costs are increased will have to hold the line on future wage in-
creases to remain competitive in the product market, and over time the
wages they pay will fall below the level that would have held had it not been
for the pension reform legislation [imposing mandated vesting]. Alterna-
tively, firms whose expected pension costs rise because of vesting may choose
to offset this rise with a reduction in promised pension benefits. In either
case, theory suggests that workers bear the added costs, as well as reap the
benefits, of the mandated change in vesting.
RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERT S. SMrrH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMIcs: THEORY AND
PUBLiC PoucY 279 (6th ed. 1997).
The economic theory is supported by empirical research. "[T]he few statistical
studies on this subject tend to support the prediction of a negative relationship be-
tween wages and benefits." Id- at 277.
A reduction in wage compensation resulting from the addition of mandated re-
tirement benefits would not occur contemporaneously with employees' accrual of the
mandated benefits. The foregone wage compensation results in future periods by
means of smaller increases in wages than might have occurred if no retirement bene-
fits were provided. In addition, there is not necessarily a perfect dollar correspon-
dence between the costs of retirement benefits and the foregone future wages. And
the costs of increased retirement benefits might be borne by employees not only
through a reduction in the employees' wage compensation, but also through reduc-
tions in forms of in-kind compensation other than retirement benefits. However, the
theory posits that there is a significant relationship between the provision of retire-
ment benefits and reductions in other forms of compensation.
258 See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
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ployer provides no retirement benefits, the competing employer will
be able to offer higher wage compensation. Short-tenure employees
can receive higher wage compensation from an employer that does
not provide retirement benefits. The retirement plan sponsor will
have a disadvantage in the employment of short-tenure employees
who prefer wage compensation. Since short-tenure employees prefer
wages to retirement benefits, competitive pressures force the retire-
ment plan to eliminate mandated benefits from the compensation
packages of short-tenure employees. 259
The proposition that mandated benefits will typically be elimi-
nated from a retirement plan is also supported by empirical analysis.
Short-tenure employees generally are likely to place a lower value on
259 Of course short-tenure employees' acceptance of the substitution of retirement
benefits for wage compensation is not an all-or-nothing proposition. Mandated re-
tirement benefits can be substituted for wage compensation in the compensation
packages of short-tenure employees up to a limitation that the value of the total com-
pensation packages provided to short-tenure employees cannot be reduced below the
value that existed prior to the vesting mandate. Retirement benefits can be substi-
tuted for wage compensation in the compensation packages of short-tenure employ-
ees, but the total value of the compensation packages to short-tenure employees must
be maintained. If short-tenure employees attach a lower value to additional man-
dated retirement benefits than the cost of providing those benefits, then the full cost
of those benefits may not be shifted to the short-tenure employees. If the wage por-
tion of these employees' compensation packages were reduced to reflect the full cost
of additional retirement benefits, the total value of their compensation packages
would fall, since the employees attach a lesser value to the retirement benefits. And
since, in a voluntary retirement plan system, other employers can offer compensation
packages with a larger proportion of wage compensation, over time employees who
place a lower value on retirement benefits will migrate to employers who do not in-
clude retirement benefits as a part of compensation.
The compensation reduction may not exceed the value of the mandated retire-
ment benefits to the short-tenure employees. This value would almost certainly be
less than the cost of the mandated benefits to the employer. (The value of retirement
benefits to employees and the cost of those benefits to the employer must be adjusted
for the income tax advantage accorded to compensation paid in this form.) An older,
highly compensated employee might value her tax-deferred interest in a retirement
trust more highly than the cost to the employer of the contribution to fund that inter-
est. This highly compensated employee might be willing to forego more in wages
than it would cost the employer to purchase retirement benefits for her. Conversely,
a young, non-highly compensated employee might attach a very low value to an inter-
est in a retirement trust, and might have a strong preference for current wage com-
pensation. This employee might be unwilling to accept employment that reflected
any implicit reduction in wages in exchange for retirement benefits. To the extent an
employer is required to provide retirement benefits to this employee, then the cost of
contributions will yield little or no value. Consideration of the cost of retirement
benefits cannot be separated from the questions of which employees will receive the
benefits and what value will be attached to the benefits by these employees.
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additional mandated retirement benefits than the full cost of those
retirement benefits. This is because short-tenure employees are gen-
erally younger employees. There is a fairly typical pattern ofjob ten-
ures among U.S. employees.
The typical career will involve a modest number of short-term
jobs (when the young worker is job shopping) followed by one or two
jobs of long duration. Thus if we ask the average duration of all jobs
that began in 1983, the answer is fairly short-perhaps as brief as
three or four years. But if we define the significance of long-termjobs
(for example, those jobs lasting fifteen years or more) in the context
of a worker's career, we find them quite important in the sense that
the typical worker will spend most of his working life in one or two
such jobs.2 60
260 See DOUGLAS A- WoLF & FRANm Law, Pension Coverage, Pension Vesting, and the
Distribution ofJob Tenures, in RETREMENT AND ECONOMIc BEHAVIOR 26 (HenryJ. Aaron
& Gary Burtless eds., Brookings Inst. 1984); see also TURNER, supra note 10, at 18 ("Job
changes generally occur in the first few years after employment begins. Young work-
ers change jobs a great deal until they find a good career match.").
Sehgal (1984) states that employment data ... support the contention that
mature American workers, on average, show substantial job stability....
Sehgal's principal findings on tenure are the following:
1. One worker in six has been with his/her employer for at least 15
years.
2. Among workers age 45 and over, nearly one-third have been with
their current employer for 20 years or more.
3. Tenure with one's employer is closely linked to tenure in one's
occupation.
Id. (summarizing Ellen Sehgal, Occupational Mobility and Job Tenure in 1983, MONTHLY
LA.B. REV., Oct. 1984, at 18-23).
Contrary to popular belief, there is no reason to believe that this typical career
pattern has changed materially since these data were analyzed.
There is a general perception that the work force has become much more
mobile in recent years than it was 20 or 30 years ago. This perception has
led some analysts to conclude that defined benefit plans are not as effective
in the delivery of retirement benefits as they used to be. Interestingly, disag-
gregation of the historical data on worker tenures does not support the gen-
eral notion that workers have become inherently more job mobile in recent
years.... The long-term trend of the tenure lines at various ages is some-
what positive since World War II.
McGmL ET AL., supra note 164, at 344; see also PAUL YAKOBOSKI, DEBUNKING THE RETIRE-
MENT PoLIcY MyTH: LiFETrME JoBs NEVER ExisTED FOR MOST WORKERS 1 (Employee
Benefit Research Institute Issue Brief No. 197, May 1998).
Over recent years, 1983-1996, median tenure among male workers dropped
noticeably, but this decrease was concentrated among prime-age male work-
ers. Despite this decline, tenure in 1996 was comparable with that of de-
cades past. Tenure levels for female workers have risen consistently over
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Younger employees generally will place a lower value on retire-
ment benefits than older employees. Many younger workers perceive
retirement as an event that is remote, unimportant, and perhaps un-
certain. This tendency by the young to undervalue the importance of
adequate savings for retirement is typically relied upon as one of the
importantjustifications for public policy efforts to enhance retirement
savings.261 Apart from any irrational or myopic mistake about the im-
portance, and therefore the value of future retirement benefits, it may
be entirely reasonable for a young employee to largely disregard her
retirement benefits and the importance of saving for retirement. Dur-
ing the job shopping phase of an employee's career, her accrued re-
tirement benefits necessarily will have a small economic present value.
And when the employee is young, it is especially difficult to assess and
value what that employee's financial needs after retirement might be.
A comparison of the small accrued retirement benefits with highly
speculative and uncertain future post-retirement needs makes the re-
tirement benefit appear to be of little value. Data indicate that em-
ployees have little understanding of the value of retirement
benefits,262 and this phenomenon is undoubtedly more pronounced
time. Thus, the labor market has not experienced radical change over re-
cent years with regard to job stability.
Id.
261 The failure of the young to accurately assess the importance of saving for re-
tirement is sometimes described as myopic behavior. "In common sense terms, myo-
pia is an irrational preference for present consumption over future consumption. In
economic terms, myopia is a discount rate that is irrationally . . . higher than the
[prevailing] interest rate." Weiss, supra note 60, at 1298. The effects of an irrationally
high discount rate are compounded by a lengthy period during which that rate is
applied, so that myopic behavior will have its most exaggerated effects on the young.
262 See McGILL ET AL., supra note 164, at 354.
[O]verall measures of participants' knowledge of how their retirement pro-
grams are working is [sic] disappointing.
... In assessing covered workers' knowledge about their defined contri-
bution plans, [the findings indicate] that only about half of those workers
whose employers contribute to the plans believed that [the employers
contributed]....
... [D]ata . . . suggest that retirement plan participants know little
about their plans.
Id.
Professor Kim recently reported data on workers' knowledge of the "at will" con-
dition that applies to almost all non-unionized employment. (The at will condition of
an employment relationship is a far more simple and immediate component of the
conditions of employment than the retirement plan and its extensive terms and con-
ditions.) Kim concluded that the "data reveal a striking level of misunderstanding
among respondents of the most basic legal rules governing the employment relation-
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among young employees. Young, and hence, short-tenure employees
will generally attach a low value to mandated additional retirement
benefits.
Because short-tenure employees place a low valuation on addi-
tional retirement benefits, the full costs of those benefits may not be
shifted to these employees. Prior to the vesting mandate, short-tenure
employees bore the costs of retirement benefits that accrued only to
those short-tenure employees who remained employed for a sufficient
period to become vested in the benefits that accrued while they were
unvested-that is, those short-tenure employees who became long-
tenure employees. (The benefits that accrued to short-tenure employ-
ees who terminated prior to vesting were forfeited, so there was no
cost for these benefits.) After the vesting mandate, all short-tenure
employees receive vested rights, so the costs of their retirement bene-
fits increase. These additional costs cannot be shifted to the short-
tenure employees nor to the employer's customers or owners. 263 In
order to eliminate the costs, the mandated benefits must be elimi-
nated from the retirement plan.
Elimination of the mandated benefits for short-tenure employees
will reduce the cost of contributions that must be paid to the retire-
ment plan. This cost reduction will return the total cost of compensa-
tion for short-tenure employees to a competitive level. In general
terms, over time and so long as retirement plan sponsorship and ben-
efit levels are voluntary, a vesting mandate cannot compel short-ten-
ure employees to accept a larger proportion of their compensation in
the form of retirement benefits than the proportion that they will ac-
ship." Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information, 83 CopRmLL L. REV. 105,
133 (1997).
263 The full costs of mandated additional benefits for short-tenure employees can-
not be shifted to them because short-tenure employees will generally not place a high
value on retirement benefits. See supra note 261 and accompanying text. If a particu-
lar employer's short-tenure employees did place a high value on retirement benefits,
then the employer's retirement plan would voluntarily provide retirement benefits to
those employees. By definition, mandated benefits are provided only to employees
who do not voluntarily choose benefits in lieu of wage compensation. Since short-
tenure employees who receive mandated benefits are by definition short-tenure em-
ployees who do not voluntarily choose retirement benefits, it follows that these em-
ployees under-value the retirement benefits. Hence the full cost of those benefits may
not be shifted to them.
As noted above, employers will not be able to shift the costs of retirement bene-
fits to customers, and the owners of the employer will not accept lower profits in
order to pay short-tenure employees compensation in excess of market rates. See
supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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cept voluntarily. 264 In short, mandated vesting in a voluntary retire-
ment plan system cannot cause employees to accept more retirement
benefits than they want.
B. Reduced Retirement Benefits for Plan Participants Generally
In our voluntary retirement plan system, with the existing nondis-
crimination regime, mandated vesting will ultimately reduce the level
of retirement benefits provided by a retirement plan to its participants
generally. As explained above, the vesting mandate will not result in
short-tenure employees accepting the substitution of retirement bene-
fits for wages in their compensation packages. Instead, a retirement
plan that faces a mandate to provide benefits to short-tenure employ-
ees will find a way to eliminate those benefits that the law would ex-
tend to short-tenure employees. Generally the short-tenure
employees will also be non-highly compensated employees; the non-
discrimination rules will then cause the elimination of benefits accru-
ing for other participants in the plan.
The analysis begins from the proposition that short-tenure em-
ployees will be unwilling to accept the substitution of mandated bene-
fits for wages, so that the retirement plan must eliminate the
mandated benefits. As an initial iteration of the process of eliminat-
ing the cost of mandated benefits, consider a reduction in the rate of
benefit accrual only for the benefits of short-tenure employees. 265 All
short-tenure employees would receive vested retirement benefits, but
they would vest in a smaller amount of benefit.266 However, since the
264 These effects imply that, over the long run, a vesting mandate cannot cause an
increase in the contributions that are paid to a retirement plan.
265 For example, a unit benefit pension plan could amend its benefit formula to
provide that a participant would accrue benefits at the rate of three percent of com-
pensation for the first 14 years of plan participation and at 25% of compensation for
the fifteenth and subsequent years of participation. Apart from possible violation of
the nondiscrimination rules, this benefit structure is entirely legal for a defined con-
tribution plan. This type of benefit structure in a defined benefit plan, however,
would violate the anti-backloading provisions of the accrual rules. See supra note 199
and accompanying text.
266 The short-tenure employees accrue benefits at a lower rate than prior to the
vesting mandate. But all short-tenure employees become vested in this reduced bene-
fit. In the absence of the vesting mandate, benefits accrued for all employees at a
higher rate, but only those employees who remained employed, and who became
long-tenure employees, would have received vested rights in this larger accrued bene-
fit. At this step in the process of adjustment to mandated vesting, it would appear that
the vesting mandate would have the effect of simply redistributing retirement benefits
away from those short-tenure employees who ultimately became long-tenure employ-
ees, and toward short-tenure employees generally. The benefit reductions are in-
curred by those short-tenure employees who become long-tenure employees, but who
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short-tenure employees are disproportionately non-highly compen-
sated employees, the nondiscrimination rules effectively forbid a re-
duction in the benefit accrual rate that is specifically targeted at the
benefits of short-tenure employees. A reduction in the rate of benefit
accrual for short-tenure employees will disproportionately reduce the
average rate of benefit accrual for the non-highly compensated em-
ployee group.267 In order to avoid disqualification, the nondiscrimi-
nation rules will then compel the plan to reduce the rate of benefit
accrual for highly compensated employees to a rate appropriately
comparable to the rate for the non-highly compensated employees.
This is the first step toward reduced retirement benefits: the lower
rate for short-tenure employees compels a lower rate for highly com-
pensated employees.
The next step in the adjustment process extends the lower bene-
fit rate from the highly compensated employee group to all long-ten-
ure employees. If the plan must reduce the benefit accrual rate of
highly compensated employees, normal retirement plan design con-
siderations dictate that the benefit rate be reduced for the remaining
non-highly compensated employees whose benefit rate had not al-
ready been reduced-that is, the group of non-highly compensated
employees who are also long-tenure employees. As a general plan de-
sign proposition, retirement benefits are more valuable to more
highly compensated employees, 2 68 so retirement plans usually will not
provide a higher rate of benefits to a less highly compensated em-
ployee group.2 69 Generally, when a plan reduces the rate of benefits
for short-tenure employees, the plan will simply reduce the benefit
rate for all non-highly compensated employees. Thus, the need to
never make up the reduction in rate of benefit accrual that occurred while they were
short-tenure employees.
267 When short-tenure employees' compensation comprises a greater proportion
of the total of compensation of the non-highly compensated employee group than of
the total compensation of the highly compensated employee group, this benefit
formula results in a discriminatory accrual of benefit and consequent disqualification
of the plan.
268 See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
269 It would be possible to reduce the benefit accrual rate solely for highly com-
pensated employees; this would comply with the nondiscrimination rules since the
average benefit rate for highly compensated employees would not exceed the average
rate for non-highly compensated employees even with the reduced accrual rate for
short-tenure employees. However, this would result in non-highly compensated em-
ployees who are long-tenure employees accruing benefits at a rate higher than highly
compensated employees. Since retirement benefits are most valuable to highly com-
pensated employees, this would be an inefficient design for the employer's retirement
plan.
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reduce the benefit rate for short-tenure employees effectively causes a
reduction in the benefit rate of the entire group of non-highly com-
pensated employees.
In summary, the inability of a sponsoring employer to shift the
costs of the additional mandated retirement benefits for short-tenure
employees to those short-tenure employees will compel a reduction in
the rate at which short-tenure employees accrue benefits. This reduc-
tion in benefit rate will cause a reduction in the level of retirement
benefits provided to all participants in the employer's retirement
plan. 270 It is a race to the bottom that starts with the benefits of short-
tenure employees, that legally must include the benefits of highly
compensated employees, and that carries down the benefits of non-
highly compensated employees.
C. Suppression of Retirement Plan Sponsorship
The combined regulatory regime of mandated vesting and the
nondiscrimination rules suppresses the number and coverage of re-
tirement plans in our voluntary system. A sponsoring employer and a
covered group of employees will choose to include retirement bene-
fits in the employees' compensation packages so long as the plan pro-
vides added value for the employer and the plan participants. A plan
provides value for the sponsoring employer by attracting the type of
employees who will be most productive for the employer, bonding
those employees to the employer, and facilitating the retirement of
employees at a time when their contribution to the productivity of the
workforce may begin to decline. A plan provides value to participants
by reducing income tax liabilities, providing efficiencies in the invest-
ment of retirement savings, and preserving retirement savings for re-
tirement purposes. All of these elements of added value depend upon
the plan providing retirement benefits to those employees who place
the greatest value upon retirement benefits. It is the long-tenure em-
270 In this respect, the operation of the mandated vesting regime is very similar to
the effect of the nondiscrimination regime. The nondiscrimination regime ties to-
gether the levels of retirement benefits provided to non-highly and highly compen-
sated employees; the highly compensated employees may not receive retirement
benefits that are impermissibly larger than those provided to the non-highly compen-
sated employees. Similarly, mandated vesting provides short-tenure employees With
retirement benefits that are vested to the same degree as the benefits of long-tenure
employees. By applying equal vesting to the benefits of both short-tenure employees
and long-tenure employees, mandated vesting ultimately has the effect of limiting the
retirement benefits of long-tenure employees to a level that is acceptable to short-
tenure employees. The level of benefits for long-tenure employees is tied to the level
of benefits accruing for short-tenure employees.
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ployees and highly compensated employees who will value retirement
benefits most highly.271
The combined regulatory regime drastically limits the ability of a
retirement plan to provide benefits to long-tenure employees. Man-
dated vesting compels a retirement plan to provide retirement bene-
fits to short-tenure employees, and the implementation of mandated
vesting necessitates the close regulation of plan participation, benefit
accrual, crediting of service, and time of benefit payment. Then the
nondiscrimination regime levels the effects of the mandated vesting
regime across all or substantial segments of the employer's workforce.
The discriminatory benefits requirement attempts to extend benefits
to these additional participants. The mandated vesting regime com-
pels a retirement plan to provide benefits to participants who would
not have received benefits in a system that left vesting unregulated.
The nondiscrimination regime then compels a retirement plan to
provide reasonably comparable benefits to employees who would not
even have been plan participants in an unregulated system.
Mandated vesting and the nondiscrimination rules substantially
reduce the range of voluntary choice in retirement plan design.272 By
limiting voluntarism in retirement plan design, the combined regula-
tory regime greatly limits the extent to which an employer and its em-
ployees may tailor the compensation packages of different employees
to satisfy their differing preferences for retirement benefits and other
forms of compensation. In the long run, the regulatory regime has no
effect upon the retirement benefits of short-tenure employees and
non-highly compensated employees, but it reduces the benefits of
long-tenure employees and highly compensated employees. These
are the employees who value retirement benefits most highly. Since a
plan is compelled to provide a lower level of benefits to the employees
who prefer those benefits, the plan will add less value for the sponsor-
ing employer and participants than it would have added in the ab-
sence of the legal mandates.273 Since retirement plans generally will
provide lesser value to sponsoring employers and plan participants,
there will be a reduction in the number of plans and the level of re-
271 See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
272 In a voluntary retirement plan system, mandated vesting and its supporting
rules create much more standardized retirement plans, more of a package deal. The
employer and employees are faced with much more of a take-it or leave-it choice.
273 See IpPoLrro, supra note 57, at 177.
Eliminating the regulatory burden on private pension plans confers eco-
nomic efficiencies. First, firms will face lower direct administrative costs of
enforcing discrimination rules. Second, low discounters will not face artifi-
cial restrictions on their savings rates (as in 401(k) plans) if others in the
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tirement benefits provided by them. Regulation necessarily implies
this reduction in the number of plans and the benefits provided by
them.
Retirement plan regulation increasingly offers employers and em-
ployees a take-it or leave-it package deal. Narrower alternative choices
about employee participation, vesting, accrual, and payment of bene-
fits imply that fewer plans will offer value added for different employ-
ers and different workforces. When an employer and its employees
desire to include retirement benefits as a part of employees' compen-
sation, they must consider not only the employees who will voluntarily
choose to save for retirement, but also the short-tenure employees
and a sufficient number of non-highly compensated employees. If the
plan cannot design coverage groups and benefit levels that will pro-
vide benefits that have a value to the entire group of participants
which is at least equal to the after-tax cost of the benefits, then the
plan will simply be "uneconomic." If the plan is previously existing, it
will be terminated; if the employer and employees were considering
retirement benefits, the design constraints imply that the plan will
never be created.
As a matter of historic fact, the 1974 enactment of ERISA's inten-
sive regulation of the retirement plan system coincided with a flatten-
ing of the growth of that system. In 1940, 15% of private sector
workers were covered by a retirement plan; in 1970 the percentage of
coverage peaked at 45%.274 Since 1970 coverage has not expanded,
firm do not wish to save. Third, pension firms will be allowed to craft their
pension plans to attain the highest value added across their workforces.
Id.
274 Private retirement plan coverage peaked in 1970, and has subsequently
declined.
Private Sector Pension Coverage:
Private sector workers Full-time private sector
Year covered (%) workers covered (%)
1940 15 % 17 %
1945 19 21
1950 25 29
1955 32 37
1960 41 47
1965 43 49
1970 45 52
1979 43 50
1983 41 47
1988 42 48
1993 43
SOURCE: Estimates for 1940-70 were calculated by Belier and Lawrence (1992) and include only
nonagricultural workers. Estimates for 1979-93 are calculated from pension supplements to the
Current Population Survey, and do not exclude agricultural employees.
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and by many measures, it has declined; in 1993, only forty-three per-
cent of workers were covered.275 Of course many factors influence
the expansion and contraction of retirement plan coverage, including
the level of marginal income tax rates faced by participants, employ-
ment patterns by industry type, the fraction of the workforce that be-
longs to labor unions, needs and preferences for part-time and
flexible time employment and for shorter-term and as-needed employ-
ment, and general economic conditions.276 Nonetheless, the regula-
tory burden on private retirement plans is significant among the
factors associated with changes in the private retirement plan system
since 1974.277 The regulatory burden can be quantified in one di-
mension: expanded regulation increases administrative costs incurred
DoRsEY, supra note 81, at 16 (citing DANmLJ. BELER & HELEN LAWRENCE, Trends in
Pivate Pension Plan Coverage, in TRENDS IN PENsIoNs (John Turner & Daniel Beller
eds., U.S. Dept. of Labor 1992)); see also William E. Even & David A. Macpherson, Why
Did Male Pension Coverage Decline in the 1980's?, 47 INDus. & LAB. REL. REV. 439, 439
(1994) ("During the 1980's, pension coverage among men in the private sector labor
force fell and real contributions to pension plans by private sector employers fell
36%."); Bloom, sura note 45, at 539.
During the 1980's... the upward trend in pension coverage reversed itself.
Household and establishment surveys provide evidence of modest to sizeable
declines in the proportion of workers covered by pensions, with considera-
ble variation across demographic groups. National income and product ac-
count data also reveal a sharp fall from 1980 to 1989 in the proportion of
total'mnployee compensation taking the form of employer contributions to
retirement plans (from 5.8 percent to 3.9 percent...
Id.
Bloom and Freeman correlate about half of the decline in pension coverage with
the fall in unionization, decline in real earnings, and to lesser degrees, changes in
industry, occupation, firm size and other employee factors. They have no empirical
explanation for the remaining half of the coverage decline. While they believe that
the regulatory burden has increased the costs of retirement plan sponsorship, they do
not believe that there is a theoretical reason why increased costs would be an impor-
tant factor in explaining the fall in pension coverage. See id. at 542, 543; see also
McDoNNELL, supra note 5, at 81.
Employment-based retirement and savings plan participation among full-
time employees has fallen in recent years. In 1986, 91% of all full-time work-
ers in medium and large establishments participated in a retirement or
other savings plan, compared with 78% in 1993. Likewise, participation
rates among full-time employees of small private establishments fell from
47% in 1992 to 42% in 1994.
Id. (citations omitted).
275 See BELLER & LAWERENCE, supra note 274.
276 See generally Bloom, supra note 45, at 542-44; Even & Macpherson, supra note
274, at 539-45.
277 The oft-cited Report of the N.Y. State Bar Assn Special Comm. on Pension Simplifica-
tion concluded,
1999]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
by retirement plans. Data demonstrate that the administrative costs of
retirement plan sponsorship have increased substantially since 1974,
particularly for plans with fewer than 100 participants and for defined
benefit plans. 278 Apart from financially measurable administrative
costs, the regulatory burden consumes a sponsoring employer's time
and attention. These added costs decrease the value of retirement
plan sponsorship, which suppresses plan coverage.27 9
The regulatory burden is particularly problematic for small em-
ployers, those employing fewer than 100 employees. 280 This group of
employers is very significant; it employs about forty-one percent of all
private-sector wage and salary workers.281 There is a substantial gap in
retirement plan coverage between small and large employers:
Employer size Participation rate*
Fewer than 25 workers 15.4%
25-99 workers 36.0
100 or more workers 66.2
*Percentage of all workers participating in an employer-sponsored plan 28 2
The most important reason for this low coverage is that these em-
ployees prefer wages and other forms of fringe benefits to retirement
benefits, but the second most significant reason is the regulatory bur-
den on a small employer's retirement plan.283 Interestingly, among
other reasons for not sponsoring a retirement plan that were specifi-
The legislative process by which the federal regulation of pensions has devel-
oped ... has produced a body of law that is both too complicated and too
changing.... The process must be halted lest the private pension system be
destroyed, with devastating results for the retirement security of the Nation's
workers and their families.
ALVIN D. LURIE, N.Y. BAR Ass'N, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PENSION SIM-
PLIFICATION, reprinted in 8 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 75, 75 (1998).
278 See McGILL ET AL., supra note 164, at 355-58; KELLY OLSEN &JACK VAN DERHEI,
DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLAN DOMINANCE GROWS ACROSS SECTORS AND EMPLOYER
SIZES, WHILE MEGA DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS REMAIN STRONG: WHERE WE ARE AND
WHERE WE ARE GOING 13-14 (Employee Benefit Research Institute Issue Brief No.
190, Oct. 1997).
279 Professor Zelinsky has suggested that as much as 50% of the decline in retire-
ment plan participation during the 1980s can be reasonably attributed to the regula-
tory burden. See Zelinsky, Tax Policy, supra note 41, at 597.
280 See PAUL YAKOBOSRI & PAMIELA OSTUw, SMALL EMPLOYERS AND THE CHALLENGE
OF SPONSORING A RETIREMENT PLAN: RESULTS OF THE 1998 SMALL EMPLOYER RETIRE-
MENT SURVEY 3 (Employee Benefit Research Institute Issue Brief No. 202, Feb. 1998).
281 See id.
282 Id
283 See id. at 6-7.
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cally cited by small employers, forty-two percent mentioned the vest-
ing requirements and the resulting larger fraction of plan
contributions being paid to short-tenure employees. 284 For this large
group of potential retirement plan sponsors, retirement plan regula-
tion, particularly the mandated vesting regime and the nondiscrimina-
tion rules, provide a powerful explanation for the omission of
retirement benefits from the employees' compensation packages.
V. SOME POLICY IMPLICATIONS
A. Can Voluntary Retirement Plans and Mandated Vesting Coexist?
Our voluntary private retirement plan system can and does coex-
ist with mandated vesting. The system has been subject to mandated
vesting for twenty-five years, yet there are still 702,000 voluntary pri-
vate retirement plans providing retirement benefits to about forty-
three percent of private sector workers. However, the retirement plan
system is very different than it would be if mandated vesting had never
been enacted. Mandated vesting probably has reduced the fraction of
workers covered by private retirement plans and the benefits that
long-tenure employees receive.
Mandated vesting has little effect upon the benefits of short-ten-
ure employees because of the voluntary nature of private retirement
plan sponsorship. Mandated vesting cannot and does not increase the
retirement benefits of the short-tenure employees, who are the in-
tended beneficiaries of the mandate. The cost of mandated retire-
ment benefits must be shifted to the short-tenure employees by means
of reductions in wages. But short-tenure employees generally are un-
willing to accept retirement benefits in lieu of wages. Since retire-
ment plan sponsorship is voluntary, and the level of benefits provided
is voluntary, retirement plans respond to mandated vesting by reduc-
ing the level of benefits that accrue for short-tenure employees. This
response returns retirement benefits for short-tenure employees to
approximately the level that existed prior to the mandate.
In the long run, in the absence of mandated vesting, more em-
ployees would be covered by retirement plans, and long-tenure em-
ployees would receive larger retirement benefits. Mandated vesting
constrains the flexibility of retirement plan design to provide retire-
ment benefits to those employees who value the benefits most highly,
the long-tenure employees. Fewer retirement plans can be created or
continued that will provide benefits to employees who value the bene-
fits at least as highly as the wages that they must forego to pay for the
284 See id at 6.
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benefits. Since fewer plans are sponsored, a smaller fraction of work-
ers is covered than would be the case in the absence of mandated
vesting. The plans that can be continued in the face of the mandate
are pushed toward providing only that level of retirement benefits
that will be acceptable to short-tenure employees. This is a lower level
of benefits than long-tenure employees would choose. If the con-
straints of mandated vesting were removed, the level of benefits pro-
vided to long-tenure employees would increase.
Mandated vesting is a destructive policy when measured against
its effect on aggregate retirement benefits. The retirement benefits of
short-tenure employees are not enhanced, but plan coverage is sup-
pressed, and the benefits of long-tenure employees are reduced. If
aggregate retirement benefits were the only standard, the conclusion
would be clear: mandated vesting should be repealed, and retirement
plan vesting should be deregulated.
B. Should Retirement Plan Vesting Be Deregulated?
It is premature to conclude that mandated vesting should be re-
pealed. Mandated vesting cannot be judged solely by its effects upon
aggregate retirement benefits. There are at least two other important
justifications for regulation of vesting. If one makes the (very dubi-
ous) assumption that the nondiscrimination regime deserves to be
sustained or improved, then regulation of vesting may be justified as a
necessary element of that regime. And regulation of vesting may be
necessary to achieve an acceptable level of protection of employee in-
terests in retirement benefits.
The nondiscrimination regime attempts to channel some portion
of a retirement plan's tax subsidy toward payment of the costs of bene-
fits for non-highly compensated employees. It does this by requiring a
plan to accrue benefits for non-highly compensated employees that
are reasonably comparable to the benefits accrued for highly compen-
sated employees. However, in order for non-highly compensated em-
ployees to actually receive retirement benefits, these employees must
achieve some degree of vesting under the plan. (In the absence of
vesting, all of the benefits of non-highly compensated employees
could be forfeited and reallocated to highly compensated employees.)
The current nondiscrimination regime essentially assumes that the
present vesting mandates provide sufficiently nondiscriminatory bene-
fits to non-highly compensated employees. If the regulation of vesting
periods were substantially relaxed, some plans would adopt longer-
deferred vesting. In order to avoid discrimination in benefits actually
paid out, it would be necessary either to regulate vesting as a distinct
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subject within the nondiscrimination regime, or alternatively, to
broaden nondiscrimination testing to include testing of benefits actu-
ally received by non-highly compensated employees.
However, the nondiscrimination norm as presently implemented
cannot provide a logical or coherent justification for mandated vest-
ing. The present nondiscrimination regime does not systematically
channel the tax subsidy to non-highly compensated employees. The
effect of the nondiscrimination regime on any given retirement plan
depends upon the proportions of highly and non-highly compensated
employees participating in that plan. The operation of the nondis-
crimination regime is disconnected from its intended purposes. Since
the present nondiscrimination regime is itself dubious, it cannot pro-
vide a sound justification for mandated vesting.
Mandated vesting might also be justified as necessary to achieve a
minimum level of employee security in retirement benefits. This can
be understood as a form of consumer protection, and the arguments
might run in the following directions: workers need to be protected
from accepting retirement benefits that turn out to be illusory, fraud-
ulent, or excessively vulnerable to employer abuse; retirement bene-
fits that remain forfeitable for some excessively long period are
unreasonably dangerous to the financial health of employees, and
should be outlawed. These concerns might support some regulation
of vesting. And there are certainly reasoned explanations to be made
for the full range of possible vesting rules. Immediate full vesting
might be mandated on grounds that any period of forfeitability cre-
ates a significant danger to employees, and that no material social ad-
vantages are offered by forfeitable retirement benefits. At the other
extreme, unregulated vesting might be justified on grounds that it will
provide a wider range of choice to employers and employees, who will
then choose forms of retirement benefits that maximize their mutual
welfare. The best choice of vesting rules probably lies somewhere be-
tween these polar positions; it is unclear what that choice should be.
But wherever choice of mandated vesting rules is made, one must
never lose sight of the fact that regulation of vesting will necessarily
suppress the total amount of retirement benefits provided by a volun-
tary retirement plan system.
Perhaps the typical patterns of job tenures have something to
teach us about retirement plan vesting. During the job-shopping
phase of their careers, younger workers are likely to sample several
jobs with tenures as short as three or four years. Little is gained from
mandating vesting for job-shoppers. (In that vein, little is gained by
requiring retirement plan participation for job-shoppers.) After job
shopping, workers settle into ajob that typically will last fifteen years
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or more; obviously most workers can have, at most, two such long-
tenure jobs. If vesting is to be regulated (and the case for regulation
remains unproven), a worker with at least fifteen years of service
should be covered by mandated vesting. Perhaps the initial version of
mandated vesting enacted in ERISA-vesting after fifteen years of ser-
vice-reflects a sounder policy. And perhaps the last twenty-five years
of incremental acceleration of vesting reflect politicians' needs for
short-term "accomplishments" rather than reasoned judgments about
the best interests of American workers.
CONCLUSION
There is a strong theoretical case suggesting that mandated vest-
ing suppresses the provision of retirement benefits in our voluntary
retirement plan system. Empirical data is consistent with this theory.
This conjunction of theory and fact raises a prima facie case for the
exercise of caution before another increment of mandated vesting is
imposed on the private retirement plan system. Proponents of man-
dated vesting should sustain a burden of persuasion that further accel-
eration of retirement plan vesting will in fact improve the availability,
security, or magnitude of retirement benefits of workers generally.
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